Venezuela After Maduro
The Reversible Opening: Sanctions Recalibration, a Pledged Asset Base, and the Essequibo Tail Risk

| ID | Statement | p | Made on | Resolves by | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLM-2026-148 | Baseline is the most probable 90 to 180 day path. | 0.65 | 2026-06-16 | 2026-12-13 | Locked |
A claim is entered in the brief's own words and carries its publication date and the day it entered the ledger: the register's briefs on 8 September 2026, when the standard was first applied; the forward benchmark on the day it was locked. It resolves only against a dated public source. The scoring rule is on the Methodology page.
The report is built on open-source intelligence cited through a numbered 30-entry source registry spanning government primaries (OFAC general licenses, a US Department of Energy fact sheet, CRS material), law-firm sanctions analyses, wire and business press (Reuters, CNBC, Bloomberg), and energy consultancies and banks (Rystad, Wood Mackenzie, Goldman Sachs). US and Venezuelan government statements are used as claim sources for position and intent, not as proof of outcome. Six numbered key judgments each carry an explicit confidence level tied to cited evidence, and every section closes with a confidence-graded assessment and rationale.
Limitations: Single-sourced figures are flagged, government statements are claim sources only, and the assessment is PERISHABLE with a two- to six-week shelf life given the OFAC, ICJ, recognition, and Citgo-auction clocks.
Estimative language in this report follows the firm’s published standard: judgments carry HIGH, MODERATE, or LOW confidence, and each carries its rationale in the full report. The framework, source tiers, and anti-fabrication perimeter are public on the methodology page. Corrections issue as numbered addenda.