PUBLISHED MARKET RESEARCH

The Rearmament Ledger

Magazines, Money, and the October Cliff



PMR-2026-0910-USA-001 · 10 September 2026

PUBLIC RELEASE

THE AEGEAN REGISTER

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The Rearmament Ledger

Magazines, Money, and the October Cliff

The United States is trying to rebuild a magazine with money that Congress has not created, inside an appropriations instrument whose operative clauses forbid the rebuild. The FY2027 request reads as a rearmament programme only because it is printed with a mandatory column beside it; strip that column away and four of the seven most-stressed munition lines fall below what was actually bought in FY2026, and all four are interceptors: PAC-3 MSE 267 against 357, THAAD 27 against 55, SM-6 106 against 166 and SM-3 Block IB zero against 42. Three rise: PrSM 680 against 108, SM-3 Block IIA 22 against 12 and Tomahawk 58 against 55. The instrument in force on 1 October 2026, H.R. 6500, freezes production rates at FY2026-sustained levels and bars the multi-year mechanism two of those seven lines depend on, and it carries defence anomalies for shipbuilding, National Security Systems and military construction and none for munitions. What is holding the Patriot interceptor line at rate in the meantime is partner money: the one FY2026 production lot whose funding split reached the public record was 94.4 percent Foreign Military Sales funded. Beneath the money, the binding physical constraint has moved from load-assemble-pack to projectile metal parts, where $469 million of capital at one facility has produced no conforming part. None of that is a forecast. It is arithmetic on primary documents, and it is the reason this report treats the lame-duck session as the last scheduled opportunity to lift the freeze before the rebuild slips a fiscal year, rather than as the fix.

HEADLINE INDICATORS

91.7%	267 vs 357	94.4%	0
PAC-3 MSE FY2027 REQUEST IN THE MANDATORY COLUMN	FY2027 DISCRETIONARY PAC-3 MSE, ARMY PLUS NAVY, AGAINST THE FY2026 ARMY P-1 BUY	FOREIGN MILITARY SALES SHARE OF THE APRIL 2026 PAC-3 MSE LOT	CONFORMING METAL PARTS FROM THE $469 MILLION MESQUITE FACILITY

DOCUMENT CONTROL

REGISTER NUMBER	PMR-2026-0910-USA-001
PRODUCT	Assessment · Publishable Market Research · Core Report

DESK	Defense and Security
ISSUED	10 September 2026 · Aegean Intelligence Group
TIMELINESS	CURRENT
DISTRIBUTION	Public release · The Aegean Register · aegeanintel.com/research

CITE THIS REPORT

Aegean Intelligence Group, “The Rearmament Ledger,” PMR-2026-0910-USA-001, The Aegean Register, 10 September 2026.

CENTRAL JUDGMENT

The Western rebuild has been funded in a vehicle that does not yet exist. In the 39 days of the opening campaign against Iran the United States expended, at the upper bound of the published estimates, more than half its prewar inventory of four of its seven most-stressed munitions, and everything fired since the close of that 39-day window is unquantified in the public record. The FY2027 request that would replace what was fired places 80 to 100 percent of every interceptor quantity in a mandatory column contingent on a reconciliation bill that neither chamber has passed and that now sits behind a midterm election. The continuing resolution that averted a shutdown on 2 September froze production rates at FY2026-sustained levels and carried no munitions anomaly, so the appropriations instrument now in force is one that forbids the ramp it is meant to bridge. Underneath the money, the binding physical constraint has moved down a layer, from load-assemble-pack to projectile metal parts and from finished rounds to single-source energetics whose new capacity converts to throughput between 2027 and 2029. The near-term demand signal keeping the interceptor lines at rate is therefore allied, not American: the FY2026 PAC-3 MSE production lot was 94.4 percent Foreign Military Sales funded, and a single partner's notified order of 730 rounds exceeds by a factor of 2.7 the entire FY2027 discretionary US buy of 267 rounds, which is an Army plus Navy figure with 244 of it in the Army line. The firm's June judgment that today's appropriations do not fix today's magazine survives in a harder form. Today's appropriations do not contain the fix.[2,9,10,12,17,20,37]

This thesis is falsifiable on three conditions, all published here so a reader can hold the firm to them, and they replace the two conditions the firm circulated in draft. The three are printed in their locked wording without inline numerals; the figures in them are cited where they are established, the $60 billion and $350 billion in Section 02 and the 101,000 rounds per month in Section 04.

CONDITION 1, THE ONE THAT CAN BITE

Enactment of any full-year FY2027 defence appropriations vehicle, by any procedural route, carrying quantities above the FY2026 buy for the four interceptor lines whose discretionary request falls below it: PAC-3 MSE above 357, THAAD above 55, SM-6 above 166, and SM-3 Block IB above 42. The condition is written against those four rather than against interceptors generally because SM-3 Block IIA and Tomahawk are already above their FY2026 quantities in the discretionary column as requested, so a looser wording would be satisfied by enacting the request unchanged while the judgment it is meant to test stood intact. This breaks KJ-1 and KJ-2 directly and is the route the report considers most likely of the three that would clear the freeze.

CONDITION 2

Enactment of a reconciliation measure providing at least $50 billion for the Department of Defense before 31 December 2026. Two disclosures travel with it, both on the page: the firm's own probability on this event is 0.10 and it is sequencing-barred by the argument the report itself makes, so it is unlikely to bite inside the window; and $50 billion is a low bar in adequacy terms, since both budget resolutions already carry $60 billion against $350 billion requested.

CONDITION 3

Projectile metal-parts capacity reaching the Inspector General's own September 2026 projection of 101,000 rounds per month with the Mesquite facility producing conforming parts. This breaks KJ-5.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Seven judgments carry this report. Three concern where the money is and what the instrument in force permits. Two concern who is holding the production lines at rate. Two concern the physical floor beneath both. Each judgment is stated here in the wording the report uses wherever it recurs; the citations sit in the section that establishes it, KJ-1 and KJ-2 in Section 02, KJ-3 and KJ-4 in Section 03, KJ-5 and KJ-6 in Section 04, KJ-7 in Section 07.

KJ-1 The FY2027 replenishment of the seven most-stressed munitions is contingent on reconciliation, not appropriations. Between 80 and 100 percent of every requested interceptor quantity, and 92.6 percent of the Tomahawk request, sits in the mandatory column. Strip that column and four of the seven discretionary quantities fall below what FY2026 bought, and all four are interceptors: PAC-3 MSE 267 against 357, THAAD 27 against 55, SM-6 106 against 166, and SM-3 Block IB zero against 42. Three rise: PrSM 680 against 108, SM-3 Block IIA 22 against 12, and Tomahawk 58 against 55. **HIGH**

KJ-2 The continuing resolution in force carries no munitions, interceptor or missile-defence anomaly, bars new starts at P-1 and R-1 line level, and bars the initiation of multi-year procurement using advance procurement funding for economic order quantity. It therefore freezes the appropriated share of the munitions production rate. It does not restrain the Foreign Military Sales share, which is not paid from Department of Defense appropriations, and the report says so rather than claiming the industrial base is frozen. **HIGH**

KJ-3 The documentary record carries exactly one Patriot production lot whose funding split is public: the award of 9 April 2026 obligated $4,496,040,000 of $4,761,000,000 from Foreign Military Sales funds. Across 2026 the United States notified 1,030 PAC-3 MSE rounds to two Gulf partners, against an FY2027 discretionary request of 267 rounds across the Army and the Navy, 244 of them in the Army line. **HIGH**

KJ-4 Partner demand, not US service procurement, is the signal most plausibly holding the Patriot interceptor line at its current rate, and US replenishment is the residual claimant on it. Held at MODERATE because three readings of the same evidence remain open: that the one published split is representative of the line, that it is an artifact of how a year-one undefinitized action obligates several partners' prepaid case values against one year of incremental US funding, and the CSIS estimate that about half of annual output goes to partners on a unit rather than a dollar basis. The funding split of the July 2026 modification, which is not public, would settle it. **MODERATE**

KJ-5	The binding physical constraint in artillery has moved from load-assemble-pack to projectile metal parts, and the fix is capitalised but not yet productive. The Inspector General states in terms that projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching the 100,000 round per month goal.	HIGH
KJ-6	Every remedy the firm can date in the energetics and precursor layer converts to throughput in 2027 or later, on both sides of the Atlantic. Held at MODERATE because three of the four dated remedies rest on company forward guidance, which is the most systematically optimistic evidence class available, and because the firm applies the same scepticism here that it applies to Rheinmetall's unconfirmed Unterluss output.	MODERATE
KJ-7	The lame-duck session is the last scheduled opportunity to lift the freeze before the rebuild slips a fiscal year. Seventeen Senate weekday session days separate the election from the 11 December expiry, and no House 2026 calendar was collected, so the joint working window is UNKNOWN and may be shorter.	MODERATE

KEY STATISTICS

91.7%
PAC-3 MSE FY2027 quantity in the mandatory column[9]

80 to 100%
Mandatory share of every FY2027 interceptor quantity[9]

4 fall, 3 rise
FY2027 discretionary quantities against FY2026; the four that fall are the four interceptor lines PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, SM-6 and SM-3 Block IB[9,10]

267 vs 357
FY2027 discretionary PAC-3 MSE, Army plus Navy, against the FY2026 Army P-1 buy; Army to Army it is 244 against 357[9,10]

94.4%
FMS share of the April 2026 PAC-3 MSE lot[17]

1,030
PAC-3 MSE notified to two Gulf partners in 2026[20,21]

46,000
Projectile metal parts per month, March 2026, against the Inspector General's own September 2026 metal-parts projection of 101,000 per month[37]

$469M
Mesquite capital, zero conforming metal parts[37]

39 days
The depletion window CSIS measures, whose calendar bounds this report does not assert[2]

EUR 109.7bn
German Einzelplan 14, 2027 draft, from EUR 82.7bn[51]

Several of these figures are not comparable with one another and are printed together to bracket the problem, not to be read against each other. The 46,000 metal parts and the 36,000 rounds that circulate as the US 155mm rate are different constraints at different plants; the 94.4 percent is a dollar split on one lot's obligation and the CSIS "about half" is a unit share across a year of deliveries; and the 39-day window is the opening campaign only, not the war.

Scope, method, and limits

EVIDENCE BASE

Open-source intelligence only, collected to 10 September 2026 and current to that date. The primary record is the Department of Defense Comptroller's FY2027 Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System volume and FY2027 P-1, the enrolled text of H.R. 6500 on govinfo, Department of Defense daily contract announcements, the Department of State congressional notification record and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency archive it replaced under Executive Order 14383, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General report DOWIG-2026-095, Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Research Service publications, USAspending contract data queried directly by Aegean, the Senate's published 2026 legislative schedule and roll-call records at senate.gov, the Federal Register, Deutscher Bundestag budget documents and Haushaltsausschuss records, European Commission and Council SAFE releases, the Hague Summit Declaration, and filings and releases from Lockheed Martin, RTX, L3Harris, General Dynamics, Rheinmetall, Chemring, Alzchem and American Pacific. Institutional analysis is drawn from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Where a claim rests on trade reporting rather than on a primary document, the reporting outlet is named in the text and the source is graded UNVERIFIED in the Source Registry; no HIGH judgment in this report rests on an UNVERIFIED source, and where a HIGH judgment rests on a single primary document the report says so on the page. That is the rule the firm applies, stated here in the form it is actually applied in rather than in a stronger form the report does not meet: KJ-3 rests on one contract announcement and says so, and the Section 01 expenditure figures rest on one institution and say so. Analytic judgments are Aegean's. No client-attributable material is used.

TIMELINESS AND SHELF LIFE

Timeliness and shelf life. This report is CURRENT to 10 September 2026 and is issued 10 September 2026 against a set of dated hinges that begin to close immediately: the AECA thirty-day review on the Saudi transmittals of 4 September closes about 4 October 2026, FY2026 closes and the coalition mission in Iraq ends on 30 September 2026, FY2027 opens under H.R. 6500 on 1 October 2026, and the continuing resolution expires on 11 December 2026. Its useful shelf life is therefore to 11 December 2026 for the legislative argument and to about the end of December 2026 for the obligation argument, when USAspending publication catches up to the FY2026 close. The industrial argument, which runs on 2027 to 2029 capacity dates, holds materially longer. In the corpus this report extends AIG-DEF-26-001, "The Western Munitions Bottleneck", 3 June 2026 (PMR-2026-0603-USA-001), and scores four of its claims in the Scorecard.[8]

LIMITATIONS

The depletion figures cover, in CSIS's own words, "the 39 days of the air and missile campaign before the ceasefire", and everything fired since the close of that window is unquantified in the public record; no figure in this report should be read against a longer window.[2] The war chronology itself was not independently verified in this cell. The operation name, the start date of the campaign and the dates of the ceasefires are UNKNOWN to this report, no publishable source for them was gathered, and the report therefore prints none of them, asserts no calendar identity for the 39-day window and computes nothing from one; the gap is recorded at row 11 of `date_verification.md`, and a Department of War or

CENTCOM statement dating the campaign's start and each ceasefire would close it. The House FY2027 defence appropriations bill was not read and is UNKNOWN: not the House-passed text, not the committee report, not the subcommittee mark. It is the single document that would test KJ-1 directly, because appropriators routinely fund in the discretionary column what an administration requests in a mandatory one, and this report does not know what quantities the committee carried. The gap is registered at P1 and the report does not attempt to close it. Two production rate sets are in circulation and they differ by a factor of about three and a half: CSIS's five-year averages (PAC-3 MSE 183 per year, THAAD 28, SM-6 96) and current rates from the same collection (PAC-3 MSE about 600 with 620 delivered in 2025, THAAD 96 against a stated 400 target, SM-6 more than 500 announced). Section 01 prints the replenishment arithmetic on both and no judgment here rests on the five-year averages alone.[2,29] The 94.4 percent Foreign Military Sales share is an obligation split on a year-one undefinitized contract action, and a competing reading of it is that a year-one undefinitized action obligates several partners' prepaid case values against one year of incremental US funding, which would make the figure a statement about payment mechanics rather than about who receives the rounds; the report carries that reading inside KJ-4 rather than discounting it.[17] The seventeen-day lame-duck count is Senate-only: no House 2026 legislative calendar was collected, a funding vehicle needs both chambers, and the joint working window is therefore UNKNOWN and may be shorter than seventeen days.[85] The "more than half" statement is an upper-bound statement: at the upper bound of the CSIS published ranges PrSM, THAAD, Patriot and SM-3 cross half, and at the lower bound only PrSM and THAAD do, and both bounds are printed wherever the claim appears.[2] The discretionary and mandatory arithmetic, including the mandatory shares and the finding that four of the seven discretionary quantities fall and three rise, is the firm's own computation from the FY2027 Weapons book and P-1 and is not a published Department statement.[9,10] The 94.4 percent is a dollar split on one production lot's obligation, while the CSIS "about half" is a unit share across a year of deliveries; the two are not the same quantity and are not presented as one, and the firm has no unit split for FY2026.[2,17] USAspending Department of Defense contract data ends at 30 June 2026 on a standing ninety-day publication lag, so the FY2026 close is not measurable until about December 2026, and the PSC series in this report are the firm's computations from Tier 1 data rather than oversight statements.[50] The Radford Grade A nitrocellulose target of Q4 FY2026 rests on a single trade-press account of an Army report the firm did not locate and could not confirm is public; it is marked UNCONFIRMED and carries no judgment on its own.[40] The removal of Patriot and C-RAM cover from Erbil rests on Iraqi officials and press with no US primary behind it and is printed as a press-only claim.[78,79] No Bundestag page publishes a running count of EUR 25 million defence approvals, the record that resolves it is the BMVg press stream, and the trade outlets covering the same sittings disagree by up to five proposals, so any forward claim on the German approval rate is genuinely uncertain in the record rather than in the analysis.[54,58] Finally, the BRIER kernel was unreachable for this cell. Every scenario in Section 07 is analyst judgment built by hand from the legislative record, no forecast in this report is a Metron output, no scenario carries a probability, and every place where a base rate, a class match or a credible interval would have been the right instrument is written `UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable` and registered in the Module 12 gap register rather than filled.

SECTION 01 · ASSESSMENT

The Ledger

The hole is measured, it is large, and the term that governs how long it takes to close is lead time rather than annual production rate.

FIGURE 01 · REPLACEMENT ARITHMETIC

The rate changes the size of the hole, not the delivery clock



Estimated 39-day expenditure divided by the stated annual rate. Grey shows the five-year average; gold shows the current rate where the public record carries one. These are years of production, not years to delivery.

SOURCE: CSIS Tables 1 and 2; current-rate statements cited in Section 01.

What the opening campaign against Iran consumed is on the public record in enough detail to be counted, and counting it is the only honest starting point for every money question that follows.

The one system-by-system expenditure table in the public record is CSIS's, published 24 April 2026, and it covers 39 days. CSIS states that "in the 39 days of the air and missile campaign before the ceasefire, U.S. forces heavily used the seven munitions in Table 1", and that "the United States struck more than 13,000 targets over 39 days".[2] That window is the opening campaign and nothing after it. The calendar dates that bound it are not established in this cell's collection. The operation name, the start date of the campaign and the dates of the ceasefires are UNKNOWN to this report, no publishable source for them was gathered, and this report therefore prints none of them and computes nothing from them; the gap is recorded at row 11 of `date_verification.md`, and what would close it is a Department of Defense, Department of War or CENTCOM statement dating the start of the campaign and each ceasefire. What is on the primary record is that the campaign had not ended at the collection cut-off: CENTCOM announced completed strikes on IRGC targets in Iran on 1 September 2026, and strikes on IRGC tankers on 5 and 8 September 2026.[1] Every expenditure figure below is a 39-day figure, and what has been fired since the close of that window is unquantified in the public record. The distinction is load-bearing and it is restated wherever a figure appears.

The table itself, at unit cost, estimated prewar inventory, estimated use in those 39 days, and delivery timeline in months: Tomahawk, $2.6 million, 3,100 prewar, more than 1,000 used, 47 months; JASSM, $2.6 million, 4,400, more than 1,100, 48 months; PrSM, $1.6 million, 90, 40 to 70, 46 months; SM-3, $28.7 million, 410, 130 to 250, 64 months; SM-6, $5.3 million, 1,160, 190 to 370, 53 months; THAAD, $15.5 million, 360, 190 to 290, 53 months; Patriot, $3.9 million, 2,330, 1,060 to 1,430, 42 months.[2] CSIS's summary judgment on that table is that "for four of them, the United States may have expended more than half of the prewar inventory".[2] At the upper bound of the published ranges the four that cross half are PrSM, THAAD, Patriot and SM-3 (computed from the same table); at the lower bound only PrSM and THAAD do.

The individual system reporting behind the ranges is where the hardest numbers sit. CSIS records the Wall Street Journal's updated Tomahawk figure at more than 1,000 expended, revised up from the Washington Post's more than 850 in the first month; the New York Times figure of about 1,100 JASSM-ER; and an Army official reportedly stating that the "entire inventory of PrSM" had been expended, with other officials saying some remain.[2] CSIS also records, in the same paper, that there have been no new deliveries of THAAD interceptors since August 2023, with deliveries set to resume by April 2027, and separately that THAAD production is 96 units per year.[2] A production rate and a delivery rate are not the same measure, and no source in this cell's collection reconciles the two for THAAD: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a Department or Lockheed Martin statement of THAAD interceptor deliveries by year since 2023.

CSIS revised the two interceptor figures on 27 July 2026, three months after the April table: Patriot inventory "under 1,000" and THAAD "approximately 250".[3] Defense News rendered the revision as 759 to 827 Patriot interceptors remaining from a prewar figure of about 2,330, and 234 to 278 THAAD interceptors remaining from 452.[4] Stars and Stripes carried the same figures on 30 July 2026; Stars and Stripes is not on the firm's allowlist and is cited here as the reporting outlet only.[5] Two things about that rendering deserve to be said plainly. The Patriot prewar base of about 2,330 matches the April table. The THAAD prewar base of 452 does not: the April table gives 360. The two THAAD baselines differ by 92 rounds and the firm has found no source reconciling them, so the THAAD consumption share should be read as a range across two bases and not as a single percentage. UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a DoD or CSIS statement of the THAAD prewar inventory definition, specifically whether the 452 figure includes rounds held by Foreign Military Sales partners.

CNN reported on 4 August 2026 that nearly 80 percent of interceptors for a key missile defence system were depleted, attributed to unnamed sources. The firm did not reach that report, no Reuters or Associated Press corroboration was located, and it is recorded here as UNVERIFIED and named to its outlet.[6] It carries nothing in this report.

What is not on the record matters as much as what is. No Department of Defense, Government Accountability Office or Inspector General stockpile statement for 2026 was found beyond the DoD Inspector General's July 2026 evaluation of 155mm artillery production, which put the Army rate at 36,000 rounds per month as of March 2026 against a 100,000 rounds per month goal.[7] GAO-26-108888 and GAO-26-108457 exist and were not read; UNKNOWN whether either carries munitions inventory figures, and reading them would close it. The only official comment located on the depletion question is Ambassador Mike Waltz to NBC News, "The U.S. military has everything it needs to conduct this campaign".[5] In a war in which CENTCOM was still announcing completed strikes on 8 September 2026, and which consumed nearly a third of the prewar Tomahawk inventory in its opening 39 days, the entire quantified public record of what the United States has left is two analyst estimates from one institution.[1,2,3] That absence is itself a finding about the record, and it is the reason every number in this section is attributed to its estimator rather than to the government.

Two denominators

The replenishment arithmetic is where the ledger stops being a stockpile question and becomes a schedule question, and it is where the public record offers two different denominators for the same division.

The first set is CSIS's five-year average production rates, given as Table 2 of the same April 2026 paper, per year and with months to first delivery: Tomahawk 79 and 35; JASSM 385 and 38; PrSM 56 and 38; SM-3 Block IB 40 and 42; SM-3 Block IIA 13 and 57; SM-6 96 and 42; THAAD 28 and 49; PAC-3 MSE 183 and 29.[2] These are five-year averages and they are not current rates. They average across years in which a line delivered nothing, which for THAAD is every year since August 2023 on CSIS's own statement in the same paper.[2]

The second set is the current rate, and most of it sits in that same CSIS paper. THAAD production is 96 units per year, against a Lockheed Martin announcement of an increase to 400 per year; PAC-3 MSE production is about 600 per year, planned to reach about 2,000 per year by 2030; RTX has announced more than 500 SM-6 per year.[2] Lockheed Martin states that it delivered about 620 PAC-3 MSE rounds in 2025, "exceeding the previous year by more than 20%", from a capacity of about 600 per year; that is company material and is labelled as such.[29] No current annual rate for Tomahawk, JASSM, PrSM, SM-3 Block IB or SM-3 Block IIA was located in this cell's collection: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a Department or contractor statement of annual deliveries on those lines.

Set the 39 days of expenditure against both denominators. All quotients below are years of production at the stated annual rate, computed by the firm from the two CSIS tables and the current-rate statements above, and they are not years to delivery.

Line	Expended in the 39 days, rounds	Five-year average rate, per year	Years at that rate	Current rate, per year	Years at that rate
Tomahawk	more than 1,000	79	more than 12.7	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
Patriot, all PAC-3 variants	1,060 to 1,430	183, PAC-3 MSE only	5.8 to 7.8	about 600, PAC-3 MSE only	1.8 to 2.4
THAAD	190 to 290	28	6.8 to 10.4	96	2.0 to 3.0
SM-3, both blocks	130 to 250	53 combined	2.5 to 4.7	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
SM-6	190 to 370	96	2.0 to 3.9	more than 500	less than 0.8
JASSM	about 1,100	385	2.9	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN
PrSM	40 to 70	56	0.7 to 1.3	UNKNOWN	UNKNOWN

Two defects inside that table are the firm's and not CSIS's, and a reader should have both. First, the Patriot row divides an all-variant numerator by a PAC-3 MSE denominator. CSIS's Table 1 Patriot row of 1,060 to 1,430 rounds covers all PAC-3 variants, while both 183 per year and about 600 per year are PAC-3 MSE figures.[2,29] Because the denominator excludes the non-MSE variants whose expenditure sits inside the numerator, both Patriot quotients are upper bounds on the time to replace the rounds fired and not point estimates. Second, five lines of the seven have no located current rate, so five of the fourteen quotients cannot be computed and are written UNKNOWN rather than carried forward at the five-year average.

The two rate sets differ in size by a factor of about three and a half on the two lines where both are known. They also differ in what pays for them, and the FY2026 quantities are the place to see it. The United States bought 357 PAC-3 MSE in FY2026 on the Army P-1 line, of which 47 rounds came under P.L. 119-21, against a line running at about 600 rounds a year; 166 SM-6, of which 111 came under P.L. 119-21, against an announced rate above 500 a year; and 55 Tomahawk, all 55 of them under P.L. 119-21.[9,10] The one FY2026 PAC-3 MSE production lot whose funding split reached the public record was 94.4 percent Foreign Military Sales funded, $4,496,040,000 of a $4,761,000,000 award of 9 April 2026, and Section 03 sets that record out in full.[17]

Those are the rates before the first delivery clock starts. On the CSIS lead times, money that becomes available on 1 October 2026 buys a PAC-3 MSE round arriving 29 months later, in about March 2029; a Tomahawk arriving 35 months later, in about September 2029; and a THAAD interceptor arriving 49 months later, in about November 2030.[2] CSIS notes that lead times "historically" ran about 24 months and "have stretched to 36 months or more".[2] The firm's own June report put Tomahawk first deliveries at March 2030 on the FY2027 submission's own schedule.[8] No figure in that set is inside this administration, this Congress or this war.

ASSESSMENT · HIGH CONFIDENCE.

The binding term in the replenishment arithmetic is lead time and not annual production rate: on every rate and every lead time located in the record, no round bought with FY2027 money reaches a magazine before about March 2029, and for Tomahawk the replenishment of the opening 39 days runs beyond a decade at the only annual rate the record carries. The rate question, which the firm previously answered with the slower denominator alone, does not weaken that finding but it does relocate it. At the five-year averages the Patriot and THAAD holes are 5.8 to 10.4 years of production; at the current rates they are 1.8 to 3.0 years; both are printed and no judgment in this report rests on the slower pair alone. The reason the current rates run three to four times the averages is, on the evidence in hand, that they are being sustained by money the appropriated column does not carry, and the evidence supports that reading on three of the seven lines and not on a fourth. On PAC-3 MSE, SM-6 and Tomahawk it holds directly: the FY2026 US-account quantities are a fraction of line output, between 13 percent and 100 percent of each came under a reconciliation act, and the only production lot with a published split was 94.4 percent partner-funded.[9,10,17] On THAAD it does not hold and the report says so: that line runs at a stated 96 rounds a year while having delivered nothing to the United States since August 2023, and where its output has gone is UNKNOWN. Rationale: the expenditure figures and both rate sets come from one T2 institution, Cancian and Park, across two publications three months apart, with the PAC-3 MSE current rate corroborated by the manufacturer's own release and the FY2026 quantities read from two T1 budget documents; the arithmetic is division rather than inference; and the report states on this page that a single institution carries the whole of the expenditure side.[2,3,8,9,10,29]

SECTION 02 · ASSESSMENT

The Column

On 1 October 2026 the fiscal year in which the United States intends to rebuild its magazine opens under an appropriations instrument that forbids the rebuild, and the money that would fund it sits in a column of the budget that no bill has created.

FIGURE 02 · FUNDING ARCHITECTURE

Most of the FY2027 quantity sits outside regular appropriations



Share of requested FY2027 quantity by funding column. The mandatory portion depends on a reconciliation vehicle; the discretionary portion is the only column regular appropriations can reach.

SOURCE: FY2027 Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System and P-1; Aegean computation.

The FY2027 request is not one request. It is two, printed side by side in the same justification documents, and the second one does not exist in law.

The two columns

The Department's FY2027 weapons request splits every stressed munition line into a discretionary quantity, which regular appropriations would buy, and a mandatory quantity, which only a reconciliation measure can buy. The seven lines read as follows in the FY2027 Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System volume and the FY2027 P-1, quantity first, then the discretionary and mandatory split.

PAC-3 MSE: 3,203 missiles for $13,960.3 million, of which 267 are discretionary at $1,395.4 million and 2,936 are mandatory at $12,564.9 million; the 267 is an Army plus Navy figure, of which 244 rounds sit in the Army P-1 line and the balance in the Navy line.[9,10] THAAD: 857 interceptors for $11,435.2 million, of which 27 are discretionary at $907.2 million and 830 are mandatory at

$10,528.0 million; the line has moved out of the Missile Defense Agency procurement account into Missile Procurement, Army.[9] SM-3 Block IB: 78, all 78 mandatory at $1,245.8 million, none discretionary.[9] SM-3 Block IIA: 136, of which 22 discretionary at $779.0 million and 114 mandatory at $3,439.6 million.[9] SM-6: 540, of which 106 discretionary at $733.2 million and 434 mandatory at $3,599.2 million, total procurement $4,332.4 million.[9] Tomahawk: 785, of which 58 discretionary at $1,931.1 million and 727 mandatory at $3,872.5 million.[9] PrSM: 1,134, of which 680 discretionary at $1,226.5 million and 454 mandatory at $692.0 million.[10]

The mandatory share of each requested quantity, computed from those lines: PAC-3 MSE 91.7 percent, THAAD 96.8 percent, SM-3 Block IB 100 percent, SM-3 Block IIA 83.8 percent, SM-6 80.4 percent, Tomahawk 92.6 percent, PrSM 40.0 percent. Every interceptor quantity in the request falls between 80 and 100 percent mandatory, with no exception; Tomahawk, the one strike weapon in the group, sits at 92.6 percent. PrSM at 40.0 percent is the only line of the seven with a majority in the discretionary column, and it is one of the two lines of the seven whose 39-day expenditure Section 01 shows is under a year of production, the other being SM-6 at the current announced rate rather than at the five-year average.

The comparators show how large a step the request is and, more importantly, what the request looks like with the mandatory column removed. All seven lines are printed below, in rounds, with the FY2026 quantity beside the FY2027 discretionary quantity. FY2026 figures are enacted quantities including anything bought under P.L. 119-21; FY2027 figures are the discretionary column only, which is the column regular appropriations can reach.[9,10]

Line	FY2026 quantity, rounds	FY2027 discretionary quantity, rounds	Direction	FY2027 total request, rounds
PAC-3 MSE	357 (Army P-1; 310 enacted plus 47 under P.L. 119-21)	267 (Army plus Navy; 244 of it Army P-1)	below	3,203
THAAD	55	27	below	857
SM-6	166 (111 of it under P.L. 119-21)	106	below	540
SM-3 Block IB	42	0	below	78
SM-3 Block IIA	12	22	above	136
Tomahawk	55 (all 55 under P.L. 119-21)	58	above	785
PrSM	108	680	above	1,134

That is the whole point of the section, and it is arithmetic rather than opinion: strip the mandatory column and four of the seven FY2027 discretionary quantities fall below what was bought in FY2026, and all four of those are interceptors. The three that rise are PrSM, which rises by a factor of 6.3; SM-3

Block IIA, from 12 to 22; and Tomahawk, from 55 to 58. The single comparison the report has repeated most, PAC-3 MSE 267 against 357, sets an Army plus Navy figure against an Army-only figure; the Army-to-Army comparison is 244 against 357 and it falls in the same direction.[9,10] The FY2025 quantities, for the trend: PAC-3 MSE 194, THAAD 62, SM-6 102, Tomahawk 38, SM-3 Block IB 12, SM-3 Block IIA 29, PrSM 338.[9,10] Four of the five interceptor lines in the set therefore sit below their FY2026 quantities in the column appropriations can reach, and of the three lines that rise, SM-3 Block IIA rises from the smallest FY2026 quantity of the seven at 12 rounds and Tomahawk rises by three rounds.

Two of the seven do not merely need reconciliation money. They need a new contracting mechanism. The FY2027 submission states that the Department "is requesting to initiate up to seven years of SM-6 Multiyear Procurement in FY 2027", and the Tomahawk line states that it "will continue to leverage the Tomahawk Multi-Year Procurement contract that the Department will initiate in FY 2026".[9] The PAC-3 MSE line states that funds "are planned to support the second year of a Multiyear Procurement (MYP) contract".[9] Hold those three sentences in view for the next paragraph.

The text now in force

H.R. 6500, the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027, was signed on 2 September 2026 and provides FY2027 appropriations through 11 December 2026.[11,12] Section 101 continues the Department of Defense at the FY2026 rate for operations under division A of P.L. 119-75.[12] Section 106 sets availability until enactment of the applicable FY2027 appropriation or 11 December 2026, whichever comes first.[12] This is the instrument that governs the Department on 1 October 2026, and on present schedules it is the instrument that governs the entire first quarter of the rearmament year.

Section 102(a) bars the use of Department of Defense funds for:

> "(1) the new production of items not funded for production in fiscal year 2026 or prior years; (2) the increase in production rates above those sustained with fiscal year 2026 funds; or (3) the initiation, resumption, or continuation of any project, activity, operation, or organization"

The prohibition in clause (3) reaches any such project, activity, operation or organization not funded in FY2026, and the enrolled text defines the bar down to the P-1 and R-1 line level.[12] Section 102(b) bars the use of Department funds to:

> "initiate multi-year procurements utilizing advance procurement funding for economic order quantity procurement unless specifically appropriated later".[12]

Set those two subsections against the three FY2027 sentences above. Clause 102(a)(2) freezes production rates at what FY2026 funds sustained. FY2026-sustained rates are not prewar rates: they already incorporate quantities bought under P.L. 119-21, which supplied 47 of the 357 PAC-3 MSE, 111 of the 166 SM-6 and all 55 of the Tomahawk that FY2026 funds bought.[9,10] For Tomahawk the FY2026-sustained rate is entirely a reconciliation-funded rate. Clause 102(a)(1) forecloses new production of items not funded for production in FY2026, and clause 102(a)(3) forecloses initiation at line level.

Section 102(b) reaches the SM-6 and Tomahawk multi-years on their face, and the report states the limit of that reading rather than asserting past it. The clause is conjunctive: it bars initiating a multi-year procurement *by means of* advance procurement funding for economic order quantity.[12] The FY2027 request language quoted above says only that the Department "is requesting to initiate up to seven years of SM-6 Multiyear Procurement in FY 2027"; it says nothing about advance procurement funding or economic order quantity, and it does not itself establish that element of the bar.[9] Whether the requested SM-6 multi-year uses economic order quantity advance procurement is UNKNOWN, and what would close it is an FY2027 advance procurement (P-1) exhibit or a Department multi-year justification naming an economic order quantity line. The Tomahawk multi-year is described in the same volume as one the Department "will initiate in FY 2026", which may place it outside a bar written on initiation, and it is carried here on its face for that separate reason.[9] What the enrolled text does establish without qualification is that clauses 102(a)(1) to 102(a)(3) foreclose new production, rate increases and line-level initiation, and that no anomaly in the bill relieves any munitions line of them.[12]

What Congress did anomalise, and what it did not

The bill is not silent on defence. Section 126 permits Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy to be apportioned for prior-year cost increases on twenty named lines, including Columbia 2021/2027 up to $566,542,000, Columbia 2024/2027 up to $19,386,000, Virginia 2019/2027 up to $561,131,000, Virginia 2018/2027 up to $44,244,000, Carrier Replacement 2013/2027 up to $324,000,000, and CVN Refueling Overhauls 2020/2027 up to $379,200,000.[12] Section 127 permits Procurement, Defense-Wide to be apportioned up to the rate for operations necessary for National Security Systems, not to exceed $2,853,000,000.[12] Section 146 permits Military Construction, Army and Navy and Marine Corps to use current and prior-year balances notwithstanding sections 102 and 104.[12]

A full-text search of the enrolled bill returns no anomaly naming munitions, interceptors, missile defence, Golden Dome, Iran, Israel or Ukraine.[12] Congress demonstrated in the same document that it knew how to write a defence carve-out, wrote three of them, and wrote none for the magazine. The three it wrote address shipbuilding cost growth on programmes already under contract, a classified-systems account, and military construction balances. All three address obligations already incurred: cost growth on submarine and carrier hulls already under contract, a classified-systems account already funded, and construction balances already appropriated. None addresses new production.

The vehicle that does not exist

The mandatory column depends on a reconciliation measure. The administration requested $350 billion in mandatory funding for the Department of Defense; the House and Senate FY2027 budget resolutions each provide $60 billion for defence, and the Senate postponed its budget resolution vote until after the August recess.[13] The gap between the request and the instruction is $290 billion, which is to say the reconciliation vehicle as currently instructed is sized at about 17 percent of what the FY2027 request assumes.

The requested allocation inside the $350 billion, as listed in the source reached, is $113 billion for the defence industrial base (including $48 billion for critical minerals), $103 billion for next-generation technology and autonomy, $47 billion for munitions, $36 billion for Warrior Ethos housing and facilities, and $17.1 billion of a $17.9 billion FY2027 Golden Dome total.[13] Those five lines sum to $316.1 billion, which leaves $33.9 billion of the $350 billion unallocated in the source reached; no further breakdown was located and the residual is UNKNOWN, closable by a published administration allocation table. No bill text or committee print for a reconciliation DoD title has been located: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a published committee print or introduced bill text. CSIS records that Republicans have raised a further reconciliation round for after the midterms.[13]

The separate Iran supplemental does not close the gap either. The request is $87.6 billion, of which about $70 billion is national defence and $67.1 billion is Department of Defense; per Secretary Hegseth's testimony it contains $17 billion for core operational costs, training, readiness and equipment replacement and $46 billion for accelerating critical capabilities, of which $21 billion is munitions acquisition and production expansion.[13] The munitions lines by system are not itemised in the source reached: UNKNOWN. Democrats oppose the supplemental over the war's unpopularity and cite unobligated funds from the 2025 reconciliation act.[13] A $21 billion munitions line inside a contested supplemental is not a substitute for a $47 billion reconciliation munitions title, and neither is available to a programme office on 1 October.

The programme that has already said what this means

Gen. Michael Guetlein, who runs Golden Dome, described the mechanism in public on 11 August 2026 at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville. Golden Dome received $25 billion in 2025 under the reconciliation act, 90 percent of which it has since obligated.[14] DefenseScoop reported the same week that 95 percent is committed on contract.[15] Two splits of the FY2027 Golden Dome request are on the record and they are not the same pair of numbers, so both are printed. Air and Space Forces Magazine gives $17 billion inside the $350 billion reconciliation package plus $400 million in the base budget, which is a reconciliation share of 97.7 percent; CSIS gives $17.1 billion of a $17.9 billion total, which is a reconciliation share of 95.5 percent.[13,14] Both shares are the firm's computation from the split beside it, and neither numerator is paired with the other's ratio. Guetlein's own summary of what a continuing resolution does to a programme funded that way: "A CR doesn't help me under Golden Dome because I don't have a top line to fall back to".[14]

That is the general case stated by the one programme manager whose funding is already almost entirely mandatory. A programme with 90 percent of its prior appropriation obligated and between 95.5 and 97.7 percent of its next-year request in the reconciliation column, depending on which of the two published splits is used, has no discretionary base for a continuing resolution to continue at.[13,14] The seven munitions lines in this section are between 80 and 100 percent mandatory. They are in the same position, with the difference that the money already obligated to them bought FY2026 quantities of between 12 and 357 rounds per line.[9,10]

The scale question sits behind all of it. The Congressional Budget Office estimated on 12 May 2026 that a national missile defence system with the capabilities outlined in the executive order "would cost about $1.2 trillion to develop, deploy, and operate for 20 years", with the space-based interceptor layer accounting for about 70 percent of acquisition costs and about 60 percent of total costs.[16] That estimate carries no published low case, and this report prints no range.

> **ASSESSMENT · HIGH CONFIDENCE.**
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> The FY2027 replenishment of the seven most-stressed munitions is contingent on a reconciliation measure that neither chamber has passed, is instructed at $60 billion against a $350 billion request, and now sits behind a midterm election; and the appropriations instrument actually in force on 1 October 2026 bars, by its own text, new production, line-level initiation and rate increases above FY2026-sustained levels, and on its face bars the initiation of the multi-year mechanism two of the seven lines depend on. Both propositions rest on primary documents: the split is read line by line from the FY2027 Weapons book and P-1, and the prohibitions are quoted from the enrolled bill, whose full text was searched and contains no munitions, interceptor, missile-defence or Golden Dome anomaly. Two limits on the judgment are stated rather than argued away. Section 102 restrains the use of Department of Defense funds, so what it freezes is the appropriated share of the production rate and not the Foreign Military Sales share, which is not paid from Department appropriations; and the economic order quantity element of the 102(b) bar is not established by the request language quoted here, so the SM-6 and Tomahawk multi-years are carried on their face rather than as demonstrated fits. Rationale: two T1 document sets, read directly, saying the same thing from opposite ends of the same fiscal year, with no source in the collection contradicting either; the count of four falling and three rising is division and subtraction on those two documents. The report has not read the House FY2027 defence appropriations bill, which is the document that would test the first proposition directly, and records that as UNKNOWN in Limitations.[9,10,12]

SECTION 03 · ASSESSMENT

The Queue

The documentary record carries exactly one Patriot production lot whose funding split is public: the award of 9 April 2026 obligated $4,496,040,000 of $4,761,000,000 from Foreign Military Sales funds. Across 2026 the United States notified 1,030 PAC-3 MSE rounds to two Gulf partners, against an FY2027 discretionary request of 267 rounds across the Army and the Navy, 244 of them in the Army line.

SOURCES [17,9,10,20,21] Section 02 showed that the money to replace what was fired sits in a column no bill has created. This section sets out what the documents say about who is paying for the interceptor line in the meantime. The inference the firm draws from those documents is stated once, in the assessment that closes the section, and it is carried at MODERATE and not above.

The one lot on the record

The Department of Defense announced the FY2026 PAC-3 MSE production award on 9 April 2026. The announcement text, quoted in full on the point that matters: "Lockheed Martin Corp., Grand Prairie, Texas, was awarded a $4,761,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for the production of PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement missiles", with completion 30 June 2030, funded by "Fiscal 2026 missile procurement, Army funds in the amount of $264,960,000; and fiscal 2026 Foreign Military Sales funds in the amount of $4,496,040,000", contract W31P4Q-26-C-0013, Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal.[17]

Foreign Military Sales funds are 94.4 percent of that award. US Army missile procurement is 5.6 percent. This is the whole of the primary evidence on interceptor allocation: one lot, one announcement, one split. There is no second contract announcement in the collection that states a funding split for any Patriot, THAAD or Standard Missile lot, and the firm did not locate one.

The historical estimate this sits above is CSIS's. Writing in April 2026, Cancian and Park state: "Because 18 other countries use the Patriot, these missiles are highly sought after. About half of the annual production goes to support these allies and partners. Ukraine is also a major user, having received more than 600 from the U.S. and other allies over the course of the war."[2] That is an analyst estimate of a multi-year norm measured in units, not a Department figure. The April 2026 award is a Department figure for one lot in one year measured in dollars. The two are not comparable quantities, and this report therefore states neither as a margin above the other.

The two are measured differently, which matters and is stated here rather than smoothed over: CSIS is describing a share of delivered units across a year of output; the contract announcement is describing the funding source of one production lot's obligation. A dollar split and a unit split are not the same quantity, and the firm has no unit split for FY2026. What can be said without qualification is that on the one lot for which the Department published the arithmetic, partner money bought nineteen dollars of every twenty.

The ledger, 14 January to 4 September 2026

The Collectors built the 2026 notification record directly from the two publishers of record. Twenty-seven congressional notifications to Gulf states, Israel, Iraq and Oman were issued between 14 January and 4 September 2026, with a combined stated estimated cost of $55.10 billion.[18,19] Of those, the lines that draw on production the US services are themselves replenishing are as follows.

Line	Quantity notified in 2026	Recipients
PAC-3 MSE	1,030	Saudi Arabia 730, Qatar 300
PAC-2 GEM-T	200	Qatar
JDAM guidance kits	11,204	Saudi Arabia 10,004, UAE 1,200
GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb I	1,500	UAE
APKWS guidance sections and all-up-rounds	up to 41,500	Saudi Arabia up to 20,000, Qatar 10,000, Israel 10,000, UAE 1,500
Coyote Block 2	240	UAE
LTAMDS radars	up to 8	Kuwait

Sources for the table: the DSCA and State Department release set enumerated at sources 18 to 25. The APKWS figure is a ceiling rather than a quantity, because the Saudi case is written as "up to 10,000" air-to-air plus "up to 10,000" air-to-ground guidance sections.[22] The four APKWS cases sum to 41,500 units at their stated ceilings: Qatar 10,000 all-up-rounds and Israel 10,000 all-up-rounds, both notified 1 May 2026, the UAE's 1,500 air-to-air guidance sections of the same date, and the Saudi ceiling of up to 20,000 guidance sections of 15 July 2026.[25,22] An earlier working total of about 31,500 for the same four cases was arithmetically wrong by 10,000 units and is corrected here and in the cell's collection file.

Set the first row against Section 02's arithmetic, with the services labelled, because the comparison is easy to state wrongly. The FY2027 request contains 3,203 PAC-3 MSE across the Army and the Navy, of which 267 are in the discretionary column that appropriations can reach. Of those 267, the Army P-1 carries 244 in Missile Procurement, Army line 4, and the balance of 23 is Navy.[9,10] The 357 rounds bought in FY2026, 310 enacted plus 47 under P.L. 119-21, are the Army P-1 line.[10] The Army-to-Army comparison is therefore 244 against 357, and the combined-request comparison is 267 against 357. Neither 267 nor 3,203 is an Army buy, and this report does not describe them as one.

A note on the 357 that the report carries rather than resolves. The Weapons book prints 357 as the FY2026 total on the Army and Navy combined PAC-3 MSE line, and the Army P-1 prints the same 357 on the Army line alone.[9,10] Either the Navy bought no PAC-3 MSE in FY2026 or the Weapons book total is Army-only at that date. Neither document says which: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is the FY2026 Navy Weapons Procurement P-1 line for PAC-3 MSE.

One partner's single notification, Saudi Arabia's 730 rounds of 30 January 2026, is 2.7 times the 267 combined discretionary quantity and 3.0 times the 244 Army quantity. The two Gulf notifications together, 1,030 rounds, are 3.9 times the 267 and 4.2 times the 244. Both notified quantities also exceed the 357 PAC-3 MSE the Army bought in FY2026 and the 194 it bought in FY2025.[9,10]

The two cases that carry the argument

Saudi Arabia, 30 January 2026, $9.0 billion: 730 PAC-3 MSE missiles with launcher conversion kits, automated logistics kits and telemetry kits, prime contractor Lockheed Martin, Dallas.[20] This is the largest single interceptor notification in the 2026 record and it is on the one Lockheed line the US Army is trying to replenish.

Qatar, 1 May 2026, $4.01 billion: 300 PAC-3 MSE and 200 PAC-2 GEM-T, Lockheed Martin and RTX, under an emergency waiver of congressional review.[21] The release is titled "Patriot missile replenishment", and the word is the tell. Replenishment is what a user does after firing. Qatar is refilling stock it expended, which places a partner ahead of the United States in the same queue for the same reason: both are replacing rounds fired in the same war. The firm has no allowlisted figure for how many interceptors any Gulf state fired in 2026, and says so: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a US or Gulf primary statement of rounds expended by state.[19]

The RTX GEM-T line carries a second claimant. Poland contracted about $988 million for PAC-2 GEM-T through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency on 23 June 2026, with deliveries beginning within months and completing in 2031; the quantity is reported only as "several hundred" against a prior approval for up to 788 units, and the contract notice was not reached, so the quantity is UNKNOWN.[26] That reporting is UNVERIFIED and is named here as the reporting outlet rather than relied on.

The eight waivers

Eight of the twenty-seven 2026 notifications carried an emergency waiver of the Arms Export Control Act congressional review period. All eight fall between 19 March and 1 May 2026, and none has been issued since.[19] They are: Kuwait's LTAMDS radars and the UAE's F-16 munitions package and FS-LIDS counter-drone systems on 19 March; and Qatar's Patriot replenishment, Qatar's APKWS, Israel's APKWS, the UAE's APKWS and Kuwait's Integrated Battle Command System on 1 May.[21,22,23,24,25]

The waivers are therefore a six-week cluster, not a practice. Every notification since 1 May 2026, including the four cases of 4 September, has run the ordinary review. The record is silent on why the cluster opened and closed where it did; no statement of reasons was located, and the firm does not supply one.

The boilerplate and the FY2027 numbers

Three of the largest 2026 cases carry the standard sentence that the proposed sale "will not alter the basic military balance in the region" and will have "no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness": the Saudi PAC-3 MSE case of 30 January, the Kuwaiti LTAMDS case of 19 March, and the Saudi JDAM-ER case of 4 September.[20,23,27]

Those three cases draw on 730 PAC-3 MSE, up to 8 LTAMDS radars and 10,004 JDAM guidance kits. The corresponding FY2027 discretionary US quantity is 267 PAC-3 MSE across the Army and the Navy, 244 of it in the Army line, and, for the same fiscal year and under the continuing resolution described in Section 02, production rates frozen at FY2026-sustained levels.[9,10,12] LTAMDS is the Army's own Patriot radar replacement programme. The report sets the two records beside each other and leaves them there.

The queue, as the partners describe it

CSIS records four separate points of queue pressure as of April 2026. Japan "has reportedly been told that its deliveries of 400 Tomahawks may be delayed because of the Iran war". Switzerland has "threatened to buy an alternate system after being told its purchase might be delayed", and CSIS adds that "other U.S. allies are also in the queue". President Zelensky "has pointed out that every Patriot fired in the Middle East is one fewer that Ukraine can acquire". And THAAD components were possibly moved from South Korea to the Middle East in March 2026.[2]

The THAAD picture behind that is the tightest in the collection. Production is 96 interceptors per year. There have been no new THAAD deliveries since August 2023, and deliveries are set to resume by April 2027.[2] The FY2027 discretionary US buy is 27 interceptors against a request of 857.[9] Two of the three Gulf THAAD batteries are Emirati and one is Saudi; Qatar has no THAAD case on the public record, only an evaluation described by a Qatar Emiri Air Defence Forces officer at DIMDEX in January 2026 as "a potential THAAD deployment under study, to see what is possible".[2,28]

The capacity being bought, and when it arrives

Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 MSE in 2025, "exceeding the previous year by more than 20%", against a stated capacity of about 600 per year, under a seven-year framework targeting about 2,000 per year by 2030.[29] On 29 July 2026 the company announced a seven-year undefinitized contract action modification "for up to $53.86 billion", on top of "the $4.7 billion UCA awarded in April", for a total of $58.62 billion, to "triple capacity by the end of 2030", with employment at Camden, Arkansas rising from 1,200 to about 1,850.[30,31] Both are company statements and are labelled as such. CSIS repeats the $58.6 billion figure and the tripling target independently.[32]

On THAAD, Lockheed recorded "a $35 billion multi-year contract with the Missile Defense Agency" in its second-quarter 2026 results, which CSIS characterises as a contract "to quadruple production of THAAD interceptors".[33,32] Against a base of 96 per year and no deliveries since August 2023, quadrupling to 400 per year is the largest single capacity commitment in the interceptor set, and its first deliveries are not scheduled to resume before April 2027.[2]

The undefinitized character of the PAC-3 MSE instrument matters for what can be concluded from it. An undefinitized contract action has no settled price and no published funding split. The FMS share of the $53.86 billion July 2026 modification is not on the public record: no Department contract announcement text for it was located.[33] That absence is not a detail. It is the single fact that would settle whether the 94.4 percent split of April 2026 is the shape of the line going forward or the shape of one lot, and it is the reason the judgment below is at MODERATE rather than HIGH. What would close it is the Department's contract announcement for the July 2026 modification, or a definitized W31P4Q contract action stating its FY2026 and FY2027 funding sources.

What 94.4 percent can and cannot mean

Three readings of the 9 April 2026 obligation line are open on the evidence in this cell, and the report puts all three on the page rather than the one that flatters the argument.

The first is that the split is representative of the line: partner money is buying most of what the Patriot line produces, and the FY2026 lot shows the shape of the whole.

The second is a funding-mechanics reading. Foreign Military Sales cases are funded by the partner into the FMS trust fund in advance and at case value, while a US service quantity is funded incrementally, one fiscal year at a time. The 9 April 2026 award is a year-one undefinitized contract action against a multi-year framework, and the July 2026 modification of up to $53.86 billion sits on top of it.[17,30] A year-one obligation on an instrument of that shape records several partners' prepaid case values against a single year of incremental US service funding, so it will read Foreign Military Sales heavy on the obligation line whether or not partners are taking most of the rounds. On this reading, 94.4 percent is a statement about payment mechanics and about the date on which money is obligated, not about who receives the missiles.

The third is CSIS's, and it is a unit measure rather than a dollar one: about half of annual Patriot output goes to allies and partners.[2] A dollar split of 94.4 percent and a unit share of about half are compatible rather than competing if the second reading holds, because they are measuring different quantities at different points in the funding cycle.

The firm holds the second and third readings together as the more likely account of the 94.4 percent figure itself, and therefore does not rest this section's judgment on that figure. The judgment rests on the notification ledger and the capacity dates, which are unit quantities and calendar dates and not obligation lines: 1,030 PAC-3 MSE rounds notified to two Gulf partners between 30 January and 1 May 2026, against an FY2027 discretionary request of 267 rounds across the Army and the Navy with 244 in the Army line, against the 357 rounds the Army bought in FY2026, and against a line that delivered 620 rounds in 2025 with no located capacity increment delivering before 2027.[9,10,20,21,29] On the first reading the judgment is strong. On the second and third it is weaker and it still stands, because the unit ledger does not depend on how the April obligation was booked. What would settle which reading is right is the funding split of the July 2026 modification, which is not public.

Where the record lives, and three defects in it

Since 6 February 2026 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency no longer publishes congressional notifications. Its Major Arms Sales index carries the banner: "In accordance with Executive Order 14383 'ESTABLISHING AN AMERICA FIRST ARMS TRANSFER STRATEGY' signed on February 6, 2026, all future Foreign Military Sales web posts for cases notified to Congress will be published on the U.S. Department of State's website".[18] The State Department index holds 51 notifications from 10 March to 4 September 2026.[19]

Three defects follow, and any reader working this record should know them. First, the two sites disagree about where the archive ends: the DSCA index stops at 6 February 2026, while the State Department index footer dates the archive cut-off at 26 February 2026, a difference of twenty days.[18,19] Second, no notification appears on either index between 6 February and 10 March 2026. Whether any case was notified in that gap is UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a Federal Register listing or a congressional committee record for the period; the Federal Register is named here as the register in which such a notification would appear and was not fetched by this cell.[86] Third, transmittal numbers are not reliable identifiers: transmittal 26-85 is carried both by the Saudi APKWS notification of 15 July 2026 and by the Iraq Bell 412EPX and Bell 407M notification of 31 August 2026.[22,34] Cases in this report are therefore keyed by date and recipient, not by transmittal number.

The hinge: about 4 October 2026

On 4 September 2026 the State Department transmitted two Saudi cases. Transmittal 26-35, Joint Direct Attack Munitions Extended Range, estimated $5.0 billion: 5,004 KMU-572 and 5,000 KMU-556 JDAM guidance kits, 5,004 BLU-111 500-pound bombs and 5,000 BLU-117 2,000-pound bombs, with FMU-139 fuzes and DSU-38 and DSU-40 target detectors, prime contractor Boeing, Arlington, Virginia.[27] Transmittal 26-68, estimated $750 million: sixty AGT-1500 tank engines with containers, spares and contractor logistics support, prime contractor Honeywell, at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama.[35]

Two things about that package are commonly reported wrongly and are stated plainly here. It was notified on 4 September 2026, not 7 September, which is the press pickup date. And no Abrams tanks are in either transmittal. The $750 million case is sixty AGT-1500 engines, which is the Abrams powerpack overhauled at Anniston, and nothing else.[35] A sale described in the trade press as an Abrams sale is a tank-engine sale.

Neither transmittal carries an emergency waiver.[27,35] Saudi Arabia is not among the countries entitled to the fifteen-day period under 22 U.S.C. 2776(b)(2), so the thirty calendar-day period in 22 U.S.C. 2776(b)(1) applies.[36] Thirty days from 4 September 2026 is 4 October 2026. The statute counts from the date the certification is received by Congress, and if formal receipt differed from the 4 September release date the close moves with it; the transmittal date is the best available marker and the three-day pre-notification consultation is not visible in the public record.[36] The report therefore states the close as about 4 October 2026 and nowhere states it as 7 October.

The JDAM half of that package matters to the argument of this section for the same reason the Patriot cases do. It draws 10,004 guidance kits from the Boeing line the US Air Force and Navy are replenishing, and 10,004 bomb bodies from General Dynamics forgings, and it does so under the sentence quoted above about no adverse impact on US defence readiness.[27]

ASSESSMENT · MODERATE CONFIDENCE.

Partner demand, not US service procurement, is the signal most plausibly holding the Patriot interceptor line at its current rate, and US replenishment is the residual claimant on it. Held at MODERATE because three readings of the same evidence remain open: that the one published split is representative of the line, that it is an artifact of how a year-one undefinitized action obligates several partners' prepaid case values against one year of incremental US funding, and the CSIS estimate that about half of annual output goes to partners on a unit rather than a dollar basis. The funding split of the July 2026 modification, which is not public, would settle it.[17,2,9,10,20,21,30,33] Rationale: the unit evidence carries the judgment on all three readings, since 1,030 rounds notified to two Gulf partners in 2026 against an FY2027 discretionary request of 267 across the Army and the Navy is a comparison of quantities and not of obligations, and every located capacity increment on the line delivers from 2027 at the earliest; the 94.4 percent dollar split is treated here as corroborative rather than load-bearing, and the unit share of 2026 output going to partners is UNKNOWN.[2,29,33]

SECTION 04 · ASSESSMENT

The Floor

Below the money, the binding physical constraint in artillery has moved from load-assemble-pack to projectile metal parts, and the fix is capitalised but not yet productive.

FIGURE 03 · THE PHYSICAL FLOOR

Where the 155mm production chain stops



The two 36,000 and 46,000 series measure different production layers. The Inspector General identifies projectile metal parts as the limiting factor; Mesquite had produced no conforming part at the measurement date.

SOURCE: DoD Inspector General, DOWIG-2026-095, Figures 1 and 2.

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General said so in terms on 13 July 2026, and the plant-by-plant tables in the same report show why the September 2026 projection does not close. Beneath the metal parts sits a chemistry layer whose new capacity converts to throughput between 2027 and 2029, on both sides of the Atlantic. FY2026 closes on 30 September 2026 with that floor unchanged.

What the Inspector General found

DoD IG report DOWIG-2026-095, "Evaluation of the DoW's Capability and Capacity to Produce 155-Millimeter Artillery Ammunition", published 13 July 2026, states that "as of March 2026, the Army had increased its monthly production from 14,000 to 36,000 rounds"; that the Army set "October 1, 2025, as the date to reach its capability goal of 100,000 155-mm rounds per month" and "did not reach" it; that the Army invested $4.5 billion in 155mm production between February 2022 and September 2025; and, in the sentence that carries this section, that "projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching the 100,000 round-per-month goal".[37]

The firm's June 2026 report, AIG-DEF-26-001, assessed at HIGH confidence that the 100,000 per month target would be reached on the mid-2026 revised timeline. It was not. That claim, CLM-2026-

083, resolved FALSE on 14 July 2026 on this evaluation, and the miss is published in the Scorecard of this report rather than absorbed quietly.[8,37]

The two tables, and the two different 36,000s

The IG publishes capacity plant by plant in two layers. Projectile metal parts, in rounds per month, pre-2022 then March 2026 then projected September 2026: Scranton 14,000, 15,000, 35,000; Wilkes-Barre 0, 21,000, 21,000; Ingersoll, in Canada, 0, 10,000, 15,000; Mesquite, Texas, 0, 0, 0; total 14,000, 46,000, 101,000. Load-assemble-pack, in rounds per month, March 2026 then September 2026 then December 2027: Iowa Army Ammunition Plant 30,000, 37,000, 78,000; Camden, Arkansas 5,000, 20,000, 50,000; Kansas Army Ammunition Plant 1,000, 6,000, 12,000; total 36,000, 63,000, 140,000.[37]

The 36,000 figure that circulates as the US 155mm production rate is the load-assemble-pack number. The metal-parts number for the same month is 46,000.[37] These are different constraints on different equipment at different plants, and conflating them hides the finding. In March 2026 the load-assemble-pack layer was the narrower of the two by 10,000 rounds a month. By the projected dates it inverts: load-assemble-pack reaches 140,000 by December 2027 while metal parts is projected at 101,000 for September 2026 and no later figure is given. That inversion is the mechanical content of the IG's sentence about metal parts being the limiting factor.

The load-assemble-pack rows sum correctly at every date. The metal-parts rows do not. Scranton, Wilkes-Barre and Ingersoll sum to 71,000 rounds per month in the September 2026 column against a stated total of 101,000, a difference of 30,000 rounds per month, and the Mesquite facility that the same table records at zero is designed for 30,000 rounds per month.[37]

That the 30,000 gap is Mesquite's nameplate is the firm's inference and not the Inspector General's attribution: the evaluation nowhere assigns the residual to Mesquite. Three other readings sit on the same table and are named here. The 101,000 total may be rounded or simply wrong. It may include a source the plant table does not itemise. Or it may assume that Mesquite is producing conforming parts by September 2026, which the same evaluation records as not achieved as of March 2026. The firm holds the third as the most likely reading, and states it as a reading. Nothing in KJ-5 depends on which of the four is correct, because the Inspector General states the limiting factor in its own words.

Defense News reports the same 14,000 to 36,000 series, the Mesquite figure and the December 2027 target.[38] Stars and Stripes, reporting the same document, gives "71,000 parts/month expected from the three other projectile-body plants by September 2026", which is the sum of the three producing rows; that outlet is not on the firm's allowlist, is marked UNVERIFIED in the source registry, is named here as the reporting outlet and carries nothing on its own.[39]

Mesquite

The Army spent $469 million to establish the Mesquite, Texas facility, operated by General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems under the Universal Artillery Projectile Lines programme and intended for 30,000 rounds per month. The IG states that "as of March 2026, the contractor responsible for the Mesquite facility has been unable to produce a single 155-mm projectile metal part that meets the contract's minimum requirements".[37] The report carries three recommendations, one of them unresolved, and records that National Technology and Industrial Base sources are "projected to be available by December 2028".[37]

$469 million of capital, four years after the February 2022 baseline, has produced zero conforming metal parts. The difference between the metal-parts total the Inspector General projects for September 2026 and the sum of its own producing plants is 30,000 rounds per month, which is the size of Mesquite's intended output. That equivalence is an inference, with the alternative readings set out above, and it is not the ground on which KJ-5 rests.

The chemistry beneath the metal

The June report identified four single-source dependencies: Radford nitrocellulose, Holston energetics, the solid rocket motor duopoly and TSMC microelectronics.[8] This cell collected evidence bearing on the first and the third, and collected none on Holston energetics and none on TSMC microelectronics. The state of those two positions as of September 2026 is therefore UNKNOWN, and it is written as UNKNOWN rather than as unchanged: no 2026 statement on Holston RDX or HMX output, and no 2026 statement on precision-guided munitions chip dependency, was located, and what would close either is a Department, GAO or company statement of current output and current qualified second sources. What follows is the state of the layers the cell did reach, with the sourcing quality stated because it varies sharply between them, and it is not a survey of all four June positions.

Nitrocellulose. The Army energetics report required by the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act states that Grade A nitrocellulose is "currently not produced in U.S." and is imported, and gives the new Grade A facility at Radford Army Ammunition Plant "initial capability by the fourth quarter of FY-26" and "full capability by the first quarter of FY-31".[40] Fourth quarter FY2026 expires on 30 September 2026, inside this report's production window and one week before its issue date. Full capability is 31 December 2030.

This is the single weakest link in the report's evidence and is marked accordingly. The Army report itself was not located and it is UNKNOWN whether it is public; the entire account rests on one trade-press outlet not on the firm's allowlist, Inside Defense, and the two Collectors recovered different publication dates for that coverage, 2 September 2025 and 26 November 2025.[40] No 2026 Army statement that initial capability has been reached exists on the public record; a targeted search of army.mil returned nothing.[40] Radford's Grade A nameplate capacity in tonnes per year and the import country of record are both UNKNOWN. The Q4 FY2026 target is therefore printed here as UNCONFIRMED and carries no judgment on its own. What would close it is publication of the Army energetics report itself, or an Army or BAE Systems statement that initial Grade A production at Radford has been achieved. It is not one of the three conditions on which this report's thesis is falsifiable: KJ-6 excludes Radford by design, so confirming it would cost the report nothing it has staked, and the Q4 FY2026 target window closed on 30 September 2026. It is carried as an indicator because it bears on CLM-2026-078.

Nitroguanidine. US nitroguanidine is single-sourced from Alzchem Group in Germany, and the same Army report notes that "demand for calcium cyanamide ... is expected to drop in Germany, which will lead to higher costs".[40] The company side of this is documented and dated. Alzchem announced on 2 October 2024 a doubling of nitroguanidine capacity at Trostberg for about EUR 152 million in total, an initial EUR 76 million announced in spring 2024 and then nearly doubled, with commissioning in the second half of 2026 and revenues "in the upper double-digit million range from 2027 onwards"; supply contracts are already signed with defence customers "who have declared their willingness to make significant contributions to the financing"; an EU grant of EUR 34.4 million was awarded in March 2024; and the US Department of Defense has committed USD 150 million towards a potential US facility by the end of 2029.[41] In February 2026 the company confirmed the Trostberg commissioning was "according to plan" for the second half of 2026 and stated that US site selection "is expected to be completed in the course of 2026".[42] Both are company materials and are claim sources.

The dependency therefore is not closable inside this report's horizon. German capacity doubles in the second half of 2026 and pays revenue from 2027; the US onshoring is a 2029 plant whose site was still unselected as of February 2026.[41,42]

Propellant and igniter feedstocks. M6 propellant is supplementally sourced from the Valley Field facility in Canada, operated by General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, because of the demand spike for Ukraine-bound M119A2 charges. Benite is sourced from Hanwha Corporation in South Korea because Radford and Valley Field cannot meet Army specification; domestic production proof is targeted by 2029.[40] Both rest on the same UNVERIFIED trade-press account of the same unpublished report and are stated on that basis.

Ammonium perchlorate. American Pacific Corporation announced on 21 April 2025 an expansion of up to $100 million at Cedar City, Utah, raising ammonium perchlorate capacity by "more than 50%", scheduled for completion during 2026.[43] That is a company claim. Breaking Defense describes AMPAC as the only US-based source of ammonium perchlorate and reports Govini characterising it as a "single point of failure".[44] A DoD IG report of July 2020 found only one DoD-approved domestic source of grade 1 ammonium perchlorate, used in 16 weapons across the Department, and Northrop Grumman Space Systems was laboratory-qualified in 2021 as a second source.[45] No 2025 or 2026

Navy or Army ammonium perchlorate contract value was recovered: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a usaspending.gov or sam.gov award record for the relevant N68936 actions.

Rayon. On 15 May 2026 the Department announced $191 million in Defense Production Act Title III investment in the solid rocket motor industrial base across nine recipients: Pacific Scientific Energetic Materials $27.3 million, Systima Technologies $5 million, R.E. Darling $27.7 million, Americarb $12.6 million, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems $20.9 million, SPARC Research $5.1 million, ICF Mercantile $9.3 million, Materials Resources $25.2 million and Anduril Industries $58 million.[46] Three cautions on that figure, and they matter more than the headline. It is cumulative: the ICF Mercantile, Materials Resources and SPARC lines, $39.6 million in total, are the awards already announced on 12 September 2025 and re-listed, so the two releases must not be added.[46,47] Net new money in the 15 May 2026 release is therefore $151.5 million across nine recipients, being $191.1 million less the $39.6 million re-listed.[46,47] And the nine amounts sum to $191.1 million rather than to the $191 million the release states.

The rayon precursor line inside that total is the ICF Mercantile award of $9.3 million, and it is one of the three lines already announced in September 2025.[46,47] This report does not present a $9.3 million award as a national single-source dependency being addressed. It is a first domestic production source being capitalised at a scale two orders of magnitude below the $4.5 billion the Army put into 155mm over the same period, and on the report's own argument capital is not throughput.[37,46] The forward record on which further Title III money would appear, and on which the commissioning date carried by each determination can be read, is the Federal Register, which is named here as the register of record and was not fetched by this cell.[86]

The load-bearing phrase is in the ICF Mercantile line, which the release describes as establishing "the first domestic production source of rayon filament cellulose precursor rayon".[46] First domestic source means there was no domestic source. Aerospace rayon is the precursor for the carbon phenolic ablatives that line solid rocket motor nozzles, and the Americarb award for "converting woven rayon fabric into carbonized rayon phenolic for nozzle insulation" sits in the same release.[46] The current foreign source of record for US aerospace rayon is UNKNOWN. As historical context only, and not as current sourcing: a Defense Systems Information Analysis Center technical inquiry published 3 October 2018 states that "as of 2012, the RUE-SPA-Khimvolokno in Belarus is the main rayon-based CF producer in the world", and that North American Rayon Corporation ceased production in the 1990s after being unable to meet Environmental Protection Agency requirements.[48] That is a 2018 document reporting 2012 data. It explains why a 2026 release can call a domestic rayon precursor line the first of its kind. It is not evidence about who supplies the United States today.

The solid rocket motor layer and what lead times can be said

The supplier base shrank from six firms in 1995 to two by 2017, Northrop Grumman following the 2018 Orbital ATK acquisition and L3Harris following the 2023 Aerojet Rocketdyne acquisition, with

Nammo of Norway as the third Western supplier and Anduril, Ursa Major, X-Bow and General Dynamics as new entrants.[44] Reported component lead times: energetic parts and propellants up to one year, certain nozzles seven to ten months, and facility qualification and production for one new entrant eighteen months to two years.[44] L3Harris chief executive Chris Kubasik, at a September 2025 investor conference: "We don't really need a third solid rocket motor provider ... they're going to call the same people that we already have locked up."[44]

On the wider lead-time question the report is deliberately narrow. A "24 to 36 months on FY27 money" figure circulates and has no primary statement behind it; the firm searched for one and did not find it, and it is not attributed to any official here.[44] What is sourced is CSIS's own formulation, that historically the interval from contract to delivery "has been about 24 months, but as munitions orders have outstripped production capacity in recent years, lead times have stretched to 36 months or more", and CSIS's five-year table of production rates with months to first delivery and to full lot: PAC-3 MSE 183 per year, 29 months and 42 months; Tomahawk 79 per year, 35 and 47; THAAD 28 per year, 49 and 53; SM-6 96 per year, 42 and 53; PrSM 56 per year, 38 and 46.[2] The firm's June decomposition gives 24 months for the PAC-3 MSE missile and 30 months for its solid rocket motor, and 34 months for Tomahawk.[8]

The same lag, stated by a European supplier

Chemring Group reported an order book of GBP 1,399.4 million at 30 April 2026, the highest in its history, on half-year revenue of GBP 237.3 million and GBP 44 million of energetics expansion capital expenditure in the half. Its three capacity programmes are described as Chicago "complete and ramping production", Scotland "progressing through commissioning" and Norway "advancing through its next phase", and the company states that together they will raise revenue by GBP 100 million a year and operating profit by GBP 30 million a year "from 2028 when the three capacity expansion programmes are complete".[49] That is company material and a claim source. It is also the cleanest single sentence in the collection on the mechanism this report is describing: money spent in 2025 and 2026 becomes output in 2028.

The FY2026 close

FY2026 ends on 30 September 2026, and the obligation record will not show what happened for another quarter. Department of Defense contract data on USAspending currently ends at 30 June 2026, because DoD contract data is published with a ninety-day delay.[50]

The following are the firm's own computations from Tier 1 USAspending data, not published Department or oversight statements, and are labelled as such. Full-year obligations under Product and Service Code 13xx, ammunition and explosives: $11.11 billion in FY2024 and $10.83 billion in FY2025. September alone: $4.30 billion in FY2024 and $4.69 billion in FY2025. September is therefore 39 percent of the year in FY2024 and 43 percent in FY2025.[50] For PSC 14xx, guided missiles, October to June obligations were $28.81 billion in FY2026 against $15.10 billion in the same period of FY2025, a factor of 1.9.[50]

Two further facts sit in the same series. The October to June PSC 14xx obligation increase from FY2025 to FY2026 is $13.71 billion, against an increase of $5.07 billion from FY2024 to FY2025 over the same nine months, so the FY2026 change is the larger of the two year-on-year changes the firm's query returned; the query covers FY2024, FY2025 and FY2026 only, so whether it is the largest change on a longer run is UNKNOWN.[50] And in each of the last two fiscal years, September alone carried 39 percent and 43 percent of full-year PSC 13xx obligations, so the FY2026 ammunition close will not be measurable until the USAspending publication catches up at the end of December 2026 on the ninety-day lag.[50] A GAO or CRS statement of the September surge rate was sought and not found: UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable, routed to Module 12.

The 13xx series also corrects a figure the firm should not carry forward. Full-year ammunition obligations have not exceeded $11.2 billion in either of the last two fiscal years and stood at $4.74 billion through June 2026, so any threshold claim near $25 billion on that code is not supportable and is not made here.[50]

ASSESSMENT · HIGH CONFIDENCE.

The binding physical constraint in artillery has moved from load-assemble-pack to projectile metal parts, and the fix is capitalised but not yet productive. The Inspector General states in terms that projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching the 100,000 round per month goal.[37] Rationale: the judgment rests on that sentence, read directly in a Tier 1 evaluation, and on the same evaluation's dated record of $4.5 billion invested between February 2022 and September 2025, of a 1 October 2025 goal not reached, and of a $469 million facility at Mesquite that had produced no conforming metal part as of March 2026; the arithmetic that the 101,000 September 2026 metal-parts projection exceeds the sum of its three producing plants by Mesquite's 30,000 nameplate is the firm's inference and is carried above as an inference with its alternative readings named, and the judgment does not depend on it; Defense News corroborates the production series and the Mesquite figure at T3, and source 39 is marked UNVERIFIED and corroborates nothing.[37,38]

ASSESSMENT · MODERATE CONFIDENCE.

This section carries a second judgment, KJ-6, which is stated separately rather than folded into the paragraph above because the two judgments carry different confidences and the firm does not blend them. Every remedy the firm can date in the energetics and precursor layer converts to throughput in 2027 or later, on both sides of the Atlantic. Held at MODERATE because three of the four dated remedies rest on company forward guidance, which is the most systematically optimistic evidence class available, and because the firm applies the same scepticism here that it applies to Rheinmetall's unconfirmed Unterluss output.[41,42,43,49,71] Rationale: the located dates are Alzchem's Trostberg commissioning in the second half of 2026 with revenue "in the upper double-digit million range from 2027 onwards" and a US site still unselected against an end-2029 commitment, domestic Benite proof targeted for 2029, AMPAC's Cedar City expansion scheduled for completion during 2026, and Chemring's three programmes paying "from 2028"; three of those four are issuer statements graded as claim sources, the Radford Grade A target rests on a single UNVERIFIED trade-press account of an unpublished report and is marked UNCONFIRMED above, and the state of the Holston and TSMC positions is UNKNOWN because this cell collected no evidence on either. The judgment is about the dates the firm could locate, and it is not a claim that the four single-source positions the firm named in June are being addressed.

SECTION 05 · ASSESSMENT

The Other Ledger

Europe has solved the appropriations problem the United States has not, and it is arriving at the same throughput wall anyway.

FIGURE 04 · CAPACITY CONVERSION

European capacity arrives after the 2026 budget decisions



Selected company milestones from the report's dated capacity ledger. The red rule marks the end of 2026. Company forward guidance is presented as guidance, not achieved output.

SOURCE: Company disclosures and reporting graded in Section 05 and the Source Registry.

Germany's 2027 draft raises the defence line by a third in a single year, with an off-budget vehicle already enacted behind it and no continuing resolution to freeze production rates. The European Union has a EUR 150 billion loan instrument disbursing cash. NATO has a 5 percent of GDP commitment in a signed declaration. And the physical dates on the European side of the ledger are the same dates as the American ones: 2027, 2028, 2029. That is the strongest available demonstration that the binding constraint in this rebuild is industrial time and not political will.

The German 2027 draft as the Bundestag states it

Einzelplan 14, the defence single plan, carries EUR 109.7 billion in the 2027 draft against EUR 82.7 billion in 2026. The Sondervermögen Bundeswehr, the off-budget special fund, carries a further EUR 29.9 billion against EUR 25.5 billion. Total defence spending in the draft is EUR 139.6 billion. Military procurement is stated at more than EUR 60 billion, composed of EUR 30.3 billion from Einzelplan 14 and EUR 29.9 billion from the Sondervermögen, against EUR 45 billion in 2026. The draft is Drucksache 21/7300.[51]

Three arithmetic consequences follow from those numbers. The Einzelplan 14 increase is EUR 27.0 billion, or 32.6 percent, year on year. The procurement increase is at least EUR 15 billion, or at least a third. And the stated procurement composition, EUR 30.3 billion from Einzelplan 14 plus EUR 29.9 billion from the Sondervermögen, accounts for the whole of the Sondervermögen's 2027 tranche of EUR 29.9 billion, so no part of that tranche sits outside the procurement line.[51] What that composition means for the fund's role is an assessment and is stated in the assessment that closes this section.

A note on a figure the firm should not carry forward. A EUR 55.8 billion procurement figure circulated in earlier working material and is not what the Bundestag states; the Bundestag states more than EUR 60 billion, and the EUR 30.3 billion plus EUR 29.9 billion decomposition is published. The EUR 55.8 billion figure is not used in this report.[51]

The calendar, which is the opposite of the American one

The 2027 budget had its first reading in plenary from Tuesday 8 to Friday 11 September 2026, with Einzelplan 14 debated on Wednesday 9 September. Budget Committee deliberations run from 23 September to 12 November 2026, with Einzelplan 14 deliberated on Thursday 8 October. The Bereinigungssitzung, the reconciliation sitting at which the committee settles the final figures, is Thursday 12 November 2026. Second and third readings run Tuesday 24 to Friday 27 November 2026, with the named final vote on 27 November.[51,52]

The contrast with Section 02 is the point of this section. The German instrument is a draft budget on a published calendar that terminates in a dated vote five weeks before the year it funds begins. The American instrument in force is a continuing resolution expiring 11 December 2026 that bars production-rate increases above FY2026-sustained levels, with the money that would replace the expended interceptors in a mandatory column contingent on a reconciliation measure neither chamber has passed.[12,13] One system has an appropriations problem. The other does not.

The EUR 25 million machinery, and what is genuinely uncertain about it

German procurement contracts above EUR 25 million are provisionally ineffective, schwebend unwirksam, until the Bundestag Budget Committee approves them. The legal basis is section 54(3) of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung and, since July 2022, section 5(3) of the Bundeswehrfinanzierungssondervermögensgesetz. The threshold has stood at EUR 25 million since a committee decision of 25 May 1981, originally DM 50 million, taken after the Tornado cost overruns. Approvals ran 55 in 2023, 97 in 2024 and 103 in 2025.[54] The 2025 total is stated by the German record at 103 proposals worth EUR 82.98 billion.[51]

The 2026 count stands at 44. The 8 July 2026 sitting, the committee's 44th and its last before the summer recess, approved 16 proposals worth over EUR 9.5 billion, the largest being four MEKO A-200 DEU anti-submarine frigates at EUR 6.3 billion firm with four options at EUR 5.3 billion, alongside the HoWiSM high-energy laser weapon system and a EUR 750 million Joint Fire Support Teams framework with a EUR 100 million first call-off.[56,57] No approval of a defence proposal is on the record between 8 July and 10 September 2026: the committee recessed after 8 July and the 8 to 11 September sitting week went to the plenary first reading.[54,56,57] The count has therefore been frozen at 44 for two months, a quarter of the year, and 44 against a 2025 base of 103 is behind the prior year's pace.

Three cautions belong with that count and the report states all three.

First, a distinction that is easy to get wrong. The six Budget Committee sessions falling between 14 September and 31 October 2026, on 23 and 24 September, 7 and 8 October, and 14 and 15 October, are *budget deliberation* sessions on the 2027 draft.[52,53] They are not the sittings at which EUR 25 million procurement proposals are approved, which are the committee's ordinary sittings. Anyone counting budget sessions as approval opportunities will overstate the throughput. The two must not be conflated.

Second, the BMVg's own planning document points the other way and is not reliable. The plan reported in September 2025, covering 153 proposals worth about EUR 83 billion from September 2025 to December 2026 with the F127 air-defence frigates as the largest single item at EUR 26.2 billion, schedules only eight defence proposals between 14 September and 31 October 2026: six on 23 September and two on 7 October.[55] That plan has been wrong in both directions all year. It planned three proposals for the 8 July sitting and 16 were approved; it planned twelve for 25 February and two were approved; it planned ten for 15 April and four were approved.[55,56,57] It is a scheduling intention, not a forecast, and this report does not use it as a base rate. That plan is reported by Sicherheit und Verteidigung from a BMVg document obtained by Politico; the underlying document is not public and the outlet is named here as the reporting outlet.[55]

Third, and most important for anyone who intends to score a forward claim on this: no Bundestag page publishes a running count of EUR 25 million defence approvals per sitting. The committee page publishes agendas and hearings only, and a search of the Bundestag text archive returned no per-sitting item for defence approvals.[53] The record that resolves the question is the BMVg press stream, indexed by the running date list on the ministry's own EUR 25 million explainer page, which publishes a release naming each tranche of approvals within a few days of each sitting.[54,59] The trade outlets that cover the same sittings disagree by up to five proposals on the same sitting: one gives 11 proposals for 8 July where two others give 16, and an H1 2026 cumulative of about 45 where both July pieces give 44.[58] A forward claim on the German approval rate is therefore genuinely uncertain, and the uncertainty is in the record rather than in the analysis.

SAFE: EUR 150 billion, and who is not in it

SAFE is Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106, adopted 27 May 2025, providing EUR 150 billion in long-maturity loans with a ten-year grace period. Nineteen member states expressed interest and demand exceeded the envelope; national defence investment plans were due 30 November 2025.[60,61] The tentative allocation adopted 9 September 2025 distributes the full EUR 150,000,000,000 across those nineteen, with Poland at EUR 43.73 billion, Romania at EUR 16.68 billion, France and Hungary at EUR 16.22 billion each, and Italy at EUR 14.90 billion at the top, down to Denmark at EUR 46.8 million.[62]

The allocation table used here rests on a law firm's reproduction of the Commission's 9 September 2025 allocation, not on the Commission's own annex, which the firm did not reach; the Commission press release links the annex but does not carry the table. The table is marked accordingly and named inline as A&O Shearman. Five of the nineteen figures are corroborated at Tier 1 by the Commission's own pages: Cyprus EUR 1.18 billion, Greece EUR 787.7 million, Lithuania EUR 6.4 billion, Poland EUR 43.7 billion and Romania EUR 16.68 billion.[60,62,63]

The absences are the finding. Germany takes no SAFE money at all. Neither do the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Slovenia, Luxembourg or Malta.[62] The largest defence budget increase in Europe is financed entirely from Einzelplan 14 and the Sondervermögen, not from EU borrowing, which means the German and the EU instruments are additive rather than the same money counted twice.

Approval ran in three waves: eight member states on 15 January 2026 at about EUR 38 billion combined, eight more on 26 January 2026 at about EUR 74 billion, and Czechia at EUR 2.06 billion and France at EUR 15.09 billion on 10 April 2026, which the Council stated brought the total to eighteen member states.[63,64,65] Hungary is the nineteenth and has no approved plan. Its EUR 16.2 billion, the joint third largest allocation, is unconverted. Hungary submitted a plan of EUR 17.4 billion in December 2025 and the Commission's stated position is that Hungary "requested more than it is entitled to".[66,67] Whether Hungary has been approved since 26 March 2026 is UNKNOWN; what would close it is a Commission or Council approval release naming Hungary. That reporting is paywalled and is named inline as Table.Briefings; the EUR 17.4 billion submission figure appears only in state media and does not stand alone here.[66,67]

Five states have drawn 15 percent pre-financing: Poland EUR 6.6 billion on 29 May 2026, the first payment to any member state and the first signed SAFE loan agreement; Cyprus EUR 177.2 million on 18 June 2026; Lithuania EUR 956.3 million on 24 June 2026; Greece EUR 118.2 million on 23 July 2026; and Estonia EUR 351.6 million on 12 August 2026.[68,60] No aggregate disbursement total across all member states is published: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a Commission statement of cumulative SAFE disbursement.

Approved loans can also land below the tentative allocation. France's approved EUR 15.09 billion is EUR 1.13 billion below its tentative EUR 16.22 billion. Estonia's approved total, implied at EUR 2.344 billion from a EUR 351.6 million payment at the stated 15 percent rate, is about EUR 317 million below its tentative EUR 2.661 billion.[62,65,68] The tentative allocation is therefore a ceiling and not a forecast of drawings, and the EUR 150 billion headline overstates what will be borrowed by an amount that is currently UNKNOWN.

The commitment above it, and the capacity beneath it

The Hague Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025 commits Allies "to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence- and security-related spending by 2035", split as at least 3.5 percent of GDP annually on core defence requirements and up to 1.5 percent on critical infrastructure, cyber defence, civil preparedness, innovation and strengthening the defence industrial base. The trajectory is to be reviewed in 2029.[69] The date is 2035, with a checkpoint four years out.

Rheinmetall's capacity milestones state the lag in company terms. Half-year 2026 sales were EUR 5.2 billion, up 39 percent, with an operating result of EUR 786 million at a 15.0 percent margin, nomination of EUR 16.2 billion and a backlog of EUR 80.5 billion at 30 June 2026 on a book-to-bill above 3.0. Operating free cash flow was minus EUR 1,616 million in the same half. The Weapon and Ammunition division spent EUR 184 million of capital expenditure in the half on UK barrel production, a new plant in Lithuania and the Nitrochemie Aschau powder expansion.[70] A record backlog and a negative operating cash flow in the same six months is the mechanism of this report expressed as an accounting identity: capacity is being bought ahead of the revenue.

The plant dates run past 2026 without exception. Unterlüß, on nearly EUR 500 million of investment, produced 25,000 rounds in 2025, is stated at 140,000 rounds for 2026 and reaches 350,000 rounds a year at full capacity from 2027, inside a group-wide target of about 1.5 million artillery shells a year from 2027.[71] No 2026 Rheinmetall statement confirming the 140,000 has been achieved was found: UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a company statement of 2026 Unterlüß output. At Nitrochemie Aschau am Inn, where the foundation was laid on 23 July 2026, EUR 350 million is invested inside a EUR 500 million programme to raise propellant charge modules from 300,000 to over one million a year and add 2,500 tonnes a year of powder, taking the site to 4,200 tonnes a year against a group target of 20,000 tonnes a year by 2030. Production starts gradually in 2027 and reaches maximum capacity in 2028.[72] Nothing in the Aschau release addresses nitrocellulose feedstock supply, which is the layer Section 04 identifies as binding. Further capacity items reported from the second-quarter call, an RDX plant at Várpalota in Hungary ready in 2027, a rocket plant at Burgos in Spain, a rocket-motor facility at Unterlüß ready in the first quarter of 2027 and a drone line ready at the end of 2026, come from an outlet not on the firm's allowlist and are named here as defence-industry.eu; the same account quotes the backlog at EUR 80.4 billion, and the company's own EUR 80.5 billion figure is used instead.[73] All Rheinmetall figures are company material and are claim sources.

The two European corroborations of the firm's June judgment

Two European primaries state the lag the June report identified, in their own words, with dates.

Alzchem, the single source of US nitroguanidine, is doubling German capacity at Trostberg for about EUR 152 million, commissioning in the second half of 2026, with revenues "in the upper double-digit million range from 2027 onwards". The US Department of Defense has committed USD 150 million towards a potential US facility by the end of 2029, and as of February 2026 the site for that plant had not been selected: site selection "is expected to be completed in the course of 2026".[41,42] Money committed in 2024, commissioning in 2026, revenue from 2027, and the American plant a 2029 project on an unchosen site.

Chemring spent GBP 44 million of energetics expansion capital in the six months to 30 April 2026, against an order book of GBP 1,399.4 million, the highest in its history, and half-year revenue of GBP 237.3 million. Its three capacity programmes, at Chicago, in Scotland and in Norway, will together raise revenue by GBP 100 million a year and operating profit by GBP 30 million a year "from 2028 when the three capacity expansion programmes are complete".[49] Both are company material and claim sources.

Money committed now, throughput two years out, on both sides of the Atlantic. That is CLM-2026-081 stated by European suppliers about European plants, and it is the reason the appropriations distinction between Berlin and Washington does not produce a difference in delivery date.

Two details that cut against a lazy reading

Allied buying is not free of the American constraint, and it is not only a claim on it.

Sweden announced on 7 September 2026 the purchase of HIMARS from Lockheed Martin for about SEK 7 billion, financed inside the Swedish Armed Forces investment plan under the Total Defence Bill 2025 to 2030 as an "opportune purchase", with first deliveries in 2027; the launcher quantity is not stated. Defense News values the buy at about $730 million.[74,75] HIMARS and GMLRS are built at Camden, Arkansas. Camden is also the load-assemble-pack site the Inspector General's tables project from 5,000 rounds a month in March 2026 to 20,000 in September 2026 and 50,000 by December 2027, the largest proportional expansion in the 155mm programme.[37] Allied buying and US artillery expansion are therefore competing for one industrial site, and a European purchase that reads as European rearmament lands on the American critical path.

Running the other way: Lockheed Martin is reported to be moving PAC-3 MSE subcomponent work into Poland under offset, with Wojskowe Zakłady Elektroniczne building attitude-control systems and, from an August 2026 purchase order, Enhanced Launcher Electronic Station and J-Box units, with the Polish line verified to US government standards in 2025 and first deliveries to the United States scheduled for 2027. No production-rate figures were disclosed.[76] If that holds, it is the first located instance of a European supplier being inserted into the PAC-3 MSE line to relieve a US bottleneck rather than to buy from it, and it complicates KJ-4's framing of partner industry as a demand claimant: allied industry would also be a supply-side input. That reporting is UNVERIFIED, comes from an outlet not on the firm's allowlist and is named here as defence-industry.eu; it carries no judgment on its own and no key judgment in this report rests on it. It is presented as the complication it is. What would close it is a Lockheed Martin or Polish Armaments Agency statement naming the WZE work packages and the 2027 delivery date.

> **ASSESSMENT · MODERATE CONFIDENCE.**
>
> Europe is running the same 2027 to 2029 delivery clock as the United States under the opposite fiscal posture, which locates the binding constraint in industrial time rather than in appropriations: Germany's draft raises Einzelplan 14 by 32.6 percent to EUR 109.7 billion on a calendar that terminates in a dated vote on 27 November 2026, SAFE is disbursing cash to five states, and the Hague commitment is signed, yet every European capacity date located here is 2027 or later, with Unterlüß at full rate from 2027, Aschau at maximum capacity in 2028, Alzchem paying revenue from 2027 and Chemring "from 2028".[51,52,68,69,71,72,41,49] On the composition of the German figure, the firm assesses that the Sondervermögen is functioning as the procurement account rather than as a supplement to it, because the whole of its EUR 29.9 billion 2027 tranche is inside the stated procurement total of more than EUR 60 billion and Einzelplan 14 supplies only EUR 30.3 billion of that total.[51] Rationale: the German budget figures and the SAFE approval and disbursement record are primary and strong, and the company capacity dates are dated company primaries, but the section's other load-bearing element, the state of the EUR 25 million approval machinery, rests on trade outlets that disagree with each other by up to five proposals per sitting against a record no Bundestag page publishes, and the SAFE allocation table rests on a law firm's reproduction rather than the Commission's annex; MODERATE is what that mixture supports, and a HIGH mark would be claiming the uncertain half.[54,58,62]

SECTION 06 · ASSESSMENT

The Gap at Erbil

Air defence is leaving a theatre on a fixed date, the interceptors that would replace it are queued behind a bill, and the country losing the cover is buying its replacement from Seoul and Ankara.

Iraq is a small case and it is the report's clearest demonstration of the mechanism. On 30 September 2026 the coalition mission ends; on the same date FY2026 closes and the American interceptor account passes into a continuing resolution that forbids the ramp. What replaces the cover at Erbil is not on order from the line this report has been describing.

The date, and where it comes from

The governing text is the US-Iraq joint statement of 27 September 2024. It sets two phases: the coalition military mission in Iraq concludes "over the next twelve months, and no later than the end of September 2025", and "the military mission of the Coalition operating in Syria from a platform determined in the HMC will continue until September 2026".[77] What falls on 30 September 2026 is the end of that second phase, the phase conducted from an Iraqi platform.

The Iraqi government describes it in wider terms. Lieutenant General Abdul Amir al-Shammari has stated to the Iraqi News Agency that 30 September 2026 is "the fixed and final date for ending the military mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq", and that 1 October marks Iraq "free of any foreign military presence"; Qasim al-Araji has confirmed the date. The same account states that US air defence in Erbil, specifically Patriot batteries, is to be removed, and names Harir in Erbil, Camp Victory and the Green Zone as the sites.[78] Reporting on 8 September 2026 describes the withdrawal of "all US-led coalition air-defence systems, including those deployed in the Kurdistan Region", with "Patriot and C-Ram capabilities" around Erbil, and states that Iraq is holding "continuous meetings with reputable companies" for air defence without naming any bidder.[79] That second outlet is not on the firm's allowlist and is named here as The National.

What is not on the record

No CENTCOM or Pentagon statement confirms the Patriot and C-RAM removal. CENTCOM's press releases from 5 August to 8 September 2026 carry no withdrawal announcement; the only Operation Inherent Resolve item in that period is a change-of-command ceremony on 11 August 2026, and the recent releases are strikes on IRGC tankers on 5 and 8 September, the completion of strikes on IRGC targets in Iran on 1 September, and the first multinational attack drone task force on 13 August.[1]

The 30 September 2026 date is verified from the agreement text and Iraqi government statements.[77,78] The removal of Patriot and C-RAM cover from Erbil is not. It rests on Iraqi officials and press, with no US primary, and this report prints it as a press-only claim and nothing more. That is precisely why the forward claim is worth locking: a CENTCOM or Department announcement that the coalition mission has completed, and whether it names air defence, resolves the question in one document. Until it exists, the state of air defence at Erbil after 1 October 2026 is UNKNOWN, and what would close it is a CENTCOM completion announcement or a Department of War statement naming the systems withdrawn.

What Iraq is buying instead

Iraq's located air defence purchases do not run through the American line. An eight-battery Cheongung-II arrangement with LIG Nex1 of South Korea, reported at $2.8 billion, was signed in

2024, with financing reported finalised in 2026. Twenty Turkish ASELSAN KORKUT-family counter-drone systems were finalised in early May 2026. The existing inventory is mixed: US Avenger, Russian Pantsir-S1 and Igla-S. No Patriot offer to Iraq was located.[80] That account comes from an outlet not on the firm's allowlist and is named here as The New Arab; the $2.8 billion Cheongung-II figure was also reported by Breaking Defense in September 2024, which the firm did not fetch. It carries no judgment on its own, and the absence of a located Patriot offer is an absence in the searched record rather than evidence that none was made.

The 2026 US notifications to Iraq that do exist are not air defence. Very Small Aperture Terminals on 14 January 2026, $110 million total including a previously valued $46 million case, prime Network Innovations.[81] Contracted logistical services for VACIS XPL passenger vehicle scanning systems on 5 February 2026, $90 million, prime Leidos.[82] Bell 412EPX and Bell 407M helicopters on 31 August 2026, $800 million, prime Bell Textron.[34] Further Bell 412EPX helicopters on 4 September 2026, $150 million.[83] Helicopters, scanning-system logistics and satellite terminals. Nothing in the 2026 Iraq notification record loads a Patriot, a THAAD or an interceptor of any kind.

What the case demonstrates and what it does not

Set the two halves of the ledger against each other on the same date. On 30 September 2026 the coalition mission ends and, on the American side, FY2026 closes with the PAC-3 MSE line running at 94.4 percent Foreign Military Sales funding on the one lot whose split is public, 1,030 rounds notified to two Gulf partners in 2026, an FY2027 discretionary request of 267 rounds across the Army and the Navy with 244 of them in the Army P-1 line, against the 357 rounds the Army bought in FY2026, and the balance of the request in a mandatory column contingent on a reconciliation measure that has not passed.[9,10,13,17,20,21] A partner that needs air defence on a date certain arrives at a line that is full and whose forward quantities are contingent. The sale goes to a supplier whose line is not full.

What that demonstrates is bounded and the report keeps it bounded. Two purchases from two suppliers by one state, both sourced to outlets off the firm's allowlist, are not a market shift. Whether this is a durable reallocation of interceptor demand away from US production or a single procurement driven by Iraqi politics and price is genuinely unknown on this evidence, and no key judgment in this report rests on the Iraqi case. What would distinguish the two is a second and third state with an open Patriot requirement selecting a non-US upper-tier or medium-tier system in 2027, which is an indicator the Outlook section can carry.

ASSESSMENT · MODERATE CONFIDENCE.

The 30 September 2026 date is firm and the procurement response points away from the American line, but the specific claim that carries the section, the removal of Patriot and C-RAM cover from Erbil, is press-only with no US primary behind it. Rationale: the withdrawal date rests on the 27 September 2024 joint statement text plus named Iraqi officials, and the absence of any air defence line in the 2026 Iraq notification record is a Tier 1 negative finding, but the Erbil removal and the Cheongung-II and KORKUT purchases all rest on outlets not on the firm's allowlist and would be raised or falsified by a single CENTCOM completion announcement.[77,78,79,80,1]

SECTION 07 · OUTLOOK

Outlook

Three Scenarios to the 11 December Expiry.

Construction confidence reflects analytical quality, not probability. Each scenario carries a velocity and a triggering signal, and each is stated twice: once for the legislative vehicle and once for the production line, because the two do not move together. The question is not which bill number advances. It is whether section 102(a)(2) of H.R. 6500 stops capping munitions production at FY2026-sustained rates, and if so, when metal reaches a plant.

The calendar is the first fact. The Senate is out from 5 October to 6 November, the election falls on 3 November, and the published lame-duck working weeks are 9 to 10 November, 16 to 20 November, and 30 November to 18 December. That is seventeen Senate weekday session days between the election and the 11 December expiry, and twenty-two Senate weekday session days to the year's last scheduled day.[85] The count is Senate-only. No House 2026 legislative calendar was collected by this cell, and a funding vehicle needs both chambers, so the joint working window is UNKNOWN and may be shorter than seventeen days; what would close it is the House majority leader's published 2026 legislative calendar, which is registered as gap C-1 at P1. Into those days run four unfinished vehicles: twelve FY2027 appropriations bills of which three have passed the House floor and none has had a Senate defence markup; an NDAA that passed the House 216 to 212 on 22 July 2026 and on which Senate cloture failed 50 to 46 on 14 July; an $87.6 billion Iran supplemental that Democrats oppose over the war and over unobligated 2025 reconciliation balances; and a reconciliation package for which no concurrent budget resolution has been adopted, the Senate having postponed its vote past the August recess. CSIS reports Republicans floating a "Reconciliation 4.0" for after the midterms, which is a statement that the reconciliation vehicle is being planned into 2027, not into December.

UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable: the historical rate at which a lame-duck Congress converts a December CR into enacted full-year defence appropriations.

The judgment this section carries on that calendar is KJ-7, and it is stated in the form the evidence supports and no wider. **KJ-7 (MODERATE).** The lame-duck session is the last scheduled opportunity to lift the freeze before the rebuild slips a fiscal year. Seventeen Senate weekday session days separate the election from the 11 December expiry, and no House 2026 calendar was collected, so the joint working window is UNKNOWN and may be shorter. That proposition and the Baseline scenario below are consistent rather than in tension, and the distinction is worth stating because an earlier draft of this report blurred it. Baseline holds that the modal outcome is that the lame duck decides nothing. KJ-7 holds that there is no further scheduled opportunity inside FY2027 to decide, so a lame duck that decides nothing is the mechanism by which the rebuild moves into the next fiscal year and the next Congress. The report does not claim that the lame duck is the decision point for the entire rebuild, and any sentence to that effect has been removed.

Baseline · The Freeze Extends. Construction Confidence: High · Velocity: Gradual. Congress does at 11 December what it did on 2 September: it passes another continuing resolution, short-dated into the new Congress or extended to the end of FY2027, and it does so without a munitions anomaly, because the September precedent shows the anomalies that survive a CR negotiation are the ones with a named prior-year cost-growth ledger behind them. H.R. 6500 carried three: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy for prior-year cost growth on twenty named lines, Procurement Defense-Wide up to $2,853,000,000 for National Security Systems, and military construction. Munitions, Golden Dome, missile defence, interceptors, Iran, Israel and Ukraine appear in none of them. Nothing in the September negotiation suggests a constituency for a munitions carve-out that was absent when the bill was drafted, and the sequencing bar on reconciliation is mechanical rather than political: no adopted budget resolution means no reconciliation instructions, and no instructions means no privileged bill to move in seventeen Senate weekday session days.[85] For the production lines this is the least dramatic and most consequential outcome. Section 102(a)(2) continues to bar production-rate increases above FY2026-sustained levels and section 102(b) continues to bar the initiation of a multi-year procurement by means of advance procurement funding for economic order quantity, which on its face reaches the SM-6 multi-year the Department asked to initiate in FY2027 and the Tomahawk multi-year it planned to leverage, though the request language quoted in Section 02 does not itself establish the economic order quantity element in either case. The FY2027 request of 3,203 PAC-3 MSE, 857 THAAD, 540 SM-6, 214 SM-3 and 785 Tomahawk does not begin, because between 80 and 100 percent of each of those quantities sits in the mandatory column. What does not stop is the work already bought: the $4.5 billion the Army obligated into 155mm between February 2022 and September 2025, the DPA Title III solid-rocket-motor awards, and above all the foreign military sales stream, which is partner-funded through the FMS trust fund and is not what section 102 restrains. The April 2026 PAC-3 MSE lot was 94.4 percent FMS-funded, $4,496,040,000 of $4,761,000,000. Under this scenario the Camden and Grand Prairie lines stay warm on allied money and the US Army remains the residual claimant on them into a third calendar year. Baseline has two branches, and they are separated by what they do to a production line rather than by what they do to a bill. Branch one is a short continuing resolution into the first quarter of 2027, which freezes the FY2026-sustained rate for a further quarter and leaves the FY2027 increment recoverable inside the fiscal year. Branch two is a full-year continuing resolution running to 30 September 2027, which freezes that rate for a further fiscal year, forecloses the SM-6 seven-year multi-year the Department asked to initiate in FY2027 and the Tomahawk multi-year it planned to leverage, and pushes the first year of the ramp into FY2028 appropriations. To a forging shop or an energetics supplier these are not the same document: one defers a capex tranche by a quarter, the other moves it into a different fiscal year and a different Congress, and the projections the Inspector General published for September 2026 and December 2027 were built on an increment that only branch one leaves reachable. This report watches for branch two, because it is the branch that is invisible in the headline and decisive on the plant floor, and the indicator that distinguishes them is the expiry date carried in the enrolled text of the next continuing resolution on govinfo, read before its topline. SIGNAL TO WATCH: A NEW CONTINUING RESOLUTION TEXT ON GOVINFO WHOSE DEFENCE ANOMALY SECTIONS AGAIN NAME ONLY SHIPBUILDING, NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION; NO SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE DEFENCE MARKUP NOTICED BEFORE 30 NOVEMBER.

Deterioration · The Freeze Hardens. Construction Confidence: Moderate · Velocity: Rapid. The 11 December deadline is met with either a lapse in appropriations or, more damaging on a twelve-month view, a full-year continuing resolution running to 30 September 2027. The two look different in the press and converge on the plant floor. A lapse stops contracting officers from awarding and stops the Defense Contract Audit Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency work that definitizes undefinitized contract actions, which matters because the largest single interceptor commitment on the record, Lockheed Martin's seven-year PAC-3 MSE modification of up to $53.86 billion announced 29 July 2026 on top of the April award, is a UCA. A full-year CR does something worse and quieter: it makes FY2026-sustained rates the operating rate for the whole of FY2027, forecloses the SM-6 seven-year multi-year the Department asked to initiate in FY2027 and the Tomahawk multi-year it planned to leverage, and pushes the first year of the interceptor ramp into FY2028 appropriations that will themselves be written by a new Congress. General Guetlein's August formulation applies beyond Golden Dome: a CR does not help a programme that has no top line to fall back to. For the lines, the metal-parts problem compounds rather than pauses. The DoD Inspector General put 155mm projectile metal parts at 46,000 rounds per month in March 2026 against a 101,000 projection for September 2026, with Mesquite counted at zero and unable to produce a single conforming projectile metal part, and load-assemble-pack at 36,000 against a 63,000 September projection. Those projections were built on funded expansion; a full-year freeze removes the FY2027 increment that carries them to the 140,000 December 2027 target. UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable: the base rate of appropriations lapses at a December CR expiry, and the credible interval on how long one lasts. SIGNAL TO WATCH: CR TEXT WITH AN EXPIRY DATE OF 30 SEPTEMBER 2027 RATHER THAN A DATE

IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2027; OR THE ABSENCE OF ANY SCHEDULED SENATE VOTE ON A FUNDING VEHICLE IN THE WEEK OF 7 DECEMBER.

Stabilization · The Column Clears. Construction Confidence: Low to Moderate · Velocity: Event-driven. A funding vehicle actually enacts before the Senate leaves on 18 December: a full-year Defense appropriations act, most plausibly inside an omnibus or a minibus built on H.R. 9495 and its roughly $1.072 trillion topline, or the NDAA finally cleared alongside it, or a reconciliation measure carrying the $60 billion for defence that both chambers' budget resolutions provide against the $350 billion requested. Any of the three lifts section 102 and restores the multi-year and economic-order-quantity authorities, and only the reconciliation route funds the mandatory column as the FY2027 request books it. An earlier draft of this report treated the appropriations and omnibus routes as outside its falsification set and noted the exclusion without remarking on it. That was a defect, because those are the routes this report considers most likely of the three, and a thesis that cannot be broken by its own most likely disconfirming event is not being tested. The falsification conditions below are restated to close it. The reconciliation route also has the longest mechanical runway ahead of it, because it must begin with a concurrent budget resolution that has not been adopted. For the production lines, the important discipline is that enactment is not delivery. On the CSIS five-year series, first deliveries run 29 months from contract for PAC-3 MSE and 42 to a full lot, 49 and 53 for THAAD, 35 and 47 for Tomahawk, 42 and 53 for SM-6. Money enacted on 18 December 2026 therefore puts first PAC-3 MSE metal from that money in mid-2029 and first THAAD metal in early 2031, against THAAD deliveries that have not resumed since August 2023 and are scheduled to restart in April 2027 on earlier contracts. The feedstock layer is on its own clock underneath all of it: Alzchem's German nitroguanidine doubling commissions in the second half of 2026 and pays revenue from 2027, its US nitroguanidine plant is a $150 million commitment for end-2029 whose site was unselected as of February 2026, and Chemring states its three energetics expansions raise revenue from 2028. SIGNAL TO WATCH: A CLOTURE VOTE FILED ON A FY2027 DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS VEHICLE IN THE WEEK OF 16 NOVEMBER; OR ADOPTION OF A CONCURRENT BUDGET RESOLUTION CARRYING RECONCILIATION INSTRUCTIONS IN EITHER CHAMBER BEFORE 30 NOVEMBER.

SECTION 08 · WATCHLIST

The three conditions on which this report is falsifiable

The report is falsifiable on three conditions, stated here in the form the manager locked on 10 September 2026 and printed in the same words wherever this report refers to falsification.

Condition 1, the one that can bite. Enactment of any full-year FY2027 defence appropriations vehicle, by any procedural route, carrying quantities above the FY2026 buy for the four interceptor lines whose discretionary request falls below it: PAC-3 MSE above 357, THAAD above 55, SM-6 above

166, and SM-3 Block IB above 42. The condition is written against those four rather than against interceptors generally because SM-3 Block IIA and Tomahawk are already above their FY2026 quantities in the discretionary column as requested, so a looser wording would be satisfied by enacting the request unchanged while the judgment it is meant to test stood intact. This breaks KJ-1 and KJ-2 directly and is the route the report considers most likely of the three that would clear the freeze.

Condition 2. Enactment of a reconciliation measure providing at least $50 billion for the Department of Defense before 31 December 2026. Two disclosures travel with it, both on the page: the firm's own probability on this event is 0.10 and it is sequencing-barred by the argument the report itself makes, so it is unlikely to bite inside the window; and $50 billion is a low bar in adequacy terms, since both budget resolutions already carry $60 billion against $350 billion requested.

Condition 3. Projectile metal-parts capacity reaching the Inspector General's own September 2026 projection of 101,000 rounds per month with the Mesquite facility producing conforming parts. This breaks KJ-5.

These three replace an earlier pair in which the most likely disconfirming event was excluded by construction. Condition 1 is the addition that closes that defect. Condition 3 replaces a condition on Radford Grade A nitrocellulose that falsified nothing this report asserts, because KJ-6 excludes Radford by design, and whose test window closed on 30 September 2026, a week before publication.

ASSESSMENT · MODERATE CONFIDENCE.

Baseline is the outcome the record supports, and this analyst reaches it independently of the manager's read rather than by adopting it: the binding constraint is not appetite but sequencing, since no Senate defence appropriations markup has occurred, no concurrent budget resolution exists to carry reconciliation instructions, the NDAA has already failed cloture once, and seventeen Senate weekday session days separate the election from the expiry, with the joint working window UNKNOWN because no House calendar was collected.[85] The refinement this analyst would add is that the consequential branch sits inside Baseline rather than between the three scenarios: a short CR into the first quarter of 2027 and a full-year CR to 30 September 2027 are the same document to a reader and two different years to a forging shop, and the report should say which one it is watching for. Confidence is moderate rather than high because a post-election Congress is a different body from the one that failed cloture in July, and because the supplemental and the NDAA can be attached to a funding vehicle at a speed the calendar alone does not predict. The three falsification conditions above are set so that the scenario this analyst calls modal is not also the scenario the report is insulated against: condition 1 breaks KJ-1 and KJ-2 on any full-year vehicle by any route, which is the Stabilization branch the analyst rates most likely of the three that clear the freeze, and condition 3 breaks KJ-5 on a plant measure that owes nothing to the legislative calendar. Rationale: the sequencing bar on reconciliation is mechanical and documented, the September CR's anomaly list is on the enrolled text, and the seventeen-day count is arithmetic on the Senate's own published 2026 schedule, which is Senate-only.[85]

Section 07 rests on the documentary record cited through Sections 01 to 06 and registered below: the enrolled text of H.R. 6500, the Senate's published 2026 schedule, CRS IN12704, the CSIS appropriations tracker and the Last Rounds tables, the FY2027 Weapons book and P-1, DOWIG-2026-095, the contract announcement of 9 April 2026, and the Alzchem and Chemring disclosures.

The forward tranche

The firm locks seven resolvable claims with this report. Each is stated here in the words it carries in the ledger, with the firm's own probability, the source that resolves it and the date it resolves. Three of the seven are expected to resolve NO and are locked anyway, because a scorecard assembled only from comfortable claims measures nothing.

CR-3-C1	The United States Senate holds a recorded cloture vote on a fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act measure on or before 9 October 2026.	**p=0.08** 2026-10-09
CR-3-C2	A joint resolution of disapproval concerning the Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack Munitions Extended Range transmittal (26-35) or the AGT-1500 engines transmittal (26-68), both notified 4 September 2026, receives a recorded vote on the floor of the United States Senate on or before 9 October 2026.	**p=0.10** 2026-10-09
CR-3-C3	United States Central Command or the Department of War publicly announces the completion of the military mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq on or before 30 September 2026.	**p=0.50** 2026-10-05
CR-3-C4	The Department of War announces at least one new Golden Dome, space based interceptor, or Missile Defense Agency SHIELD task order award in its daily contract announcements between 1 October and 15 November 2026 inclusive.	**p=0.40** 2026-11-16
CR-3-C5	Congress enacts a reconciliation measure providing at least $50 billion in new budget authority for the Department of Defense on or before 31 December 2026.	**p=0.10** 2026-12-31
CR-3-C6	Fiscal year 2026 Department of Defense contract obligations under Product Service Code 14xx (guided missiles) exceed $38.0 billion as reported by USAspending.gov.	**p=0.60** 2026-12-15
CR-3-C7	The Haushaltsausschuss of the German Bundestag approves at least 20 defence procurement proposals of more than EUR 25 million between 14 September and 31 October 2026 inclusive.	**p=0.18** 2026-11-07

The resolution rule for each is recorded in full with the claim, so that two readers scoring it independently would reach the same answer. CR-3-C7 carries a stated tolerance of plus or minus two proposals because no official running count is published and the trade outlets that cover the sittings disagree by up to five on a single sitting.

Indicators to the 11 December expiry

Method note for the manager: hand-built by the Scenario analyst from the collection record. The BRIER kernel was unreachable, so no indicator carries a base rate, a threshold derived from a class match, or a credible interval. Where one of those would have been the right instrument the cell is written `UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable` and routed in `gaps_module12.md`. Every source named below is a public register a reader can open without a subscription or a clearance.

Thirteen indicators. Six are falsifying: three carry the three conditions on which the report's thesis is stated to be falsifiable, and three would falsify a named key judgment. They are marked in the last column and restated after the table, because the thesis is published as falsifiable and this is where that promise is kept.

The set

01 **Whether a Senate floor vote or cloture filing appears on any FY2027 defence appropriations vehicle in the lame-duck weeks of 9 to 10 November, 16 to 20 November and 30 November to 18 December**

CADENCE: Weekly while the Senate is in session | SOURCE: Senate legislative schedule and roll-call vote pages, senate.gov

> A filed cloture motion before 11 December moves the read toward Stabilization. Silence through the week of 16 November leaves Baseline standing, because seventeen weekday session days separate the election from the expiry

02 **Adoption of a concurrent budget resolution carrying reconciliation instructions for defence in either chamber**

CADENCE: Weekly | SOURCE: Congressional Record and the House and Senate Budget Committee pages

> This is the mechanical gate on reconciliation: no adopted resolution means no privileged bill. Adoption before 30 November is the first honest sign that the mandatory column can move in this Congress

03 **Enactment of a reconciliation measure carrying at least $50 billion for DoD before 31 December 2026**

CADENCE: Weekly, daily in the week of 7 December | SOURCE: govinfo public-law and enrolled-bill texts; White House bill-signing statements

> FALSIFIES THE THESIS. Both chambers' budget resolutions provide $60 billion for defence against the $350 billion requested, so an enacted measure at the resolution level clears the $50 billion bar and the report's central claim fails

04 **A published Army confirmation that Radford Army Ammunition Plant has reached initial Grade A nitrocellulose capability**

CADENCE: Weekly, with the reported Q4 FY2026 target expiring 30 September 2026 | SOURCE: army.mil news releases; DoD IG reports index at dodig.mil; GAO reports

Bears on CLM-2026-078 and on KJ-6. Not a falsification condition for this report: KJ-6 excludes Radford by design, so a confirmation would cost the report nothing it has staked. The Q4 FY2026 target rests on a single trade-press account of an unpublished Army report and is UNCONFIRMED at primary level; a primary confirmation would close the most acute single-source position the firm has named since June

05 **Daily contract announcements naming PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, SM-6, Tomahawk or 155mm metal parts, read for the funding-source line**

CADENCE: Daily, digested weekly, with earnings dates as checkpoints | SOURCE: war.gov daily contract announcements (GlobalSecurity date mirrors where the listing page is unreachable)

FALSIFIES KJ-2 IN PART. An award funded from FY2027 US procurement appropriations at a quantity above the FY2026-sustained rate means section 102(a)(2) has stopped binding. An award funded from FMS balances confirms KJ-3 and KJ-4 instead: the allied stream, not the appropriated one, is holding the line at rate. Read the same stream for definitization of the seven-year PAC-3 MSE modification of up to $53.86 billion announced 29 July 2026: definitization requires appropriated funds behind it, and continued undefinitized status into 2027 is the clean evidence that the largest interceptor commitment on the record is still unfunded paper

06 **Monthly obligation postings under PSC 13xx (ammunition and explosives) and 14xx (guided missiles)**

CADENCE: Monthly, with the standing 90-day publication lag; the FY2026 September close becomes visible about December 2026 | SOURCE: USAspending.gov API and award-search downloads

The September share of the year ran 39 to 43 percent for 13xx and 25 to 42 percent for 14xx in FY2024 and FY2025. An FY2026 September share inside that band confirms the surge is habitual rather than a rebuild; a share materially above it would show the Department front-loading before the freeze. UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable: the tolerance band that should count as materially above

07 **New congressional notifications of PAC-3 MSE, PAC-2 GEM-T, THAAD or JDAM cases, and the closing of the AECA thirty-day review on the 4 September Saudi transmittals about 4 October 2026**

CADENCE: Weekly | SOURCE: State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, arms-sales congressional notifications page (DSCA no longer publishes, per Executive Order 14383)

Each new interceptor case deepens the allied claim on the same lines the US Army is waiting on and hardens KJ-4. 1,030 PAC-3 MSE rounds were notified to two Gulf partners in 2026 against an FY2027 discretionary buy of 267. A first Gulf THAAD case would extend the queue past the April 2027 delivery restart

08 **DPA Title III determinations, presidential determinations and industrial-base notices touching energetics, nitrocellulose, ammonium perchlorate, rayon precursor or projectile metal parts**

CADENCE: Weekly | SOURCE: Federal Register

New Title III money is capital, not throughput, and confirms CLM-2026-081 rather than refuting it. Read the commissioning date in each notice, not the dollar figure: a determination whose stated capability date falls inside FY2027 would be the first counter-example the firm has found

09 **Bundestag Haushaltsausschuss approvals of EUR 25 million defence proposals, the Bereinigungssitzung of 12 November 2026 and the final budget vote of 27 November 2026**

CADENCE: Weekly, with 12 and 27 November as fixed checkpoints | SOURCE: BMVg press stream, indexed from the BMVg 25-Millionen-Euro-Vorlagen explainer page; Bundestag Textarchiv for the budget calendar

European approvals load the same feedstock layer as the US ramp, and the 2026 count has stood at 44 since 8 July. A heavy autumn tranche tightens propellant, powder and nitroguanidine supply against US demand rather than relieving it. UNKNOWN, kernel unreachable: the base rate of approvals per sitting, which the trade press reports with disagreements of up to five proposals per sitting

10 **The defence anomaly sections of any new continuing resolution, read for a munitions or missile-defence carve-out**

CADENCE: Event-driven, at each funding vehicle | SOURCE: govinfo enrolled bill text

FALSIFIES KJ-2. H.R. 6500 carried anomalies only for Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy, National Security Systems at up to $2,853,000,000, and military construction. An anomaly that lifts the section 102(a)(2) rate cap for munitions, or that restores the section 102(b) multi-year and economic-order-quantity authority, would break the judgment that the CR is a production-rate freeze rather than a neutral bridge

11 **Follow-up reporting on 155mm projectile metal-parts capacity, including whether Mesquite produces a conforming part**

CADENCE: Monthly | SOURCE: DoD IG reports index at dodig.mil; GAO reports; Army public affairs

FALSIFIES KJ-5. The IG series is 46,000 rounds per month of metal parts in March 2026 against a 101,000 September 2026 projection, with Mesquite at zero, and load-assemble-pack at 36,000 against 63,000. Metal parts reported at or near the 101,000 projection, with Mesquite producing, would move the binding constraint back off the metal-parts step

12 **Q3 2026 and Q4 2026 earnings disclosures on backlog composition, FMS share and munitions segment margin**

CADENCE: Quarterly, at each announced earnings date | SOURCE: sec.gov 8-K and 10-Q filings for Lockheed Martin, RTX, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics and L3Harris; company reports for Rheinmetall, Chemring and Alzchem

BEARS ON KJ-4. Backlog is not cash. Read operating free cash flow against backlog and read any disclosed FMS share of missile-segment backlog. Rheinmetall's H1 2026 operating free cash flow was minus EUR 1,616 million against a record EUR 80.5 billion backlog, which is what buying capacity ahead of revenue looks like on a cash statement. BEARS ON KJ-4: a disclosed Foreign Military Sales share of interceptor work materially smaller than the one published lot split implies would weaken the judgment

13 **Enactment of any full-year FY2027 defence appropriations vehicle, by any route, and the quantities it carries for PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, SM-6 and SM-3 Block IB**

CADENCE: On each enactment, and weekly on the Senate floor schedule | SOURCE: govinfo.gov enrolled bill text and public laws; the accompanying committee report tables; congress.gov

FALSIFIES THE THESIS, condition 1. Compare the enacted interceptor quantities line by line against the FY2026 buy given in Section 02. Quantities above the FY2026 buy break KJ-1 and KJ-2 whatever the procedural route, including a route that never touches reconciliation.

What would falsify the report

The thesis is published as falsifiable on three conditions, and the indicator set watches all three.

Condition 1 is watched by indicator 13. Enactment of any full-year FY2027 defence appropriations vehicle, by any procedural route, carrying quantities above the FY2026 buy for the four interceptor lines whose discretionary request falls below it, which is PAC-3 MSE above 357, THAAD above 55, SM-6 above 166 and SM-3 Block IB above 42, would break KJ-1 and KJ-2 directly. The condition names those four rather than interceptors generally because SM-3 Block IIA and Tomahawk are already above their FY2026 quantities in the discretionary column as requested, so a looser wording would be satisfied by enacting the request unchanged while the judgment it tests stood intact. This is the condition an earlier draft of this report did not have, and its absence was the report's most serious structural defect: the routes the report itself considers most likely to clear the freeze, a full-year appropriations act or an omnibus, were outside the falsification set entirely. A thesis that cannot be broken by its own most likely disconfirming event is not being tested.

Condition 2 is watched by indicator 3. If a reconciliation measure carrying at least $50 billion for the Department of Defense is enacted before 31 December 2026, the claim that the FY2027 rebuild has been funded in a vehicle that does not yet exist fails, and it fails cleanly, because the vehicle will then exist. Two disclosures travel with this condition. The firm's own probability on the event is 0.10 and the route is sequencing-barred by the argument this report itself makes, so it is unlikely to bite inside the window. And $50 billion is a low bar in adequacy terms, since both budget resolutions already carry $60 billion against the $350 billion requested, so a measure at the resolution level clears the bar while funding barely a sixth of the ask. The test is enactment, not adequacy.

Condition 3 is watched by indicator 11. Projectile metal-parts capacity reaching the Inspector General's own September 2026 projection of 101,000 rounds per month, with the Mesquite facility producing conforming parts, would break KJ-5.

Indicator 4, which watches for a published Army confirmation that Radford has reached initial Grade A nitrocellulose capability, is retained as an indicator but is no longer a falsification condition. It was one in an earlier draft, which was a defect: KJ-6 excludes Radford by design, so confirming it would have cost the report nothing it had staked, and the target window closed on 30 September 2026, a week before publication. It still matters to CLM-2026-078, which is why it stays in the set.

Three further indicators falsify a named judgment rather than the thesis. Indicator 10 falsifies KJ-2 if a munitions anomaly appears in a new continuing resolution. Indicator 5 falsifies KJ-2 in part, and KJ-3 and KJ-4 by implication, if an appropriated award raises a US production rate above the FY2026-sustained level. Indicator 12 bears on KJ-4 if disclosed backlog composition shows the Foreign Military Sales share of interceptor work to be materially smaller than the one published lot split implies.

No indicator in this set carries a probability, a base rate or a credible interval, because none could be computed in this session.

SECTION 09 · DECISION

Decision

Reading the Ledger from a Desk.

The decision this report forces is not a view on which bill passes. It is a decision about which of two funding streams a reader's own cash flow depends on, because the continuing resolution has separated them. Section 102(a)(2) of H.R. 6500 caps US production rates at FY2026-sustained levels and section 102(b) bars the multi-year and economic-order-quantity mechanism, so the appropriated stream is frozen until a new vehicle enacts. The foreign military sales stream is not restrained by section 102, because it is partner-funded through the FMS trust fund, and it was the larger of the two on the only interceptor lot whose split is public: the April 2026 PAC-3 MSE award obligated $4,496,040,000 of $4,761,000,000 from Foreign Military Sales funds, which is 94.4 percent. Section 03 sets out three readings of that figure, including the reading on which it is an artifact of how a year-one undefinitized action obligates prepaid partner case values against one year of incremental US funding, and the decisions below are framed on the reading that a reader can check against their own order book rather than on the split. A reader whose order book is FMS-weighted has a different December than a reader whose order book waits on the mandatory column.

The second reading is about timing rather than direction. Enactment is not delivery. On the CSIS five-year series, money converts to first metal in 29 months for PAC-3 MSE, 35 for Tomahawk, 42 for SM-6 and 49 for THAAD, and to a full lot in 42 to 53. Below that, the feedstock layer runs on a clock nobody in Congress sets: Alzchem's German nitroguanidine doubling pays revenue from 2027 and its US plant is an end-2029 project whose site was unselected as of February 2026; Chemring states its three energetics expansions raise revenue from 2028; the DoD Inspector General puts 155mm projectile metal parts at 46,000 rounds per month as of March 2026 with Mesquite at zero. A decision taken in December 2026 on the strength of a December 2026 appropriation is a decision about 2029 and 2030 revenue, and should be sized as one.

The third reading is that the observable events are dated and few. The AECA thirty-day review on the Saudi transmittals of 4 September closes about 4 October. The Senate is out from 5 October to 6 November. The lame-duck working weeks are 9 to 10 November, 16 to 20 November and 30 November to 18 December, with the CR expiring on 11 December inside the last of them, which is seventeen Senate weekday session days between the election and the expiry.[85] That count is Senate-only. No House 2026 legislative calendar was collected by this cell and a funding vehicle needs both chambers, so the joint working window is UNKNOWN and may be shorter. The German Bereinigungssitzung is 12 November and the Bundestag's final budget vote 27 November. Every trigger in the table below is one of those dates or a document that appears on a named public register, so that a decision can be pre-authorised rather than argued after the fact.

The decision table

Whether to commit uncovered expansion capital in projectile metal parts, forgings or energetics ahead of an FY2027 appropriation OWNER: Sub-tier suppliers in energetics and forgings | TRIGGER: 11 December 2026 passes with a continuing resolution in force and no munitions anomaly in its enrolled text on govinfo	Hold expansion capex at the level already covered by obligated DPA Title III awards, FMS-backed orders or prior-year Army 155mm obligations; defer uncovered tranches to the next stated expiry date

Whether to keep the same capex tranche on the calendar when the freeze is extended for a full year rather than a quarter OWNER: Sub-tier suppliers in energetics and forgings | TRIGGER: The enacted continuing resolution carries an expiry of 30 September 2027 rather than a date in the first quarter of 2027	Re-baseline the tranche to FY2028 appropriations and re-price any customer schedule commitment that assumed an FY2027 rate increase
Whether to fund bid and proposal work against reconciliation-dependent lines for the FY2027 cycle OWNER: Prime-contractor bid-and-proposal planners | TRIGGER: No concurrent budget resolution carrying reconciliation instructions is adopted in either chamber by the last Senate session day before 11 December 2026	Reweight the FY2027 B&P allocation to FMS cases and to discretionary-column lines; hold mandatory-column pursuit work at maintenance level until instructions are adopted
Whether to extend working-capital facilities against undefinitized contract actions OWNER: Prime-contractor treasury | TRIGGER: The seven-year PAC-3 MSE modification of up to $53.86 billion announced 29 July 2026 remains undefinitized at the Q4 2026 earnings date	Size and extend the facility to the disclosed UCA financing gap; do not release the drawn balance until a definitization notice appears in the war.gov daily contract announcements
Whether to hold or rotate sector exposure between finished-round assemblers and FMS-weighted or feedstock positions OWNER: Defence-sector equity allocators | TRIGGER: Any further continuing resolution is enacted whose defence anomaly sections name only shipbuilding, National Security Systems and military construction	Rebalance toward disclosed FMS-funded backlog and feedstock positions; set the review date at the new CR expiry rather than at the next earnings date
Whether to place or advance an interceptor case into the US line inside the current lot year OWNER: Allied procurement authorities buying into US lines | TRIGGER: A State Department congressional notification for another PAC-3 MSE, PAC-2 GEM-T or THAAD case is published ahead of your own case, or the 4 October 2026 AECA review close passes on the 4 September Saudi transmittals	Submit the letter of request or accept the letter of offer and acceptance inside the current lot year; re-baseline delivery assumptions by lot year rather than by calendar year

SECTION 10 · SCORECARD

Scorecard

The firm publishes the resolution of its own prior judgments, whether they land or miss, in the report that supersedes them. Six items from AIG-DEF-26-001, "The Western Munitions Bottleneck", 3 June 2026, are scored here: the four claims on the firm's claim ledger, the report's headline thesis, and its second falsification condition.[8] One ledger claim is resolved and it is a miss, and it is published first for that reason. Three are advanced but not resolved, and each is carried forward with the evidence that moved it and, where a fair reading requires one, the piece of counter-evidence that cuts against it. The headline thesis and the second falsifier are scored last, and they are scored because a scorecard that grades four subsidiary claims and leaves the headline alone would itself be a finding about the firm.

CLM-2026-083 · Resolved FALSE, 14 July 2026

The firm judged at HIGH confidence, p=0.85, that the Army's 100,000 rounds per month 155mm target would be reached on the mid-2026 revised timeline. It was not, and it will not be on any date the record now contains. The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, in DOWIG-2026-095, published 13 July 2026, states that as of March 2026 the Army had increased monthly production from 14,000 to 36,000 rounds at the load-assemble-pack layer, that the Army had set 1 October 2025 as the date to reach its capability goal of 100,000 rounds per month and did not reach it, and that projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching that goal. The evaluation gives no date on which the goal will be met. The Army accepted the findings.[37] The claim resolved FALSE on 14 July 2026.

What the firm got wrong is worth stating exactly, because the failure mode is repeatable. The firm treated a stated revised timeline as a forecastable date. It was not one. It was a goal-post, published by the organisation being measured, and the constraint that determined whether it could be hit sat one layer below the number the firm was watching: projectile metal parts, at 46,000 per month in March 2026 against a September 2026 projection of 101,000 that depended entirely on a $469 million facility at Mesquite that had produced no conforming part.[37] The firm had the load-assemble-pack series and read it as the production series. It did not have, and did not go looking for, the metal-parts capacity table that would have shown the goal was unreachable on the stated timeline. The lesson the firm takes from the miss is narrow and it is not a lesson about optimism: trust a capacity table, not a goal-post, and when the two are available, the binding number is the one further down the bill of materials.

A second figure from the same June report is corrected here. AIG-DEF-26-001 stated that "all-US-facility production reached approximately 40,000 per month by 2025".[8] The Inspector General's series puts Army load-assemble-pack output at 36,000 rounds per month as of March 2026, up from 14,000, with the 100,000 per month goal set for 1 October 2025 and not reached.[37] The firm's June figure was therefore about 4,000 rounds per month, or roughly eleven percent, above the rate the Inspector General records for a date nine months later, and it was published as an achieved all-facility rate rather than as a projection. The firm does not carry the 40,000 figure forward. Where this report states a US 155mm rate it states 36,000 rounds per month at load-assemble-pack as of March 2026 and 46,000 metal parts per month at the same date, and it keeps the two layers apart.[37]

CLM-2026-078 · Advanced, not resolved. Resolves 3 June 2028

The firm judged nitrocellulose at Radford the most acute single-source bottleneck in the US system, with the solid rocket motor duopoly a close second, each carrying a multi-year qualified-supplier path no supplemental appropriation can shortcut inside 24 months. Section 04 moves the claim forward on four pieces of evidence. The Army's own energetics report, required by the FY2025 NDAA, states that Grade A nitrocellulose is currently not produced in the United States and is imported, and gives Radford initial capability in the fourth quarter of FY2026 and full capability in the first quarter of FY2031, which is 31 December 2030.[40] US nitroguanidine is single-sourced from Alzchem in Germany, whose Trostberg doubling of about EUR 152 million commissions in the second half of 2026 and pays revenue from 2027, and whose US facility is a $150 million Department commitment for end-2029 on a site still unselected as of February 2026.[41,42] The Department's DPA Title III award of 15 May 2026 describes the ICF Mercantile line as establishing the first domestic production source of rayon filament cellulose precursor, which is to say there was no domestic source of the precursor for solid rocket motor nozzle ablatives.[46] And Chemring, on the energetics side, states that its three capacity programmes raise revenue by GBP 100 million a year "from 2028 when the three capacity expansion programmes are complete".[49] Every one of those dates is 2027 or later, which is the substance of the claim.

The counter-evidence a fair reading requires is in the same section. The Inspector General identifies projectile metal parts, not energetics, as the current limiting factor for 155mm.[37] That means the June claim named the right structural bottleneck and not the current binding one. Energetics remains the position with the longest qualified-supplier path and the least substitutability, and nothing in the record shortens it; but a reader who bought the June report and went looking for the constraint that is actually holding 155mm output down in 2026 would have been looking one layer too deep. The claim is advanced on its own terms and it is qualified on that point, and the qualification is the same one that produced the CLM-2026-083 miss.

CLM-2026-079 · Advanced. Resolves 31 March 2030

The firm judged that even with FY2027-funded large-lot orders, Tomahawk first deliveries do not arrive until March 2030. Two independent pieces of the current record push the same way. The FY2027 request is 785 Tomahawks, of which 58 are discretionary at $1,931.1 million and 727 are mandatory at $3,872.5 million, a mandatory share of 92.6 percent, so the large-lot order the claim assumes is itself contingent on a vehicle that does not exist.[9] And CSIS's Table 2 gives Tomahawk 35 months to first delivery and 47 to a full lot against a five-year production rate of 79 per year, which puts money made available on 1 October 2026 into first metal in September 2029 and a full lot in 2030.[2] The section 102(b) bar on initiating a multi-year using advance procurement for economic order quantity sits on top of both.[12] Nothing in the record shortens the interval. The claim is advanced.

CLM-2026-081 · Advanced strongly. Resolves 31 December 2028

The firm judged that authorizations from 2024 to 2025 convert to throughput in 2026 to 2028, not in the budget year, and that today's appropriations do not fix today's magazine. This is the judgment this report hardens, and it hardens it into a stronger form. The Army invested $4.5 billion in 155mm production between February 2022 and September 2025 and the metal-parts layer stood at 46,000 rounds per month in March 2026 with Mesquite at zero.[37] Every European capacity date located in Section 05 is 2027 or later: Unterlüß at full rate from 2027, Nitrochemie Aschau at maximum capacity in 2028, Alzchem paying revenue from 2027, Chemring "from 2028".[41,49,71,72] Rheinmetall booked a record EUR 80.5 billion backlog and minus EUR 1,616 million of operating free cash flow in the same six months, which is what buying capacity ahead of revenue looks like on a cash statement.[70] And the American appropriation that would fund the next increment is a continuing resolution whose section 102(a)(2) forbids the rate increase.[12] The June claim said appropriations do not fix today's magazine. The harder form this report publishes is that today's appropriations do not contain the fix at all: the money that would buy the FY2027 increment is in a mandatory column with no bill behind it, and the instrument actually in force bars the ramp.

The June report's headline thesis · NOT YET RESOLVABLE as of 10 September 2026

AIG-DEF-26-001's thesis was that "the Western precision-munitions industrial base can sustain peer combat for roughly thirty to sixty days before the binding constraint shifts from finished-round assembly to single-source feedstock and qualified-supplier microelectronics, and to a five-prime concentration that cannot be expanded inside a budget cycle".[8] It is the single most directly testable statement the firm has published, a campaign of thirty-nine days has since occurred and is the subject of this report, and the firm therefore states plainly why it is not scoring it either way.

Three things bar a score on the evidence in hand. First, the thesis is stated about peer combat. No source in this cell's collection characterises the campaign against Iran as peer combat, and the firm does not assert the equivalence in order to score its own claim. Second, the thesis is a claim about where the binding constraint sits after thirty to sixty days, and the record for the thirty-nine days carries an inventory measure rather than a constraint measure: CSIS gives estimated prewar inventory and estimated use for seven munitions and states that for four of them the United States may have expended more than half the prewar inventory in the thirty-nine days of the air and missile campaign before the ceasefire.[2] That is expenditure against stock. It is not a statement that feedstock or microelectronics became binding at any point in the window. Third, the five months of war since that first ceasefire collapsed are unquantified in the public record, so even the inventory series stops at day thirty-nine.

What can be said, and is said here rather than left out, cuts in two directions. The direction that supports the June claim is that the constraint has in fact moved below finished-round assembly: the Inspector General states that projectile metal part production is the limiting factor for reaching the 100,000 round per month goal, and every energetics remedy the firm can date converts to throughput in 2027 or later.[37] The direction that cuts against it is that projectile metal parts are neither single-source feedstock nor qualified-supplier microelectronics. The June report named four single-source positions and the constraint that is actually binding 155mm output in 2026 is a fifth thing, a forging and machining capacity problem at four named plants. The structure of the June claim survives. Its specificity does not.

What would resolve it is a US primary or T2 statement of which production or feedstock layer became binding during the thirty-nine day campaign, or a CSIS, GAO or CRS treatment of expenditure against production rate by munition class across the whole war rather than its opening campaign. Until one exists the claim is carried as unresolved, and the firm records that it is carrying its own headline unresolved rather than quietly retiring it.

The June report's second falsification condition · NOT MET as of 10 September 2026

AIG-DEF-26-001 stated its thesis falsifiable on two conditions, the second being "a published Tomahawk lead time below 24 months".[8] The condition is not met, and the record has moved away from it rather than toward it. CSIS states that the interval from contract to delivery "has been about 24 months, but as munitions orders have outstripped production capacity in recent years, lead times have stretched to 36 months or more", and its five-year table gives Tomahawk at 35 months to first delivery and 47 months to a full lot against a production rate of 79 per year.[2] The firm's own June decomposition gave 34 months for Tomahawk, and the FY2027 request of 785 rounds carries first deliveries in March 2030.[8] No published Tomahawk lead time below 24 months exists in this cell's collection, and none was located.

The firm notes what that outcome is worth. A falsification condition that the record moves further away from is a weak test, and this is the second time in one document that the firm has had to say so about its own falsifiers: the Challenger made the same criticism of this report's original two conditions, which is why this report now carries three and why the first of them is set on the event the report considers most likely rather than least.

What this report is putting at risk

A scorecard is only worth reading if the firm keeps writing claims it can lose. Seven forward claims are locked with this publication, each with a named public register and a read date, so a reader can score them without asking the firm for anything. Each is printed below in the exact words of the firm's claim ledger, in quotation marks, so that a reader scoring from this Scorecard scores the same proposition as a reader scoring from the Outlook table. The resolution rules are the ledger's and are summarised after each statement; where a summary and the ledger differ, the ledger governs.

FC-1 (CR-3-C1). "The United States Senate holds a recorded cloture vote on a fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act measure on or before 9 October 2026." Read on 9 October 2026 on the Senate roll-call records at senate.gov.[85] Cloture on the motion to proceed failed 50 to 46 on 14 July 2026 and the bill was not enacted as of 1 September 2026; a voice vote, a unanimous consent agreement or a filed but unvoted cloture motion does not count.[84]

FC-2 (CR-3-C2). "A joint resolution of disapproval concerning the Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack Munitions Extended Range transmittal (26-35) or the AGT-1500 engines transmittal (26-68), both notified 4 September 2026, receives a recorded vote on the floor of the United States Senate on or before 9 October 2026." Read on 9 October 2026 on the Senate roll-call records at senate.gov and on congress.gov, against an AECA thirty-day review closing about 4 October 2026 on the 4 September transmittals.[85,27,35,36] Introduction of such a resolution without a recorded vote does not count.

FC-3 (CR-3-C3). "United States Central Command or the Department of War publicly announces the completion of the military mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq on or before 30 September 2026." Read on 5 October 2026 on the CENTCOM and war.gov press-release streams. The date is fixed in the 27 September 2024 joint statement and by named Iraqi officials, and no US primary yet confirms it; a statement by an Iraqi official, or press reporting alone, does not count.[1,77,78]

FC-4 (CR-3-C4). "The Department of War announces at least one new Golden Dome, space based interceptor, or Missile Defense Agency SHIELD task order award in its daily contract announcements between 1 October and 15 November 2026 inclusive." Read on 16 November 2026 on the war.gov daily contract announcements and their date mirrors. The firm has no baseline for this series and registers that as a gap rather than pretending to one; a modification counts only if the announcement identifies it as a new task order.[14,15]

FC-5 (CR-3-C5). "Congress enacts a reconciliation measure providing at least $50 billion in new budget authority for the Department of Defense on or before 31 December 2026." Read on 31 December 2026 on congress.gov and the govinfo public-law texts. This is falsification condition 2 of the three this report states, and the firm prints alongside it that its own probability on the event is 0.10, that the route is sequencing-barred on the report's own argument, and that both budget resolutions already carry $60 billion against $350 billion requested, so the bar is enactment and not adequacy.[13]

FC-6 (CR-3-C6). "Fiscal year 2026 Department of Defense contract obligations under Product Service Code 14xx (guided missiles) exceed $38.0 billion as reported by USAspending.gov." Read on 15 December 2026 on api.usaspending.gov, on the same query the firm ran on 9 September 2026. The FY2025 full year was $32.38 billion and FY2026 stood at $28.81 billion through 30 June 2026 on a ninety-day publication lag.[50]

FC-7 (CR-3-C7). "The Haushaltsausschuss of the German Bundestag approves at least 20 defence procurement proposals of more than EUR 25 million between 14 September and 31 October 2026 inclusive." Read on 7 November 2026 on the BMVg press stream indexed from the ministry's own explainer page, with the stated tolerance of plus or minus two proposals where the release and contemporaneous trade reporting disagree on a single sitting.[54] The firm's own collection suggests this one will miss: the 2026 count has stood at 44 since 8 July, the BMVg's internal plan schedules only eight defence proposals in that window, and the six committee sessions in the period are budget deliberation sessions on the 2027 draft rather than approval sittings.[55,56,57] It is published anyway, at the number the firm would have picked before seeing that, because a scorecard that only carries claims the firm expects to win is a marketing document.

SYNTHESIS

The rebuild is a timing problem before it is a money problem

The report's argument resolves into four linked constraints. Each one has a different owner, clock, and public signal.

01 · AUTHORITY

The requested money is not enacted authority

Regular appropriations can reach only the discretionary column. For the stressed interceptor lines, most requested FY2027 quantity sits in the mandatory column, while the continuing resolution freezes new starts and rate increases.

02 · DEMAND

Partner funding is carrying the visible near-term signal

The only Patriot lot with a published funding split was 94.4 percent Foreign Military Sales funded. Partner notifications therefore matter more to the near-term line signal than the unfunded mandatory request.

03 · CONVERSION

Capital does not become throughput on the budget calendar

The physical constraint sits below final assembly, in metal parts, energetics, and qualified supply. The dated remedies in the record convert mainly from 2027 through 2029.

04 · DECISION

Readers should separate covered exposure from uncovered exposure

Commitments supported by obligated awards, partner-funded orders, or prior-year balances sit on a different footing from capex and working capital that require a still-unenacted FY2027 vehicle.

> **The decision is not whether rearmament is politically intended. It is which funding stream, contracting authority, and conversion date a reader's own exposure actually depends on.**

SOURCE REGISTRY

1. U.S. Central Command, Press Releases (including "CENTCOM Completes Strikes on IRGC Targets in Iran," 2026-09-01 and IRGC tanker strikes, 2026-09-05 and 2026-09-08), https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/, fetched 2026-09-09. [T1]

2. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park, "Last Rounds? Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire," 2026-04-24 (the PDF filename carries 260424; collection_B records the publication date as 2026-04-21, and the two have not been reconciled, so the registry date governs and the discrepancy is recorded here), https://www.csis.org/analysis/last-rounds-status-key-munitions-iran-war-ceasefire (PDF: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2026-04/260424_Cancian_Park_Last_Rounds.pdf). [T2]

3. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park, "Renewed Iran War Would Test Diminished Interceptor Inventories," 2026-07-27, https://www.csis.org/analysis/renewed-iran-war-would-test-diminished-interceptor-inventories. [T2]

4. Defense News, "Pentagon Gives Industry 21 Days to Submit Plans for Significantly Faster Weapons Production," 2026-08-11, https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/08/11/pentagon-gives-industry-21-days-to-submit-plans-for-significantly-faster-weapons-production/. [T3]

5. Stars and Stripes, "Iran War Missile Stockpiles: Patriots," 2026-07-30, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2026-07-30/iran-war-missile-stockpiles-patriots-22406307.html. Named inline as the reporting outlet; corroborated on the interceptor figures by source 4. [UNVERIFIED]

6. CNN, "Nearly 80% of Interceptors for a Key Missile Defense System Depleted, Sources Say," 2026-08-04, https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/04/politics/us-iran-key-missile-interceptors-low. Not fetched by the firm; no Reuters or AP corroboration located; named inline; carries no claim in this report. [UNVERIFIED]

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10. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "FY2027 Procurement Programs (P-1)," April 2026, https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/FY2027_p (Missile Procurement, Army, lines 2, 4 and 5). [T1]

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12. U.S. Government Publishing Office, enrolled text of H.R. 6500, Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr6500enr/html/BILLS-119hr6500enr.htm (sections 101, 102, 106, 126, 127, 146; full-text searched). Public law number not yet served by govinfo. [T1]

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15. DefenseScoop, "Guetlein: Golden Dome in Jeopardy Due to 2027 Funding Uncertainty," 2026-08-12, https://defensescoop.com/2026/08/12/guetlein-golden-dome-in-jeopardy-due-to-2027-funding-uncertainty/. Not on the firm's allowlist; named inline; carries only the "95 percent committed on contract" figure, which is not load-bearing. [UNVERIFIED]

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57. Sicherheit und Verteidigung (suv.report), "Haushaltsausschuss billigt 16 Ruestungsvorhaben," July 2026, https://suv.report/haushaltsausschuss-billigt-16-ruestungsvorhaben/. Second outlet for the 8 July 2026 sitting; the coincidence of "44th sitting" and "44 projects" in the same reporting is noted as a possible source of confusion and neither figure is confirmed from a Bundestag document. Not on the firm's allowlist; named inline. [UNVERIFIED]

58. Sicherheit und Verteidigung (suv.report), "Halbjahresbilanz 2026: was wurde bisher beschafft?," 2026, https://suv.report/halbjahresbilanz-2026-was-wurde-bisher-beschafft/ (session-by-session 2026 actuals; gives 11 proposals for 8 July where sources 56 and 57 give 16, and an H1 cumulative of about 45 where both give 44). Cited in this report only to establish that the trade outlets disagree by up to five proposals on the same sitting. Not on the firm's allowlist; named inline. [UNVERIFIED]

59. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Gruenes Licht fuer sieben weitere Beschaffungsvertraege," 2025-09-15, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/gruenes-licht-fuer-sieben-weitere-beschaffungsvertraege-5991106 (BMVg publishes a release naming each tranche of approvals within a few days of the sitting; this one covers the 10 September 2025 sitting). Cited to establish that the BMVg press stream, not any Bundestag page, is the resolving record for the approval count. [T1-CAND]

60. European Commission, "SAFE: Security Action for Europe," https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/safe-security-action-europe_en, read 2026-09-10 (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 adopted 2025-05-27; EUR 150 billion in long-maturity loans with a ten-year grace period; nineteen member states expressed interest and demand exceeded the envelope; national plans due 2025-11-30; 15 percent pre-financing rate; disbursements to Cyprus, Lithuania, Greece and Estonia). [T1]

61. European Commission, press release IP/25/2042, "Commission Announces Tentative Allocation of EUR 150 Billion under SAFE to Boost Defence Readiness," 2025-09-09, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2042. The release links its allocation annex but does not carry the table; the annex itself was not reached by the firm. [T1]

62. A&O Shearman, "Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Update: Financial Assistance Tentative Allocation," 2025-09-12, https://www.aoshearman.com/en/insights/safe-update-financial-assistance-tentative-allocation, reproducing the Commission's allocation of 2025-09-09 (nineteen member states, EUR 150,000,000,000 in total; Poland EUR 43,734,100,805; Romania EUR 16,680,055,394; France and Hungary EUR 16,216,720,524 each; Italy EUR 14,900,000,000; down to Denmark EUR 46,796,822). Law-firm secondary reproduction, not the Commission's own annex; not on the firm's allowlist; named inline. Five figures are corroborated at T1 by sources 60 and 63. The absence of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Slovenia, Luxembourg and Malta is a fact by absence from this list. [UNVERIFIED]

63. European Commission, "Commission Approves First Wave of Defence Funding for Eight Member States under SAFE," 2026-01-15, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/commission-approves-first-wave-defence-funding-eight-member-states-under-safe-2026-01-15_en (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal, Romania; about EUR 38 billion combined; Cyprus EUR 1.18 billion, Romania EUR 16.68 billion). [T1]

64. European Commission, "Commission Approves Second Wave of SAFE Defence Funding for Eight Member States," 2026-01-26, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/commission-approves-second-wave-safe-defence-funding-eight-member-states-2026-01-26_en (Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Finland; about EUR 74 billion combined). [T1]

65. Council of the European Union, "SAFE: Final Green Light for Financial Assistance to Czechia and France," 2026-04-10, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/10/safe-final-green-light-for-financial-assistance-to-czechia-and-france/ (Czechia EUR 2.06 billion maximum loan with EUR 309 million pre-financing; France EUR 15.09 billion maximum loan with EUR 2.26 billion pre-financing; "brings the total to 18 member states"). [T1]

66. Table.Briefings, "Why Hungary Is the Only Country Still Waiting for Its SAFE Loans," 2026-03-26, https://table.media/en/europe/news/why-hungary-is-the-only-country-still-waiting-for-its-safe-loans (Commission position that Hungary "requested more than it is entitled to"). Paywalled; only the lead paragraph and the quoted Commission position were readable. Not on the firm's allowlist; named inline. Whether Hungary has been approved since 2026-03-26 is UNKNOWN. [UNVERIFIED]

67. Xinhua, 2025-12-03, https://english.news.cn/20251203/a562daca31d44748a7d553d2ff417c4a/c.html (Hungary's EUR 17.4 billion SAFE submission of December 2025). State media; does not stand alone and carries no claim in this report independent of source 66. [RESTRICTED]

68. European Commission, "Poland Receives First EUR 6.6 Billion Payment under SAFE," 2026-05-29, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/poland-receives-first-eu66-billion-payment-under-safe-2026-05-29_en (first payment to any member state; Poland the first to sign a SAFE loan agreement). Subsequent 15 percent pre-financing payments (Cyprus EUR 177.2 million 2026-06-18, Lithuania EUR 956.3 million 2026-06-24, Greece EUR 118.2 million 2026-07-23, Estonia EUR 351.6 million 2026-08-12) are from source 60. No aggregate disbursement total is published: UNKNOWN. [T1]

69. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Hague Summit Declaration, 2025-06-25, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_236705.htm, read 2026-09-10 (5 percent of GDP annually by 2035, split at least 3.5 percent on core defence requirements and up to 1.5 percent on critical infrastructure, cyber defence, civil preparedness, innovation and the defence industrial base; trajectory reviewed in 2029). [T1]

70. Rheinmetall AG, "Financial Report for First Half of 2026: Strong Sales Growth and Record Profitability," 2026-08-06, https://www.rheinmetall.com/Rheinmetall%20Group/Presse/News/Documents/2026/08/2026-08-06-Rheinmetall-News-Half-Yearly-Financial-Report-H1.pdf (H1 sales EUR 5.2 billion up 39 percent; operating result EUR 786 million at 15.0 percent; nomination EUR 16.2 billion; backlog EUR 80.5 billion at 2026-06-30; book-to-bill over 3.0; operating free cash flow minus EUR 1,616 million; Weapon and Ammunition H1 capital expenditure EUR 184 million). Company material; labelled inline. [claim]

71. Rheinmetall AG, "A New Era at Rheinmetall: Ammunition Factory Opening in Unterlueß," https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2025/09/2025-09-05-factory-opening-in-unterluess (investment nearly EUR 500 million; 25,000 rounds in 2025, 140,000 rounds in 2026, 350,000 rounds a year at full capacity from 2027; group-wide about 1.5 million artillery shells a year from 2027). Company material; labelled inline. Publication date UNCONFIRMED between 2025-09-05 (URL slug) and 2025-05-09 (rendered page text). No 2026 company confirmation that the 140,000 figure has been achieved was found: UNKNOWN. [claim]

72. Rheinmetall AG, "Foundation-Laying Ceremony for Powder Plant at Nitrochemie Aschau," 2026-07-23, https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2026/07/2026-07-23-rheinmetall-foundation-laying-ceremony-aschau-powder-plant (EUR 350 million at Aschau within a EUR 500 million programme; propellant charge modules from 300,000 to over one million a year; additional 2,500 tonnes a year of powder taking the site to 4,200 tonnes a year; group target 20,000 tonnes a year by 2030; production starts gradually in 2027 and reaches maximum capacity in 2028; about 500 new jobs). Company material; labelled inline. Nothing in the release addresses nitrocellulose feedstock supply. [claim]

73. defence-industry.eu, "Rheinmetall Accelerates F-35 and Missile Production, Adds Explosives and Rocket Capacity to Support EUR 80.4 Billion Backlog," 2026-08-15, https://defence-industry.eu/rheinmetall-accelerates-f-35-and-missile-production-adds-explosives-and-rocket-capacity-to-support-e80-4-billion-backlog/ (RDX plant at Varpalota, Hungary ready in 2027; expanded powder blending in Switzerland; rocket plant at Burgos, Spain; rocket-motor facility at Unterlueß ready Q1 2027; drone line ready end-2026; one part of the expansion described as behind schedule without saying which). Not on the firm's allowlist; named inline. The backlog figure here (EUR 80.4 billion) differs from the company's own H1 report and this report uses EUR 80.5 billion from source 70. [UNVERIFIED]

74. Government Offices of Sweden, "Sweden to Buy US Artillery Rocket System and Enter Sweden-Finland Cooperation on Rocket Artillery," 2026-09-07, https://www.government.se/press-releases/2026/09/sweden-to-buy-us-artillery-rocket-system-and-enter-sweden-finland-cooperation-on-rocket-artillery (about SEK 7 billion; financed inside the Swedish Armed Forces investment plan under the Total Defence Bill 2025 to 2030 as an "opportune purchase"; first deliveries 2027; quantity not stated; Sweden-Finland Joint Declaration on rocket artillery; Saab and Lockheed Martin Joint Declaration on Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb integration and HIMARS munitions production). government.se is the publisher of record and is a candidate for allowlist admission. [T1-CAND]

75. Defense News, "Sweden to Buy HIMARS Rocket Artillery for Around $730 Million," 2026-09-08, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/09/08/sweden-to-buy-himars-rocket-artillery-for-around-730-million/. [T3]