

PUBLISHED MARKET RESEARCH

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An extension announced in words, instruments due to lapse on 9
November, a precedent of late and backdated paper, and two
summits agreed as a pair

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Summit Season: APEC Shenzhen, G20 Miami and the Truce to 10 January

An extension announced in words, instruments due to lapse on 9 November, a precedent of late and backdated paper, and two summits agreed as a pair

The US and China truce will most likely survive summit season by rollover, not by a larger bargain. The extension to January was announced by ministers and endorsed by the leaders, but the US instruments that carry it still end on 9 November, last year's equivalents were published days after their effective date and backdated, a new Section 301 duty on Chinese goods has applied since July, and the two summits that must carry the truce, Shenzhen and Miami, were agreed as a reciprocal pair.

Our judgment is that the truce holds through APEC Shenzhen and G20 Miami and is rolled forward again near its January end date, without a broad trade package. The port-fee suspension and the BIS Affiliates Rule suspension both still end on 9 November 2026, no extending notice appeared in the Federal Register by 14 October, and last year the equivalent notices were published two and three days after they took effect, with retroactive effect. We therefore expect the extension to be papered around or shortly after 9 November, possibly retroactively, and we do not treat a short gap cured in that way as a break. The Washington summit traded small, reversible concessions and left chip and rare-earth controls in place, and the Section 301 forced-labour duty now in force sits outside anything the truce is known to suspend. Operators should plan for continuity, expect a few days of legal uncertainty after 9 November, and hold contingencies until the new dates are published on both sides.

HEADLINE INDICATORS

10 January 2027 ANNOUNCED END DATE OF THE EXTENDED TRUCE	9 November 2026 SCHEDULED END OF THE BIS AFFILIATES RULE SUSPENSION	12 and 13 November 2025 PUBLICATION OF LAST YEAR'S BIS AND USTR SUSPENSIONS, BOTH EFFECTIVE 10 NOVEMBER 2025
18 to 19 November 2026 APEC LEADERS' MEETING IN SHENZHEN	12.5 percent SECTION 301 FORCED-LABOUR DUTY ON CHINESE GOODS FROM 24 JULY 2026	14 billion USD TAIWAN ARMS PACKAGE ON HOLD

DOCUMENT CONTROL

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CENTRAL JUDGMENT

Summit season is designed to keep the truce alive, not to transform it. The two leaders agreed their trips as a pair: Trump to Shenzhen as APEC guest, Xi to Miami as G20 guest, and each trip is the condition of the other. The weak point is execution, not intent. The extension rests on statements, the instruments that carry it still name November dates, and the agencies showed last year that they publish such notices after the deadline and backdate them, so the 9 November date is a point of legal uncertainty for a few days rather than a cliff. The US side of the bargain has also changed: the emergency tariffs were struck down and replaced in July by a Section 301 duty on Chinese goods, so the truce now matters mainly for the port fees, the Affiliates Rule and China's rare-earth suspension, and a tariff move under the new duty is a live lever outside it. Washington's restraint on the frozen Taiwan arms package and its handling of Chinese buyers of Iranian oil are the two places where a security or sanctions shock could strain the truce before Miami.

KEY JUDGMENTS

KJ-1	The truce will most likely be papered to the new January date around or shortly after the November instruments lapse, possibly with retroactive effect and possibly in narrow terms, and a gap of a few days cured in that way would cost little. Last year the BIS and USTR suspensions were published in the Federal Register two and three days after the date they took effect, no extending notice had appeared by 14 October, and the extension was announced by the Treasury Secretary and endorsed in both leaders' readouts.	MODERATE
KJ-2	The Washington summit produced a managed holding pattern rather than a new bargain: tariff lists and purchases moved, while chip and rare-earth controls did not. Nikkei Asia reports the matched 30 billion USD figure and the extension, the product lists and the coal pledge rest on Fortune alone, and Fortune and the CSIS takeaways separately report no movement on the controls, with CSIS analysts expecting any larger deal only after the two summits.	MODERATE
KJ-3	Trump is likely to travel to Shenzhen and meet Xi there, possibly only for a bilateral rather than the full leaders' sessions, and Shenzhen is more likely to yield statements on dialogue and purchases than a broad trade package; the main risk is the post-midterm calendar, a contested result, a funding fight or a further escalation of the US war with Iran in the fortnight after the vote. Trump has already travelled to Beijing this year, the Shenzhen trip is the condition for Xi's reciprocal trip to Miami, and CSIS analysts describe both trips as confirmed.	MODERATE
KJ-4	Xi is likely to attend the Miami summit in person if Trump travels to Shenzhen and meets him there, and unlikely to if Trump does not, which makes his attendance a little better than an even call before Shenzhen. The two trips were agreed as a pair, while Xi skipped the last G20 and a narrow host-set agenda at the host's own resort with a member excluded lowers the cost of sending a deputy.	LOW

KJ-5

If the truce breaks between the summits, meaning a lapse not cured within a fortnight or a new measure that reverses a truce concession, the likeliest form is a lapse of the Affiliates Rule or port-fee suspension left uncured, followed by Iran-linked sanctions on a large state-owned Chinese buyer or bank, then congressional pressure over the frozen Taiwan arms package, then a US tariff move under the Section 301 duty, with a Taiwan sale notified on the administration's own initiative least likely. The Affiliates Rule returns by default unless a notice is published, the April sanctions on a major Chinese refinery strained but did not break the truce, and Congress has no ready vehicle to force a sale, but this ranking rests on press reporting and the rule's own terms rather than on any stated policy.

LOW

KEY STATISTICS

61 days Length of the announced extension from 10 November 2026 to 10 January 2027, 2026-09-23¹	30 billion USD Value of nonsensitive goods each side named for lower tariffs, 2026-09-24²	77 goods Items on the US tariff cut list, 2026-09-28³	1619 categories Product categories on the Chinese tariff cut list, 2026-09-28³
10 million tons Annual Chinese coal imports for two years that the US says China agreed, 2026-09-28³	25 million tonnes Annual Chinese purchase commitment for US soybeans through 2028, 2026-09-09⁹	10 percent Section 122 surcharge on all imports including Chinese goods from 24 February to 24 July 2026, 2026-02-21⁸	12.5 percent Section 301 forced-labour duty on Chinese goods in force from 24 July 2026, 2026-07-24²⁰
400000 barrels Daily crude processing capacity of the Chinese refinery the US sanctioned over Iranian oil, 2026-04-24²⁵	14 billion USD Value of the Taiwan arms package reported as stalled, 2026-09-29¹⁸		

Scope and method

METHOD

This paper reads public reporting on the September state visit to Washington and the truce extension announced there, the Federal Register texts that set the November dates for the reciprocal tariff suspension, the port-fee suspension and the BIS Affiliates Rule suspension together with their publication dates, a search of the Federal Register run on 14 October 2026 for any notice extending them, the Federal Register notice and analysis of the Section 301 forced-labour duties that replaced the Section 122 surcharge, reporting on the stalled Taiwan arms package and on US sanctions against Chinese buyers of Iranian oil, the CSIS takeaways from the Washington summit, and published analysis of the US G20 presidency and the APEC calendar. Facts are taken only from the sources in the registry, at their tier; sources off the firm's list are marked. Where a public legal text that should exist has not been found, the gap is stated as unknown rather than inferred. Probabilities are the author's own judgment. No client-attributable material is used.

SECTION 01 • ASSESSMENT

An extension announced, not yet on paper

The deadline moved in words before it moved in law, and the precedent is paper that arrives late and is backdated.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on 23 September 2026, after talks with the Chinese vice premier, that the United States and China would extend their trade truce to 10 January 2027.¹

CSIS analysts wrote on 28 September 2026 that the summit extended the truce for a few months, and that the leaders' readouts showed both intending to attend the November APEC meeting in China and the December G20 summit in Miami.¹⁷

The USTR notice suspended the Section 301 actions on China's maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors from 12:01 am on 10 November 2025 through 11:59 pm Eastern time on 9 November 2026, and was published in the Federal Register on 13 November 2025, three days after the suspension took effect.¹⁵

The BIS rule suspending the Affiliates Rule for one year was published in the Federal Register on 12 November 2025, two days after its 10 November 2025 effective date, with the suspension set to end on 9 November 2026 absent a future extension and the rule returning into the Export Administration Regulations from 10 November 2026.¹⁴

A search of the Federal Register run on 14 October 2026 returned no BIS or USTR document on either suspension newer than the November 2025 notices.²²

Sourcing Journal reported on 28 September 2026 that USTR had not issued a Federal Register notice to extend the port-fee pause, and that the White House fact sheet from the Washington summit did not mention port fees.²³

Trade counsel wrote on 1 October 2026 that BIS had not published a notice changing the Affiliates Rule date and that the US government had not confirmed the two-month extension applies to the rule.²⁴

China suspended for one year part of the rare-earth export controls it announced in October 2025, under the arrangement reached at Busan.¹⁰

UNKNOWN: whether a Federal Register notice from USTR or BIS, a presidential document or a Chinese announcement will carry the new January date, when, and whether it will apply retroactively. None was found in public texts on 14 October 2026.

ASSESSMENT • MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Both governments will most likely paper the new January date, but on last year's precedent the US notices are as likely to appear in the days after 9 November, with retroactive effect, as before it, and they may be narrower than the announcement implied. A short gap cured retroactively costs little, so the test of the truce is whether the paper appears within about a fortnight, not whether it beats the deadline. The 2025 notices were published two and three days after their effective dates, no extending notice had appeared by 14 October, and the extension was announced at ministerial level and endorsed in both leaders' readouts.

SECTION 02 • ASSESSMENT

What the Washington summit bought

The deliverables were lists and purchases, not changes to the controls.

Nikkei Asia reported on 24 September 2026 that the two sides agreed tariff relief for USD 30 billion of nonsensitive goods each, alongside the two-month extension.²

Fortune reported on 28 September 2026 that the US plans tariff cuts on 77 goods and China on 1619 product categories, including agricultural products, timber, seafood, dairy and medical equipment.³

The US said China agreed to import 10 million tons of coal a year for two years, a commitment the Chinese readout did not mention and that only this report of 28 September 2026 carries among the sources read.³

Reuters reported on 9 September 2026, as carried in secondary reporting and not read in the original, that Chinese buyers took about 1 million tons of US soybeans in one week, bringing purchases to nearly half of the 25 million tons a year that the White House said Beijing had committed to through 2028.⁹

The relaxation of US semiconductor controls and Chinese rare-earth controls that some had hoped for did not happen, while the two sides agreed an AI dialogue mechanism and new military crisis channels, Fortune reported on 28 September 2026.³

CSIS analysts wrote on 28 September 2026 that Beijing remains dissatisfied with US embargoes on high-end semiconductor exports, that no substantive agreement was reached on many advanced technologies of concern, and that any larger deal would only be announced after the November APEC meeting and the December G20 summit.¹⁷

ASSESSMENT • MODERATE CONFIDENCE

The summit bought a managed holding pattern in which each side keeps its strategic controls and trades concessions that can be paused or reversed, and the new AI and military channels are talks rather than concessions; a larger deal held back until after the summits is consistent with that pattern for now. Nikkei Asia carries the matched tariff figure and the extension, the product lists and the coal pledge rest on Fortune alone, and two independent sources, one of them a tier two institution, report no change to either side's export control regime.

SECTION 03 • ASSESSMENT

The legal ground under the truce has moved

The tariff the truce suspended is no longer the tariff that matters.

The Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs on 20 February 2026, and from 24 February 2026 a flat Section 122 surcharge of 10 percent applied to all imports for 150 days, ending on 24 July 2026, according to Global Trade Alert on 21 February 2026.⁸

USTR's final action in its forced-labour investigations of 60 economies took effect at 12:01 am on 24 July 2026, with China among the economies paying a flat 12.5 percent duty on top of the existing Section 301 duties on Chinese goods, according to Global Trade Alert on 24 July 2026.²⁰

The Federal Register published on 28 July 2026 the USTR notice of the actions taken in the Section 301 investigations of 60 economies over the failure to prohibit imports made with forced labour.²¹

Executive Order 14358 of November 2025 framed the US side of the truce as a suspension of the heightened reciprocal tariff rate on Chinese goods to 10 November 2026, under the emergency authority the Supreme Court later struck down.⁶

UNKNOWN: which US measures the January date now governs, whether the forced-labour duty on Chinese goods falls within the truce at all, and how the court challenge to the new duties will end. No official text read for this paper says.

ASSESSMENT • MODERATE CONFIDENCE

The reciprocal tariff date of 10 November has lost most of its practical force, so the US side of the truce now rests on the port-fee suspension, the Affiliates Rule suspension and restraint, while the Section 301 forced-labour duty on Chinese goods applies regardless and a change to its rate or scope is a live lever for Washington outside the truce. The replacement duty is set out in a Federal Register notice and described in a tier two analysis, while its relation to the truce rests on inference because no official text links the two.

SECTION 04 • ASSESSMENT

Shenzhen: a host's stage

Beijing hosts, and the host wants a smooth meeting.

The Council on Foreign Relations noted on 23 September 2026 that the Washington visit was the third in-person meeting of the two leaders in eleven months, after Busan in October 2025 and Trump's visit to Beijing in May 2026, and that a meeting at APEC in Shenzhen was expected in November.⁴

The South China Morning Post reported in June 2026 that the APEC summit is scheduled for 18 to 19 November 2026 in Shenzhen, and that Trump, if he attends, would be the first sitting US president to visit the city.¹²

A Shenzhen district government notice of 6 January 2026 gives the same dates of 18 to 19 November 2026 for the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Shenzhen.²⁶

Fortune reported on 28 September 2026 that Trump will travel to China in November for the APEC summit and that Xi will visit the US in December for the G20 meeting in Miami.³

CSIS analysts wrote on 28 September 2026 that the trips to the November APEC summit and the December G20 summit have now been confirmed.¹⁷

The Associated Press, carried by Fortune, reported on 24 April 2026 that a US and Israeli war with Iran had broken out and that the United States had imposed a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz that month.²⁵

UNKNOWN: no official White House travel notice for Shenzhen was found, and the meeting dates rest on one press report on the firm's list and one local government notice off it, rather than an official APEC text.

ASSESSMENT • MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Trump is likely to travel to Shenzhen and meet Xi there, possibly only for a bilateral and without staying for the full leaders' sessions as in Korea last year, and the meeting is more likely to yield statements on AI dialogue, purchases and the rollover than a broad trade package. The main risk is the calendar after the US midterm elections, where a contested result, a funding fight or a further escalation of the war with Iran could keep him at home and send the Vice President or the Secretary of State instead. Trump has already travelled to Beijing this year, the Shenzhen trip is the condition for Xi's reciprocal visit to Miami, and both Fortune and CSIS analysts report the trips as set.

SECTION 05 • ASSESSMENT

Miami: a narrow G20 with an empty chair

The host has narrowed the agenda and excluded a member.

The US presidency named three themes for its G20 year, deregulation, affordable and secure energy supply chains and new technologies, and left climate, debt and development off the agenda, the Council on Foreign Relations reported on 19 December 2025.⁵

The same analysis reported that South Africa would not be welcome at the Miami summit, that Poland was invited, and that the leaders of Argentina, China, Mexico, Nigeria and Russia skipped the Johannesburg summit in November 2025.⁵

The Associated Press reported on 5 September 2025 that the United States plans to host the G20 summit in December 2026 at Trump's golf resort in Doral, Florida.²⁷

The Miami summit is planned for 14 to 15 December 2026 at the Trump National Doral resort, according to a report citing the White House.¹³

UNKNOWN: the exact Miami dates rest on a source off the firm's list, and no official G20 or White House text confirming them was read for this paper.

ASSESSMENT • LOW CONFIDENCE

Miami is more likely to produce a narrow host's statement than a full consensus communique. Xi is likely to attend in person if Trump travels to Shenzhen and meets him there, and unlikely to if Shenzhen is cancelled or downgraded to a deputy. Xi's trip was agreed as the reciprocal of Trump's, but he skipped the last G20, and a host-set agenda at the host's own resort with one member excluded lowers the cost of sending a deputy if the pair breaks.

SECTION 06 • ASSESSMENT

Spoilers: paperwork, Iran, Congress and the frozen arms package

A short lapse is not a break; the strains to watch are an uncured lapse, Iran and Taiwan.

Fortune reported on 29 September 2026 that a 14 billion USD US arms deal for Taiwan is stalled, and that senators have pressed the administration for its release.¹⁸

The Associated Press reported on 29 September 2026 that Taiwan said US arms sales to the island are unchanged but that the 14 billion USD package remains on hold.¹⁹

CSIS analysts wrote on 28 September 2026 that the Trump administration is likely to sell arms to Taiwan in the next 12 months despite Chinese warnings.¹⁷

China sanctioned 20 US defence companies and 10 executives in December 2025 after a US arms package for Taiwan, Defense News reported on 26 December 2025.¹¹

The Council on Foreign Relations wrote on 23 September 2026 that US arms sales to Taiwan are likely to be among the actions China denounces most, and that China remains the largest buyer of Iranian oil.⁴

The US Treasury sanctioned on 24 April 2026 the Dalian refinery of Hengli Petrochemical, one of China's largest independent refineries with capacity of about 400000 barrels of crude a day, and about 40 shipping firms and vessels, over purchases of Iranian oil, weeks before the May Beijing summit.²⁵

UNKNOWN: whether BIS has drafted an extension of the Affiliates Rule suspension, whether Treasury plans further Iran-linked designations of Chinese buyers or banks, and whether a new US chip control is scheduled; neither government has said.

ASSESSMENT • LOW CONFIDENCE

We count as a break only a lapse not cured within about a fortnight or a new measure that reverses a truce concession, so a short lapse papered retroactively, as last year, does not count. On that definition the likeliest break is an Affiliates Rule or port-fee lapse left uncured, then Iran-linked sanctions that reach a large state-owned Chinese buyer or bank, then congressional pressure over the Taiwan package through letters, hearings or a provision in the annual defence bill, since Congress has no ready vehicle under the Arms Export Control Act to force a sale, then a US tariff move under the Section 301 duty, and last a Taiwan sale initiated by the administration itself. The April refinery sanctions came weeks before a summit and did not derail it, which marks the Iran path as a strain that becomes a break only if it reaches larger state firms, the Taiwan package has been held as leverage since the May summit, and the ranking rests on press reporting and the rule's own terms rather than on any stated policy.

SECTION 07 • DECISION

Decision

Decision	Owner	Trigger	Pre-authorised action
Keep rare-earth contingency sourcing live	Supply chain lead	No Chinese announcement extending the rare-earth suspension by 20 November	Activate secondary sourcing and draw on buffer stocks
Schedule China-linked vessel calls at US ports	Logistics lead	No Federal Register notice extending the port-fee suspension by 9 November; last year's notice came three days late and was backdated, so act on the fee only if none appears by 20 November	Keep planned calls, document port-fee exposure from 10 November for a retroactive cure, and price the fee into quotes only after 20 November
Prepare affiliate screening of Chinese counterparties	Export compliance lead	No Federal Register notice extending the BIS Affiliates Rule suspension by 9 November; last year's rule was published two days late with retroactive effect	Screen new orders against the ownership test of the Affiliates Rule from 10 November and hold, not cancel, shipments that fail it until 20 November
Release tariff contingency in pricing	Commercial lead	Truce instruments published past January, or a broader package announced at Shenzhen or Miami	Release the contingency held against port-fee and control snapback
Hold tariff contingency on Chinese goods	Commercial lead	A USTR notice changing the Section 301 forced-labour duty rate or scope for Chinese goods	Reprice affected lines and review sourcing from other economies
Review Iran-linked counterparty exposure	Sanctions compliance lead	A Treasury designation of a state-owned Chinese refiner, trader or bank over Iranian oil	Rescreen Chinese energy counterparties and their banks and suspend new dealings with any listed party
Escalate Taiwan exposure review	Risk committee	A DSCA notification of the Taiwan package, a congressional provision on it, or a new US chip control between the summits	Freeze new China-dependent commitments pending review

SECTION 08 • OUTLOOK

Outlook

Baseline. USTR and BIS publish the notices moving the November dates around or shortly after 9 November, with retroactive effect, Trump travels to Shenzhen and meets Xi, the meeting yields statements on AI dialogue and purchases, the Taiwan package stays frozen, Iran-linked sanctions stay on smaller Chinese buyers, and Xi attends Miami, which passes with a narrow host's statement. The truce is rolled forward again near its January end date without a broad package.

Deterioration. The Affiliates Rule or port-fee suspension lapses for weeks rather than days because the notices are held as leverage, Treasury designates a large state-owned Chinese buyer of Iranian oil, or Congress presses the Taiwan package into the defence bill, and Beijing withholds purchases and delays its rare-earth paperwork. A post-midterm shock or a wider war with Iran keeps Trump from Shenzhen or shrinks the meeting, Xi sends a deputy to Miami, and the truce enters the new year on a bare verbal rollover.

Stabilization. Both sides publish the new dates before the old ones lapse, Shenzhen produces a framework for a broader package, and Xi attends Miami in person. The January date is extended by a longer period, with a published schedule for tariff and control talks.

Claim C-1. The Federal Register publishes, on or before 20 November 2026, a USTR notice that extends beyond 9 November 2026 the suspension of the Section 301 actions on China-linked vessels and cargo handling equipment, whether or not with retroactive effect. Probability 0.75. Resolves on 2026-11-20 from Federal Register: YES if a USTR notice published in the Federal Register on or before 20 November 2026 extends that suspension to any later date, including by retroactive effect from 10 November 2026; NO otherwise. Horizon 60 days. The extension was announced by the Treasury Secretary and endorsed in both leaders' readouts, and last year's suspension notice was published three days after it took effect, so the window tests whether the truce is papered rather than how fast. The risk is a deliberate hold as leverage before Shenzhen.

Claim C-2. President Trump travels to Shenzhen during the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and meets Xi Jinping or appears at the meeting there. Probability 0.75. Resolves on 2026-11-30 from GovInfo: YES if the Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents on GovInfo records remarks, a bilateral meeting or a joint appearance by the President in Shenzhen dated 17, 18, 19 or 20 November 2026; NO otherwise. Horizon 60 days. The trip is the condition for Xi's reciprocal visit to Miami and CSIS analysts describe it as confirmed, and a bilateral-only trip resolves YES. The main path to a cancellation is the post-midterm calendar: a contested result, a funding fight or a further escalation of the war with Iran.

Claim C-3. Xi Jinping attends the G20 leaders' summit in Miami in person. Probability 0.55. Resolves on 2026-12-18 from Reuters: YES if Reuters reports that Xi Jinping attended in person any session of the G20 leaders' summit in Miami on 14 or 15 December 2026; NO otherwise, including if Reuters reports that another official led China's delegation, that the summit was not held on those dates, or reports neither. Horizon 90 days. Xi's trip is reciprocal to Trump's Shenzhen visit, so his attendance is likely if Claim C-2 resolves YES and unlikely if it resolves NO, and this figure blends both branches. He skipped the last G20, and a narrow agenda with a member excluded lowers the cost of absence.

Claim C-4. The Federal Register publishes, on or before 12 January 2027, a presidential document or USTR notice that extends any US truce measure toward China beyond 10 January 2027. Probability 0.55. Resolves on 2027-01-12 from Federal Register: YES if a presidential document or USTR notice published in the Federal Register on or before 12 January 2027 extends any suspension or exclusion granted under the US and China arrangement to a date after 10 January 2027, including by retroactive effect; NO otherwise. Horizon 90 days. The Treasury Secretary has said the current deal could simply be rolled again, and the pattern so far is rollover. Last year's notices came days after their effective dates, so a January notice later than two days past the deadline, or a rupture, would resolve it NO.

Claim C-5. The Federal Register publishes, on or before 20 November 2026, a BIS rule or notice that extends beyond 9 November 2026 the suspension of the expansion of end-user controls to affiliates of listed entities, whether or not with retroactive effect. Probability 0.7. Resolves on 2026-11-20 from Federal Register: YES if a Bureau of Industry and Security rule or notice published in the Federal Register on or before 20 November 2026 extends that suspension to any later date, including by retroactive effect from 10 November 2026; NO otherwise. Horizon 60 days. The suspension is part of the arrangement both sides say they have extended, and last year's rule was published two days after it took effect, so the window tests whether the truce is papered rather than how fast. No notice had appeared by 14 October and the US government has not confirmed the extension covers the rule, which keeps this below the port-fee claim.

Claim C-6. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency posts a major arms sale notification for Taiwan dated from 10 October to 15 December 2026. Probability 0.15. Resolves on 2026-12-16 from DSCA major arms sales notifications: YES if the DSCA major arms sales page lists a notification to Congress of a proposed sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States dated from 10 October 2026 to 15 December 2026 inclusive; NO otherwise. Horizon 90 days. The 14 billion USD package has been held since the May Beijing summit as leverage, and the Shenzhen and Miami trips give the administration reasons to keep it frozen. Senate pressure is the main path to a notification before Miami, but Congress has no ready vehicle to force one.

Claim C-7. The Federal Register publishes, on or before 9 November 2026, a BIS rule or notice that extends beyond 9 November 2026 the suspension of the expansion of end-user controls to

affiliates of listed entities. Probability 0.35. Resolves on 2026-11-10 from Federal Register: YES if a Bureau of Industry and Security rule or notice published in the Federal Register on or before 9 November 2026 extends that suspension to any later date; NO otherwise. Horizon 30 days. This claim tests the timing in the first key judgment: last year the rule was published two days after its effective date, and no notice had appeared by 14 October. A notice before the lapse is possible because the date is known well in advance, but the precedent points to publication after it.

Indicators.

- Federal Register notices from USTR on the port-fee suspension, and whether they apply retroactively from 10 November
- A Federal Register notice from BIS on the Affiliates Rule suspension, and its effective date
- A Chinese Ministry of Commerce announcement on the rare-earth control suspension
- Any USTR notice changing the Section 301 forced-labour duty on Chinese goods, and the court challenge to it
- Confirmation of the President's travel to Shenzhen and of a bilateral meeting with Xi
- Treasury designations of Chinese refiners, traders or banks over Iranian oil, and China's response
- DSCA notifications for Taiwan and any Senate or House provision on the frozen package
- Weekly US export sales of soybeans to China
- China's announcement of its delegation leader for the Miami summit

SECTION 09 • SCORECARD

Scorecard

No earlier firm claim is resolved or advanced by this draft.

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