Chokepoints: Panama, Suez, Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz in Transit Counts
The Red Sea corridor is back above its pre-Gulf-crisis level, Hormuz is not, and Panama waits on water
Transit counts at the world's four chokepoints now split two ways: the Red Sea corridor through Bab el-Mandeb and Suez has climbed back above its pre-Gulf-crisis level, a low bar set deep in the Houthi crisis, Hormuz runs at a war-time fraction of its old flow under a rising tempo of attacks, and Panama's count is set by water, with the dry season still ahead.

| ID | Statement | p | Made on | Resolves by | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLM-2026-376 | The total non-Iranian-linked transits of the Strait of Hormuz for the latest complete week reported in the first Lloyd's List Intelligence Strait of Hormuz Brief published on or after 24 November 2026. | 70 to 210 transits (central 120) | 2026-10-11 | 2026-12-08 | Locked | |
| CLM-2026-377 | The preliminary weekly count of Bab el-Mandeb transits in the first Lloyd's List Intelligence Red Sea Brief published on or after 24 November 2026 is 257 or more, at or above its January 2026 weekly average. | 0.65 | 2026-10-11 | 2026-12-08 | Locked | |
| CLM-2026-378 | The weekly count of Suez Canal transits in the first Lloyd's List Intelligence Red Sea Brief published on or after 24 November 2026 is 270 or more. | 0.60 | 2026-10-11 | 2026-12-08 | Locked | |
| CLM-2026-379 | Total daily transit slots across the Neopanamax and Panamax locks of the Panama Canal in effect on 24 November 2026 are 33 or more. | 0.70 | 2026-10-11 | 2026-12-01 | Locked |
A claim is entered in the brief's own words and carries its publication date and the day it entered the ledger: the register's briefs on 8 September 2026, when the standard was first applied; the forward benchmark on the day it was locked. It resolves only against a dated public source. The scoring rule is on the Methodology page.
The war that closed Hormuz to normal trade did not close the world's other chokepoints; it rerouted traffic through them. The Red Sea corridor has recovered beyond its January level because container carriers are returning to Suez, while crude tankers using the Red Sea have thinned under the Houthi campaign against Saudi-linked shipping; that January level is a low bar, since Suez traffic remains far below where it stood before the Houthi campaign began. Hormuz remains open in name and thin in counts: its non-Iranian-linked traffic is rising slowly from a very low base while the attack tempo climbs. Panama is the one chokepoint governed by rain rather than war, and its slots are set by the level of its lake. By the late November readings we expect Hormuz to stay far below its pre-war flow, the Red Sea corridor to hold above January, and Panama to keep its current slots, with each of these views tested by a claim below.
Open-source intelligence current through 11 October 2026. The publication carries a 10-entry source registry, explicit confidence tags, limitations, and deterministic resolution rules for its forward claims.
The source tiers, estimative language, forward-claim rule, scoring, and corrections record are public on the Methodology page.