

PUBLISHED MARKET RESEARCH

Elevated and Persistent Risk of Unrest in Western Europe: Migration, Political Violence and the Flashpoints Where Tension Is Highest

Anti-migrant disorder recurs at a high level while most measured series fall; localised civil war like violence is remote to unlikely and national civil conflict remote

AIG-DEF-26-009 · 28 SEPTEMBER 2026

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THE AEGEAN REGISTER • PUBLISHED MARKET RESEARCH

Elevated and Persistent Risk of Unrest in Western Europe: Migration, Political Violence and the Flashpoints Where Tension Is Highest

Anti-migrant disorder recurs at a high level while most measured series fall; localised civil war like violence is remote to unlikely and national civil conflict remote

Multi-day anti-migrant disorder has recurred in at least one country each year since the Southport killings, now including Ireland, but most measured series of migration and violence fall, so the risk is elevated and persistent rather than rising. Riots and violent rallies are the established strands and vigilantism an emerging one to watch; the Ceuta surge reads first as a negligent border, with leverage a separate low-confidence risk, and sustained civil conflict at national scale remains remote on this horizon.

The risk of violence and instability in select Western European towns and cities is elevated and persistent, not rising on the evidence read, and the right question is where and after which triggers it flares, not whether the state collapses. Multi-day anti-migrant disorder has recurred in at least one country in each year since the Southport killings, in England, Northern Ireland, Spain and Ireland, while the measured series point the other way: asylum applications, irregular crossings, UK small boat arrivals, Swedish shootings, German far-right offences and Irish arson attacks on asylum housing all fell. Disorder runs in two established strands, riots set off by a single crime and violent rallies against asylum policy, with vigilantism an emerging strand that the state has so far policed. The riots read here were set off by ordinary violent crimes and by false claims about who the attacker was, not by jihadist attacks, so a loop between terrorism and disorder is a low-confidence hypothesis, not a finding. We judge repeated multi-day unrest likely in each of the next few years, localised civil war like skirmishes between organised civilian groups remote to unlikely, and sustained national civil conflict remote.

HEADLINE INDICATORS

130 suspects TERRORISM SUSPECTS OF ALL IDEOLOGIES ARRESTED IN THE EU IN 2025 WHO WERE AGED 18 OR YOUNGER, THE YOUNGEST 12	35 percent FALL IN IRREGULAR CROSSINGS INTO THE EU FROM JANUARY TO AUGUST 2026, EXCLUDING THE CEUTA MOVEMENT	About 400 arrests MADE IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE ENGLISH RIOTS AFTER THE SOUTHPORT KILLINGS OF JULY 2024
23 arrests MADE ON THE SECOND NIGHT OF DISORDER AT THE CITYWEST ASYLUM CENTRE NEAR DUBLIN, OCTOBER 2025	147 shootings RECORDED IN SWEDEN IN 2025, DOWN FROM 390 IN 2022	24 arrests AT THE VIOLENT FAR-RIGHT RALLY AGAINST ASYLUM POLICY IN THE HAGUE ON 19 SEPTEMBER 2026

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CENTRAL JUDGMENT

Western Europe faces an elevated and persistent risk of recurrent anti-migrant and political disorder, concentrated in particular towns and cities, which states have so far contained within days. The pattern is a sequence: a single violent crime, often with a foreign or migrant suspect and often amplified online by false claims about the attacker, sets off riots aimed at migrants' housing and at the police, while planned rallies carry the same anger into capital cities. Recurrence each year fits a stable high risk as well as a rising one, and the measured series read here mostly fall, which is why this note does not call the trend rising. Sudden border surges such as Ceuta feed the same politics, but the only official assessment read found a neighbouring state negligent rather than pulling a lever. The places where tension is highest are Northern Ireland, Dublin and Irish towns with asylum housing, English towns with asylum housing, the Murcia region and the Ceuta border in Spain, The Hague, and the Channel coast of northern France, with sustained violence of a different kind in Swedish gang conflict and the French suburbs.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- | | | |
|-------------|---|-----------------|
| KJ-1 | <p>EU first-time asylum applications and registered irregular crossings are lower than a year earlier, excluding the Ceuta movement, though the Western Mediterranean route to Spain rose; with the people who entered Ceuta without registration counted, total irregular entries into the EU this year likely exceed last year's, and the fall in UK small boat arrivals is indicated, not established from the government series. Moderate confidence applies to the narrower EU statement, since Eurostat and Frontex, both primary and listed, show the fall in the registered EU flows on their own, while the UK year-to-date figure rests on a source off the list.</p> | MODERATE |
| <hr/> | | |
| KJ-2 | <p>The Ceuta crossing of July 2026 reads first as an enforcement failure: the only official assessment read, a declassified Spanish one, found Moroccan authorities negligent and passive rather than encouraging, and the note does not find that a neighbouring state held and pulled a lever. A risk remains that sudden mass crossings a neighbour tolerates could be used as leverage, and EU governments plainly fear that instrumentalisation, but whether it happened here or recurs is not shown. Confidence is low because the negligence finding rests on one listed outlet, the earlier episodes at Ceuta and on the Belarus border were not read from a listed source, and the two listed estimates of the crossing differ by between twelve and twenty-two thousand people.</p> | LOW |
| <hr/> | | |
| KJ-3 | <p>The pool of terrorism suspects arrested in the EU is young and attacks use simple weapons: more than a quarter of the terrorism suspects arrested in the EU last year, across all ideologies, were aged 18 or younger, though arrests measure where enforcement falls, including early preventive arrests of minors, rather than who carries out attacks, and the finding that vehicle rammings and stabbings have become the dominant methods of Islamist attacks is one analyst's comment, since the Europol report's own breakdown by method was not read. The age and arrest figures rest on the listed Europol report and the method trend on one ACLED expert comment, and neither shows that jihadist suspects alone are getting younger.</p> | MODERATE |

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| KJ-4 | <p>Anti-migrant disorder runs in three established strands, riots set off by a single violent crime and amplified online, aimed at migrants' homes and at the police, planned far-right rallies against asylum policy that turn violent, and covert arson against buildings rumoured to house asylum seekers, the one strand with a series, in Ireland, while vigilantism against migrants and their boats or housing is an emerging strand to watch that the state has so far policed. Multi-day episodes recurred in England in 2024, in Northern Ireland, Spain and Ireland in 2025 and in Northern Ireland in 2026, while the English disorder of 2026, the Dublin riot of 2023 and the rallies in The Hague were single-day events; the riots read here were set off by ordinary violent crimes and false claims about attackers, not by jihadist attacks, so a loop in which perceived attacker identity drives reprisal disorder is a hypothesis, not a finding. The search did not cover counter-mobilisation by targeted communities, so its absence from the sources read is a gap, not evidence of absence, and the nearest precedent on the wider record is the Leicester unrest of 2022, which set organised groups of two communities against each other and was not read from a listed source. Confidence is low because this is a recurrence record from wire reporting rather than a rate series, and the vigilante strand rests on one report.</p> | LOW |
|-------------|--|------------|
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- | | | |
|-------------|--|------------|
| KJ-5 | <p>The Western European violence that is already sustained, rather than episodic, lies in Swedish gang conflict and in periodic multi-night riots against the police in French suburbs, not in anti-migrant disorder, and German police crime statistics are a weak proxy for the risk at issue, since what drives instability is how single violent crimes are perceived and politicised rather than the aggregate crime rate. Reuters and France 24, both listed, report the Swedish figures and two French episodes, while every German crime figure read here rests on sources off the firm's list and suspect counts measure investigations, not convictions.</p> | LOW |
|-------------|--|------------|
-

KJ-6

Over one to three years, the risk of political and intercommunal violence in Western Europe is elevated and persistent: we judge repeated multi-day anti-migrant or intercommunal unrest likely in at least one country in each year, most plausibly in Northern Ireland, Ireland, English towns with asylum housing, Spain and the Netherlands, though that recurrence is counted over three years, 2024 to 2026, from the Southport riots, a start date chosen after the fact; localised civil war like skirmishes, meaning armed clashes between organised civilian groups lasting days in one town, unlikely within three years, since such clashes have happened in Western Europe, in Dijon in June 2020 and in Leicester in 2022, neither read from a listed source, but have stayed rare, local and contained within days, and none has been set off by anti-migrant disorder; and sustained civil conflict at national scale remote on this horizon. Confidence is low because the judgment rests on a recurrence record without a baseline, while the measured series read here mostly fall and no series shows disorder becoming more frequent or more severe.

LOW

KEY STATISTICS

130 suspects Terrorism suspects of all ideologies arrested in the EU aged 18 or younger, the youngest 12, 2025⁸	486 suspects Arrests for terrorism-related offences in the EU, 2025⁸	27 percent Fall in first-time asylum applicants in the EU from 2024 to 2025, 2025¹	35 percent Fall in irregular crossings into the EU from January to August 2026, excluding the Ceuta movement, 2026-08³
400 arrests Approximate arrests in the first week of the riots after the Southport killings, 2024-08-06¹¹	32 officers Police officers injured in Northern Ireland by the third night of the Ballymena riots, 2025-06-12¹²	23 arrests Arrests on the second night of disorder at the Citywest asylum centre near Dublin, 2025-10-23²⁹	19 incidents Arson incidents linked to asylum accommodation in Ireland in 2024, against four in 2025, 2025-11-07³¹
147 shootings Shootings in Sweden in 2025, down from 390 in 2022, 2025-12-30²⁰	72 thousand people Spanish authorities' revised estimate of the crossing into Ceuta, 2026-07-31⁵		

Scope and method

METHOD

This note assesses the risk of widespread violence, turmoil and instability, and the possibility of localised civil war like skirmishes, in the Western European cities and countries where tension over migration and violence is highest, over a horizon of one to three years. It sets aside the civilizational framing of earlier drafts and does not test a breakdown of state order, which almost no serious analyst forecasts; it grades instead the likelihood of repeated multi-day unrest, of armed clashes between organised civilian groups, and of sustained national civil conflict. Because no formal count of anti-migrant riots over time was available, it builds a recurrence record across years and countries from listed wire and broadcast reporting, now including Ireland, and it weighs that record against the measured series it read from Eurostat, Frontex, Europol, the UK government and Reuters, which mostly fall. It reads conflict analysis from ACLED and the Council on Foreign Relations, and one scholarly argument for rising civil conflict risk, all read on the ship date. Sources off the firm's Source List are marked and carry no high confidence judgment. Probabilities in claims are the author's own judgment unless stated. No client-attributable material is used.

SECTION 01 • ASSESSMENT

Steady-state flows are falling on every series read

Eurostat counted 669,400 first-time asylum applicants in the EU in 2025, 27% fewer than the 912,400 of 2024.¹

In June 2026, 37,075 people applied for protection in the EU for the first time, 29% fewer than in June 2025.²

Frontex reported about 75,000 irregular crossings into the EU in the first eight months of 2026, 35% fewer than a year earlier, stated that most people entering Ceuta at the end of July crossed without registration and are not in that count, and reported that the Western Mediterranean route to Spain was the only major route to rise, by 34%.³

The UK government recorded 1,655 people arriving in 24 small boats across the English Channel from 21 to 27 September 2026.⁶

The Migration Observatory reported 16,300 small boat arrivals in the UK from 1 January to 9 September 2026, 47% fewer than in the same period of 2025.⁷

Eurostat reported that 4.43 million non-EU citizens who fled Ukraine held temporary protection in the EU on 31 July 2026, a group outside the asylum series, with Germany hosting 1,290,225 of them.²⁵

UNKNOWN: the UK's cumulative small boat total for 2026 was not read from the government's own time series, and how many people who entered Ceuta claimed asylum was not read.

ASSESSMENT • MODERATE CONFIDENCE

Steady-state migration pressure on the EU and the UK is lower this year than last on every series read, and only the Western Mediterranean route rose, so the flows themselves do not support a thesis of rising pressure. Eurostat and Frontex are primary and listed and agree on the fall, while the UK cumulative figure rests on a source off the list.

SECTION 02 • ASSESSMENT

Ceuta: a negligent border first, leverage a separate and lower-confidence risk

The Council on Foreign Relations reported that a declassified Spanish assessment judged Moroccan authorities to have acted in a negligent and passive manner rather than to have encouraged the crossing of 30 and 31 July 2026, which Spanish authorities revised to about 72,000 people, and that more than 80 people died on both sides of the border.⁵

Al Jazeera reported that between 50,000 and 60,000 people entered Ceuta from Morocco over two days at the end of July 2026, and that at least 72 people died trying to reach the enclave.⁴

Al Jazeera reported that 22 of the EU's 27 member states signed a joint letter calling for an emergency response to Ceuta, warning against the instrumentalisation of migration, and that Italy suspended its open border with Spain while France announced a five-fold increase in police at its border with Spain.⁴

The Council on Foreign Relations reported that the joint letter was signed on 1 August 2026, that Portugal declared enhanced controls at its southern border and that Spain installed a floating sea barrier of 500 metres off Ceuta.⁵

UNKNOWN: the earlier episodes at Ceuta and on the Belarus border were not read from a listed source, so recurrence of state instrumentalisation is not shown, and the two listed estimates of the Ceuta crossing differ by between 12,000 and 22,000 people.

ASSESSMENT • LOW CONFIDENCE

The evidence read supports an accident-prone border before it supports a state that holds a lever: the only official finding is negligence, and the joint letter shows that EU governments fear instrumentalisation, not that it happened at Ceuta this summer. The political effect is nonetheless real, since one surge moved most member states to emergency demands and reimposed checks inside Schengen within days, so a sudden crossing that a neighbour tolerates remains a risk to watch, though whether it drives instability faster than the flows is not measured. Confidence is low because the negligence finding rests on the Council on Foreign Relations alone, the earlier episodes were not read and the two estimates of scale differ widely.

SECTION 03 • ASSESSMENT

Terrorism: a young pool of suspects and low-technology methods

Europol reported 45 terrorist attacks in 10 Member States in 2025, of which 22 were completed, 20 foiled and 3 failed, and 486 arrests for terrorism-related offences in 21 Member States, 71% of them for jihadism-related offences.⁸

Europol reported that 130 of the terrorism suspects arrested in the EU in 2025, across all ideologies, were aged 18 or younger, the youngest 12, and that jihadist attacks caused five deaths and 81 injuries while a right-wing attack caused one death.⁸

On 25 July 2026 a van was driven into crowds at Berlin's Pride celebration, killing one person and injuring 29, and ACLED notes that vehicle rammings and stabbings have become the dominant methods of Islamist attacks in Europe.⁹

Al Jazeera reported that the Berlin suspect, a 21-year-old German citizen with Lebanese roots known to the authorities for Islamist radicalisation and a previous conviction after a failed attempt to join the Islamic State group, was shot dead by police on 26 July 2026 after running at officers with a bladed weapon.¹⁰

UNKNOWN: the age profile of jihadist suspects alone was not read, so whether jihadist terrorism is getting younger is not shown, and no anti-migrant or far-right mobilisation after the Berlin attack was found in the sources read.

ASSESSMENT • MODERATE CONFIDENCE

The terrorism threat is carried by a young pool of suspects and simple weapons, which makes it harder to see before an attack even when its capability stays low, but the record read does not show jihadist attacks setting off reprisal disorder: the one jihadist attack examined, Berlin, has no reprisal on the record. The counts rest on the listed Europol report and the method trend on ACLED, with the Berlin attack corroborated by a second listed outlet.

SECTION 04 • ASSESSMENT

Disorder recurs in two established strands, with vigilantism emerging

Al Jazeera reported that nearly 400 people were arrested in the week after rioting began in Southport in the summer of 2024, driven by false claims about the background of the suspect in the killings of three girls on 29 July 2024, with disorder spreading to towns including Darlington and Plymouth and to Belfast.¹¹

The Associated Press reported that on 23 November 2023 up to 500 people rioted in central Dublin after rumours spread that a foreign national was behind the stabbing of three children outside a school, looting shops and setting fire to vehicles, and that police arrested 34 people overnight.²⁸

The Telegraph reported that on 16 December 2023 fire destroyed the Ross Lake House hotel in County Galway, which was due to house 70 asylum seekers, hours after an anti-migrant protest outside it.³⁰

The Hope and Courage Collective counted 38 arson incidents linked to asylum accommodation in Ireland since 2018, rising from 10 in 2023 to a peak of 19 in 2024 and falling to four in 2025, with 82% at empty buildings or properties rumoured to be intended as accommodation.³¹

Al Jazeera reported a third straight night of rioting in Northern Ireland on 11 and 12 June 2025, centred on Ballymena and spreading to Larne, Newtownabbey and Coleraine, with at least 32 police officers injured, homes and cars of minority families attacked, and police describing the violence as clearly racially motivated.¹²

France 24 reported three successive nights of anti-migrant unrest in Torre Pacheco in Spain from 11 to 13 July 2025, after the beating of a 68-year-old man, with online calls by a group named Deport Them Now for attacks on people of North African origin and about 80 participants identified, most of them not from the town.¹³

Al Jazeera reported that Irish police arrested 23 people on the second night of anti-immigration disorder at the Citywest Hotel near Dublin on 22 October 2025, after six arrests the night before, with two officers taken to hospital, following the arrest of a man accused of sexually assaulting a ten-year-old girl.²⁹

After a stabbing in north Belfast, rioters in June 2026 set fire to homes they believed housed immigrants, torched a bus and attacked police; more than two dozen people were left homeless, and the chief constable put 200 more officers on the streets.¹⁴

Al Jazeera reported that the Belfast stabbing took place on 8 June 2026, that the suspect was a 30-year-old Sudanese refugee, that footage of the stabbing spread on social media with calls to protest, and that in Southampton the week before, protests at a hotel housing asylum seekers followed the killing of a student by a British Sikh man, not a migrant.¹⁵

The Crown Prosecution Service reported that a planned protest in Southampton on 2 June 2026 escalated into violent disorder on that day in which police officers were injured, and that 13 men were given custodial sentences.¹⁶

Al Jazeera reported that on 20 September 2025 thousands joined an anti-asylum protest in The Hague, where some threw bottles and rocks at police, a police car was set on fire and police used water cannon, about a month before national elections.¹⁷

On 19 September 2026 about 500 far-right protesters clashed with riot police in The Hague at a rally against asylum policy organised by the group We Are The People; police used water cannon and made 24 arrests, and Prime Minister Rob Jetten said the demonstrators deliberately sought confrontation.¹⁸

The Associated Press reported on 14 January 2026 that France banned 10 members of a British group from its territory after the Interior Ministry said they had travelled to northern France to hunt for and destroy small boats used to cross the Channel, calling their activities a potential threat to public order.¹⁹

UNKNOWN: the scale of the disorder in Glasgow and elsewhere in Scotland in June 2026 was not confirmed against a listed source, no formal count of anti-migrant riots over time was read, and no counter-mobilisation or armed self-defence by targeted migrant or minority communities was found in the sources read.

ASSESSMENT • LOW CONFIDENCE

Multi-day anti-migrant disorder recurs at a high level rather than as isolated shocks, in at least one country each year since the Southport killings, and it follows the same sequence of a trigger crime, online amplification and attacks on homes and police, but the Irish arson count, the one series of this kind read, peaked and then fell. The triggers read are ordinary violent crimes and false or perceived claims about the attacker, including a case that did not involve a migrant, so the link to jihadist terrorism is at most a hypothesis that perceived attacker identity drives reprisal disorder. Vigilantism is an emerging strand to watch rather than the most likely path to clashes, since the one case read shows the state stepping in early and a clash between civilian groups would need a second organised side that the record does not show. Confidence is low because this record is built from wire reporting rather than a rate series, the vigilante strand rests on one Associated Press report, the Irish arson count and the Southampton source are off the list and the rally in The Hague this year rests on one listed outlet.

SECTION 05 • ASSESSMENT

Where violence is already sustained: Sweden, France and the limits of German crime data

Reuters reported that shootings in Sweden fell to 147 in 2025 from 390 in 2022 and by 49% from 2024, while deaths from shootings stayed at 43, that police count about 17,500 active gang members, and that the justice minister said Sweden still had levels of violence no decent society can accept.²⁰

France 24 reported that France had six nights of riots after a police officer shot a 17-year-old in Nanterre on 27 June 2023, with more than 3,000 people detained, more than 45,000 police officers mobilised and 99 town halls attacked.²¹

France 24 reported that in 2005 the deaths of two young men fleeing police in Clichy-sous-Bois set off three weeks of riots across France, with almost 3,000 people arrested, thousands of vehicles set on fire and a state of emergency declared.³²

The German federal government reported that violent crime cases fell 2.3% in 2025, that non-German suspects made up 42.9% of violent crime suspects, and that immigrant suspects fell 7.2%.²²

German police recorded 5.5 million offences in 2025, down 5.6%, while homicide and related offences rose 6.5% to 2,450 and sexual offences rose 8.5% to 14,500.²³

UNKNOWN: the non-German suspect share was not read against age, sex and residence status, and the German Federal Statistical Office series that could anchor it on a listed source was not read for this draft.

ASSESSMENT • LOW CONFIDENCE

The cases closest to sustained collective violence in Western Europe are Swedish gang conflict and the French suburban riots against the police, which recur across two decades, and neither is anti-migrant disorder. The same figures also show containment working: Swedish shootings fell by more than half in three years under police pressure, and each French episode was brought under control within weeks, so these cases show where state capacity is tested rather than a state losing control. German aggregate crime figures answer a narrower question and matter to this risk mainly through how single crimes by foreign suspects are perceived and politicised. Reuters and France 24 are listed, while every German crime figure here rests on sources off the list.

SECTION 06 • ASSESSMENT

The trajectory: elevated and persistent, weighed against falling series

Europol reported that right-wing terrorism accounted for one death in the EU in 2025.⁸

Far-right extremist offences in Germany fell to 36,951 in 2025 from 42,788 in 2024, with 1,395 violent offences.²⁴

Exit polls reported on 21 September 2026 gave the Alternative for Germany 37% of the vote in the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state election, and Chancellor Merz called the outcome a disaster.²⁶

David Betz of King's College London argued in Military Strategy Magazine in 2023 that civil war is likely to dominate the military and strategic affairs of the West in the coming years, contrary to the usual expectations of writing on future war.²⁷

UNKNOWN: no series of politically motivated or intercommunal violence over time across Western Europe was read, and the long-run historical record of anti-migrant and urban disorder that would give recurrence a baseline was not read, so whether the risk is rising, flat or falling is not measured.

UNKNOWN: trust in institutions, housing and fiscal stress, and police capacity per head were not read for the countries where tension is highest, and support for anti-migration parties in the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and the Netherlands was not read from a listed source.

ASSESSMENT • LOW CONFIDENCE

The risk is elevated and persistent rather than rising: anti-migrant disorder recurs each year, but the measured series read here mostly fall, from asylum applications, irregular crossings and small boats to Swedish shootings, German far-right offences, right-wing terrorism deaths and Irish arson attacks, and recurrence each year fits a stable high risk as well as a rising one. On that reading, repeated multi-day unrest in at least one country each year is likely, localised civil war like skirmishes in the highest-tension towns are remote to unlikely within three years, since the record holds no organised armed clash between civilian groups and no counter-mobilisation, and sustained national civil conflict is remote on this horizon; the civil conflict thesis is one scholar's lens, not a finding of this note. Political drivers such as anti-migration party strength could raise the risk, but the electoral figure and the thesis read here rest on sources off the list. The flashpoints where tension is highest are Northern Ireland, Dublin and Irish towns with asylum housing, English towns with asylum housing, the Murcia region and the Ceuta border in Spain, The Hague, the Channel coast of northern France and the French suburbs. Confidence is low because the grading rests on a recurrence record without a baseline, and the drivers that point up rest on sources off the firm's list.

SECTION 07 • DECISION

Decision

Decision	Owner	Trigger	Pre-authorised action
Adjust duty of care for staff in flashpoint cities	Corporate security lead	A violent crime with a foreign or migrant suspect, or false claims about an attacker's identity, trends nationally in a country where you operate, or a rally against asylum policy is announced in a city where you operate	Move staff travel and events away from protest sites and asylum housing for the following days and brief staff from migrant and minority backgrounds
Keep protection at public events	Event security owner	A national terror threat level rises, or a vehicle or knife attack occurs in the country	Add vehicle barriers and bag checks at public gatherings and watch for protest calls in the days after an attack
Plan for sudden border checks inside Schengen	Logistics and travel lead	A mass crossing at an external EU border, or a member state announces the reintroduction of internal border controls	Build extra time into road freight and staff travel across the affected internal borders and confirm alternative routings
Reprice local operating risk in the highest-tension towns	Investment risk committee	Multi-day disorder in the same town twice within a year, a vigilante group clashes with police or with migrants, or internal border controls stay in place across several member states	Reopen this assessment, review exposure in the affected towns and ask for a revised note

SECTION 08 • OUTLOOK

Outlook

Baseline. The risk stays elevated and persistent: multi-day anti-migrant disorder recurs in at least one country, most likely in the summer and after a trigger crime, and police contain each episode within days; rallies against asylum policy turn violent from time to time, vigilante groups stay small and are policed, arson against asylum housing stays below its earlier peak, and occasional border surges keep migration at the top of national politics.

Deterioration. A highly publicised crime by a migrant suspect, a mass-casualty attack or a second mass crossing at Ceuta or Melilla sets off simultaneous riots in several countries; vigilante groups attack asylum housing, targeted communities organise to defend themselves, and clashes between organised civilian groups last several days in one or more towns, with police overstretched and internal border controls extended.

Stabilization. Falling arrivals, cooperation with Morocco, swift prosecution of rioters, arsonists and vigilantes and visible enforcement lower the political temperature; internal border checks are lifted, rallies shrink and the online amplification of single crimes loses its reach.

Claim C-1. Violent disorder described as anti-migrant, anti-immigrant or directed against asylum seekers or their accommodation takes place on at least two consecutive nights in a single town or city in the United Kingdom, Ireland or an EU Member State between 2026-09-29 and 2026-12-26. Probability 0.40. Resolves on 2026-12-27 from Reuters: YES if Reuters reports, in the window, violent disorder in one town or city on at least two consecutive nights that Reuters or the police describe as anti-migrant, anti-immigrant or directed against asylum seekers or their accommodation; NO otherwise. Horizon 90 days. Multi-day episodes have recurred every year since the summer of 2024, and the Citywest disorder of October 2025 shows that the autumn quarter is not immune, but most episodes read here fell in the summer months, so this quarter sits a little below even odds. This is the author's judgment, not a modelled figure, raised from the previous draft because the Irish record adds an autumn case.

Claim C-2. Fewer than 25,000 people are recorded arriving in the UK by small boat in the calendar year 2026 up to and including 26 December 2026. Probability 0.55. Resolves on 2026-12-27 from UK government open data: YES if the sum of daily small boat arrivals from 1 January to 26 December 2026 in the UK government's published small boat data, read on the resolution date, is below 25,000; NO otherwise. Horizon 90 days. The year-to-date total from an unlisted tracker and the latest week from the government series put this threshold within reach of the autumn run rate, so it is close to even, with a small lean to YES as autumn weather usually cuts crossings. The threshold replaces the easier one of an earlier draft, which the year-to-date total had already made near certain.

Claim C-3. A completed attack that national authorities describe as Islamist or jihadist terrorism kills at least one person in an EU Member State or the UK between 2026-09-29 and 2026-12-26. Probability 0.50. Resolves on 2026-12-27 from Reuters: YES if Reuters reports such an attack in the window, with a prosecutor, interior ministry or police force describing it as Islamist or jihadist terrorism; NO otherwise. Horizon 90 days. Fatal jihadist attacks in Europe have occurred several times a year in recent years, which puts a single quarter near even odds. This is the author's judgment, not a modelled figure.

Indicators.

- A violent crime or attack trending nationally within a day, with false or unverified claims about the attacker, followed by calls to protest at a named hotel, street or mosque
- Riots in the same town on consecutive nights, or in several towns of one country within a week
- Arson or attempted arson at buildings rumoured to house asylum seekers, in Ireland or elsewhere
- Vigilante groups patrolling for migrants, attacking boats or housing, or clashing with police
- Organised self-defence or counter-mobilisation by targeted migrant or minority communities
- Organised far-right rallies against asylum policy announced in capital cities

- Anti-migrant or far-right mobilisation in the days after a jihadist attack
- Arrests of minors for terrorism offences or for rioting
- Changes to the official terror threat level in Germany, France, the Netherlands or the UK
- Signs of a new mass crossing at Ceuta or Melilla, or of a neighbouring state easing its own border enforcement
- Member states reintroducing or extending internal border controls inside Schengen
- Anti-migration parties winning or leading in national or state elections

SECTION 09 • SCORECARD

Scorecard

No earlier firm claim is resolved or advanced by this draft.

SECTION 10 • WHAT IS NOT KNOWN

Unknowns

- UNKNOWN: a formal count of anti-migrant riots, violent rallies and vigilante incidents over time across Western Europe, and the long-run historical record of such disorder, needed to measure whether the risk is rising, flat or falling.
- UNKNOWN: the UK's cumulative small boat arrivals for 2026 from the government's own time series; this degrades the base of Claim C-2.
- UNKNOWN: whether the Berlin attack of July 2026 was followed by anti-migrant or far-right mobilisation in Germany, and the age profile of jihadist suspects alone.
- UNKNOWN: the earlier episodes of state instrumentalisation at Ceuta and on the Belarus border, not read from a listed source.
- UNKNOWN: the scale of the Scottish disorder of June 2026, not confirmed against a listed source.
- UNKNOWN: any counter-mobilisation or organised self-defence by targeted communities.
- UNKNOWN: the German non-German suspect share read against age, sex and residence status, and the German Federal Statistical Office series that could anchor it.
- UNKNOWN: trust in institutions, housing and fiscal stress, police capacity and support for anti-migration parties in the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and the Netherlands.
- UNKNOWN: how many people who entered Ceuta claimed asylum, and how long the internal border measures taken after Ceuta will last.

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